The ABCs of leftist politics are rooted in an analysis of capital. Even if the European left—which tries to pass off identity politics as leftism—and those who seek to keep capitalism alive by cloaking its spirit in Islamic or nationalist garb through right-wing slogans refuse to accept it, and even if it does not sit well with them, capital’s place in human history and its impact on human nature form the fundamental starting point of the leftist political stance. The labor-capital contradiction forms the backbone of all social systems and political analyses. The state, too, shapes its fundamental policies in the direction of whichever side holds the upper hand in the labor-capital competition. For this reason, the primary threat identified by the leftist and socialist tradition is not state-driven but capital-centered. When fundamental state policies are encircled and brought under the control of capital, government policies are, of course, subject to criticism in the interest of the common good and the interests of the oppressed classes. Capital’s role in the struggle for freedom and equality is expressed very clearly. Human alienation and the restriction of freedom are linked to the encroachment of capital. Similarly, the primary obstacle to the struggle for equality is defined as the unjust accumulation of capital.For this reason, property has been deemed theft by Christian socialist thinkers, and Abu Dhar was driven into the desert for this very reason. State and government policies are shaped by the stance they adopt in the face of this struggle for freedom and equality. Government policies that protect and promote society’s freedom in the face of capital embody a commitment to social justice. Similarly, the distortions in income distribution and the structural, rigid chasm between social classes are linked to the welfare state’s sensitivity to issues of equality. In recent years, since virtually every concept in Turkey has been addressed through the lens of identity debates, the concepts of equality and freedom have also begun to be interpreted solely in terms of ethnic identity and religious groups. Undoubtedly, the equality and freedom of identities are not issues to be taken lightly or relegated to a position of insignificance. However, engaging in identity fetishism while ignoring capital-driven threats and risks leads leftist politics to self-negation. This is the greatest danger facing Kurdish and Alevi politics. In particular, discourses and political solutions centered on minority rights—originating in Europe—have pushed the “prescription” for solutions for marginalized and discriminated-against identities toward anti-state positions. However, neither does the relationship between the state and capital in Turkey share characteristics similar to the emergence of nation-states in Europe, nor can the history of social struggles in Anatolia be analyzed within this context. In this regard, the efforts and endeavors during the final period of the Ottoman Empire to prevent capital from serving as a tool of external aggression are significant. For this reason, minority capital acting as a subcontractor for the Duyun-u Umumiye was targeted. The fact that Jewish, Greek, and Armenian merchants operated as agents of the Debt Administration—or, in the words of Dr. Kıvılcımlı, ’usurious merchants“—has, viewed from today’s perspective, been interpreted as anti-minority sentiment. Similarly, in the early years of the Republic, efforts to build domestic national capital were also sabotaged in a similar manner. The producers, who were the focus of the First Economic Congress, were replaced by Western-backed capital monopolies that clung to the state like leeches and rapidly amassed wealth. This is the reason why capital in our country has no concern for or demand for the free market, competition, or democracy. The media hegemony and political manipulation that steer government policies in favor of capital must also be questioned in this context. It is a clear fact that the efforts to bring the culturally marginalized groups—excluded during the founding processes of the Democratic Party, the Motherland Party, and today’s ruling party—into the political center and decision-making processes are ongoing. Operations by capital to encircle politics and reduce the struggle for democracy to representative democracy or liberal democracy must not be overlooked. The struggle of marginalized cultural and identity groups to exist and survive—and their feeling compelled to express themselves through right-wing parties—has pushed the CHP into the position of a party of the bureaucracy. Just as there are growing pains associated with changes in global and regional politics, the search for structural change—which is inevitable in Turkey’s domestic politics—is of the utmost importance in this regard. The Turkish left will not be able to return to its mission until it breaks free from the 1990s vision of democratization—one built on globalization, identity construction based on micro-nationalism, and subsequently, the clash of identities. Western-centric leftist interpretations that fuel micro-nationalism are at a new crossroads. A perspective that does not disregard identities or cultural differences, but rather synthesizes their self-development and preservation with the greater good of the whole and the common interests of society and the country, is the most challenging test facing the left today. For a left that fuels conflict and pits identities against one another, capital may even appear to be an ally. In this sense, the crossroads facing Kurdish politics applies equally to the Turkish left. Consequently, the Turkish left faces a fundamental choice. It must either interpret the state and society by viewing capital’s corrupting and decaying relationships as a refuge, or carefully analyze capital’s rapidly shifting maneuvers to chart a new course for itself. Do the quests of the interest groups entrenched within today’s ruling politics regarding the post-Erdoğan era truly stem from a quest for democracy, as is often assumed, or do they arise from an effort to continue their habits of unjust and easy profiteering—even under the banners of other parties if necessary? Without making this distinction in a straightforward and sound manner, neither an accurate reading of the ruling power nor a coherent opposition strategy can be constructed. Despite the Istanbul Municipal Elections and the supposed change in the ruling party, how have the unchanging centers of capital ensured continuity in their dominance over municipal tenders? This is the aspect of the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality (İBB) case that requires the most careful scrutiny. To personalize the issue and reduce it solely to party competition is to obscure the reality of contractor capital. Capital, true to its nature, ”changes horses midstream.