There is an oft-repeated claim: “Islam is really Arab culture.” One step beyond this claim comes a harsher generalization: “Arab culture is reactionary; therefore Islam is the source of reaction.”
This approach, which at first glance seems like a shortcut explanation, actually involves serious reductions at the historical, sociological and cultural levels. However, it is not just an error of understanding; this discourse is a discourse that has ideological functions and produces class and political consequences.
From a reasonable perspective, the main problem with such generalizations is that they reduce historical and material reality to cultural essentialism. That is, instead of the modes of production, class contradictions and political power structures that determine social relations, a vague and often ideological category called “culture” is invoked. Thus the real causes are rendered invisible.
In the Turkish context, we see this discourse systematically repeated, especially in the harsh and exclusionary versions of Turkish nationalism and in openly racist circles. This repetition is not accidental. Because this reduction serves a specific political purpose: To obscure class contradictions and direct social discontent towards the wrong target.
First of all, a clear distinction must be made: Islam is a religion, while Arabism is a culture and ethnicity. Although religions bear the traces of the geography in which they originated, they transform through interaction with different societies in the course of history. In this sense, Islam has also become universalized and transformed into a belief system that is experienced in different ways in different geographies. From Iran to Indonesia, from Anatolia to Africa, it is clear that Islam is too plural to be reduced to a singular cultural form.
But the critical point for a reasonable analysis is this:
It is not the religions and cultures themselves, but how they are used, under which historical conditions and within which class relations.
“A statement like ”Arab culture is reactionary“ is not only scientifically erroneous; it is also ideologically functional. Because this discourse looks for the cause of problems such as social backwardness, authoritarianism or democratic deficiencies not in economic and political structures, but in an ”other culture". Thus, the responsibility of the ruling classes becomes invisible.
At this point, it is necessary to take a closer look at how certain strands of Turkish nationalism use this discourse. This use has two main purposes:
First, to build an artificial cultural superiority.
Identifying Islam with Arab culture and branding it as “reactionary” is an easy way to position Turkish identity as “progressive” and “modern” in contrast. This is an ideological mirror that hides class reality: Concrete problems such as labor exploitation, income inequality and unemployment are not discussed; instead, the discourse of cultural superiority is put into circulation.
Second, to neutralize class-based criticism.
When vague concepts such as “Arabization” are cited as the source of social problems instead of capitalist relations of production, state policies or global inequalities, the anger of the working classes is directed at the wrong targets. Thus the ruling order remains unquestioned.
This mechanism points to a phenomenon often discussed in socialist literature: false consciousness. People may adopt discourses that are contrary to their material interests because they cannot see the real causes. When it is said that “Arab culture is the problem”, the real causes of unemployment, poverty or lack of freedom become invisible.
Yet history clearly shows us this:
Authoritarianism is not specific to a particular religion, nor is backwardness the destiny of a particular culture. Likewise, freedom and progress do not belong to a single culture. They are the product of social struggles, class balances and political processes.
The criticism of Islam as “reactionary” needs to be rethought in this context. What is decisive here is not religion itself, but the classes by which it is interpreted and for what purposes. Throughout history, religion has both been used as a tool of oppression and inspired the resistance of the oppressed. This dual character stems not from the essence of religion but from its social context.
Therefore, both “Islam is reactionary” and “Arab culture is reactionary” are inadequate and misleading from the point of view of a reasonable analysis. Such generalizations hide the real contradictions and create an ideological smokescreen.
It should be underlined here again:
The persistent repetition of this discourse by some nationalist and racist circles in Turkey points to a conscious or semi-conscious ideological function rather than a “fallacy”. This function is to divide society not on the basis of class, but on the basis of cultural distinctions and thus ensure the continuation of the existing order.
Consequently, reducing Islam to Arab culture and Arab culture to a single adjective such as “backwardness” is not only an analytical error but also a political choice. A reasonable perspective rejects such reductions and turns its attention to the question:
“Who benefits from this discourse?”
If a discourse favors the rulers rather than the oppressed, it is necessary to stop and think again.
Maybe the real issue is this:
To condemn a religion or culture, or to understand the social relations, class structures and power mechanisms shaped within that religion and culture?
The answer to this question will determine how we view not only Islam and Arabism, but also the struggle for justice, equality and freedom.