Last October, MHP Chairman Devlet Bahçeli’s speech—in which he addressed Abdullah Öcalan, the founding leader of the PKK who has been held at İmralı Prison for 26 years, suggesting that he could be granted the right to hope if he disbanded the organization—generated great excitement.
How could this not generate excitement? The long-serving chairman of a party that is the stronghold of nationalism in Turkey not only spoke of an amnesty for the first time, but also said that, if necessary, Öcalan could even make this appeal by coming to the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and addressing the DEM Group Meeting.
Initial reactions suggested that Bahçeli’s statement could not have been made independently of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. According to reports, the ruling party intended to use the MHP to soften reactions among nationalist circles and then launch a new process of rapprochement.
However, the process did not unfold as expected.
First and foremost, even though Bahçeli’s statement was well-received by the AK Party’s Kurdish-origin lawmakers or prominent figures, it did not garner much support across the entire party.
While a softening was expected in the process that began with Bahçeli’s statement, on the contrary, there has been no decrease in the number of operations targeting DEM-affiliated municipalities and related organizations.
Finally, a large number of people were detained during a raid on the Democratic Congress of the Peoples (HDK), an organization with DEM at its core.
Is the goal of these operations to sever DEM’s ties with the left?
There are differing views on the reasons behind these operations. According to the first view, while the government is trying, on the one hand, to persuade the organization to lay down its arms through talks with Öcalan, on the other hand, it is seeking to force an agreement by increasing pressure.
In addition, there is an allegation—which is by no means far-fetched—that by targeting individuals who represent the more left-wing faction of DEM in these operations, the aim is to force the party to end its cooperation, particularly with the CHP and other left-wing parties. A DEM that distances itself from the opposition—or at the very least remains neutral in the rivalry between the ruling party and the CHP—would, of course, serve Erdoğan’s interests. Erdoğan may well take steps in this direction to ensure that happens.
He could lose the weapon of polarization
While I do not take either claim lightly, I believe there are three reasons why Erdoğan, unlike in the past, does not want a new peace process. These are, in order:
1. Erdoğan has been winning elections through polarization for the past 10 years. In this context, his rhetoric labeling the opposition as “terrorists” and accusing them of “collaborating with terrorists” is his strongest argument. A peace process would cause him to lose this weapon.
2. The rhetoric of “We are fighting terrorism” gives Erdoğan the opportunity to implement security-oriented policies. These policies are particularly effective among certain segments of the public. News of a surprise operation can instantly shift the agenda. A story of heroism that emerges, a wave of anger, or new weapons systems used in the fight against terrorism all provide the government with an opportunity for propaganda.
3. Erdoğan manages to win votes—in part through religious arguments—from Islamists or Kurds who identify as right-wing. Although they occasionally voice complaints, this segment does not take much issue with Erdoğan’s hardline rhetoric. The segment from which Erdoğan fails to draw votes consists of Kurds who vote for DEM. People in this segment come from more secular, left-leaning circles in terms of their lifestyle. Even if there were a peace process, there is no guarantee they would direct their votes toward the AK Party. Furthermore, it appears that Kurdish voters who have lived in major cities for many years and have become urbanized are acting more independently due to the impact of economic problems and are leaning toward the opposition. This trend was evident in the most recent local elections as well.
He may think that it won't benefit Erdoğan
For these three fundamental reasons, I believe that Erdoğan does not think the peace process will yield any significant political benefit for him. For these reasons, not only will it be difficult to implement a potential peace process, but even if it were to begin, sustaining it would not be easy either.