“ The CHP’s quest for change, which has turned into a ”wind of lies,“ must be addressed from this perspective. Kılıçdaroğlu’s speech at the 37th Party Congress in 2020 laid out the parameters of the change needed by the country and society. The quest for domestic and national change—which is both essential for preserving the Republic’s achievements and inevitable as we enter the second century—has been sabotaged and diverted from its goal, as if it were merely a matter of replacing individuals. The ”Six-Party Table“ initiative, intended to appeal to different segments of society, has been reduced to a stepping stone, used to court parasitic capital and facilitate the injection of right-wing political maladies into the party. By allowing mafia-like elements—so corrupt they could not even find a place in right-wing parties—to take the stage in recent times, particularly the most fanatical İmamoğlu-Özel, is an attempt to equate this with the social gain of the Felicity Party’s base supporting an Alevi candidate in the 2023 elections—a clear diversion of the real issue. Today, the CHP’s struggle for purification is not, as is often assumed, merely an internal power struggle within the party. A purification process beginning within the CHP could, after some time, affect all parties—including the ruling party—triggering a domino effect and potentially leading to a quest for political restructuring. If you view society and the national interest as the center of gravity in politics, you must set aside both party fanaticism and the cult of the individual, and address capital’s recent attempts to switch sides with fairness. The capital relations that encircle the state and corrupt politics are, for this reason, a matter of survival and security—and thus also a matter of independence and, consequently, democracy. I do not mean to reduce democracy to representative democracy and internalize it with all its corruption. Undoubtedly, a true people’s democracy requires standing up against every form of covert or overt encroachment directed against it. To feign sensitivity toward authoritarian regimes while attempting to present soft and covert capital encirclement as a recipe for salvation is a betrayal of all the left’s principles. Doing this in the name of Kurdishness or Alevism only makes this betrayal ”twice as bad.“ Kurdish political actors, standing on their heads in the face of the irresistible power of money, have resorted to every kind of scheme to divert mainstream Kurdish politics from its goal and have entrenched themselves behind the pretext of victimhood. If Öcalan can muster the strength to break this siege through his new political discourse and quest, the HDP and DEM tradition will be reshaped accordingly. Öcalan’s true rivals, therefore, are not the new democratic nationalism espoused by Bahçeli and the MHP, but rather Kurdish nationalism itself, which has become deeply intertwined with capital. Similarly, the Alevis” sense of having been excluded from power for a long time and their habit of surviving by keeping a low profile are being put to a difficult test by Kılıçdaroğlu. Had the critical threshold been crossed in the 2023 elections and the opportunity to take power been seized, a completely different picture might have emerged. However, if the social consensus—which is of great sociological value and may have emerged out of necessity due to the 50+1 system—had been viewed as an achievement and preserved, subsequent political processes might have unfolded differently. Individuals who appeared to be aligned with Kılıçdaroğlu but whose interests devolved into a “bet on the winning horse” reflex—those who succumbed to personal ambition and greed, becoming captive to public contracts and hotel rooms—have influenced the fate of the party that left its mark on the founding of the Republic. Leaders lacking a serious understanding of social opposition turned an opposition built solely on anti-Erdoğan sentiment into a basis for alliance under the guise of “leftism,” thereby sabotaging the possibility of healthy change. For this reason, the convergence of circles that “can’t get enough” of the Justice and Development Party’s resources—and who play the opposition card once removed from power—with those who have turned the resources of the Istanbul Municipality into an effort to redesign the center of politics must be closely monitored. Those who believe they can conceal the adventures of capital by organizing troll campaigns on social media and financing them at low cost may not understand the searing reality and the transformative power of history. For 14 centuries, Kerbala has continued to serve as a test of humanity’s conscience—much like Gaza today—despite the hegemony of every form of tyranny and oppression. Those who, in exchange for a few pennies on social media, carry out campaigns of abuse and lynching with the help of fake accounts and professional software have, of course, successfully carried out their perception operation. However, they will not be able to go beyond the point where “the rich man’s wealth tires the poor man’s tongue.” Those who turn a blind eye to the fact that İmamoğlu’s actions—dating back to his time at the Beylikdüzü Municipality—are being monitored and tracked can continue to console themselves with a romanticized view of the “state,” the judiciary, and the security bureaucracy. “Don’t the ruling party’s municipalities steal too?” —those who consider it a feat to whitewash “our thieves” with this fantasy may use it as a side dish for the convergence of the Alevi community with capital, or as the icing on the cake for future electoral alliances with the liberal wing of Kurdish politics. Just as liberal policies on a global scale have fanned the flames of racist, xenophobic, Islamophobic, and right-wing nationalism around the world like a “flash in the pan” and inflated them like a “balloon,” this wave in Turkey will also subside in short order. The Left will shake off its hesitation and turn inward; guided by patriotism and the true will of the people, it will lead the way toward the Turkey of tomorrow and the regional transformation movement. Even those eager to sacrifice this to debates over Ottomanism and the caliphate will not be able to stop it.
Türkçe
English
Deutsch