The defense industry debate in Turkey is no longer a technical issue, but has become a part of the political narrative. According to some approaches, the strongest claim of this narrative can be summarized as follows: “Pre-AKP poverty, post-AKP great leap forward.” A story so clear, so sharp and so unproblematic... This is precisely why it needs to be scrutinized carefully. Because history does not progress in such smooth lines.
In order to present something as a “miracle”, according to some interpretations, it can be argued that what preceded it should be left in the background. According to some evaluations, what is being done today can be handled in this way. According to some interpretations, Turkey's defence industry history is either romanticized and neutralized, or completely ignored and rendered invisible.
Yet, this is a country that tried to produce even in the first years of the Republic, even in the face of poverty. Nuri Demirağ can be considered not only as an entrepreneur but also as a representative of the idea of strategic independence. It is known that he established an airplane factory with his own capital, produced and even aimed to export. Vecihi Hürkuş, on the other hand, is remembered in historical records for designing and flying his own airplane in the face of impossibilities.
These initiatives may not be technically perfect. But technical perfection is not the issue. The point is this: It can be said that this country came up with the idea of “do-it-yourself” at a very early stage.
It can be stated that the same will also manifested itself in maritime and other military fields. It is known that the shipyard culture inherited from the Ottoman Empire was attempted to be modernized during the Republican period. However, according to some evaluations, these efforts failed to transform into a systematic industrial ecosystem.
And why?
This is because there are assessments that Turkey's main problem has never been “not being able to start”, but rather not being able to sustain the processes that have been initiated. After 1950, with its integration into NATO, Turkey is known to have turned towards a model that meets its defense needs through foreign procurement. This preference may have seemed logical, cheaper, faster and safer in the short term.
But in the long run, it can be said to have a severe consequence: addiction.
There are historical evaluations that Demirağ's factory was closed, Hürkuş's efforts were not systematized and the will for domestic production was replaced by imports. According to some interpretations, this situation can be considered not only as an economic choice but also as a strategic retreat.
However, there is a critical point here: it can be said that this pullback does not mean a reset.
Because it can be stated that the main backbone of the defense industry continued to form through the Kırıkkale line in the same period. Founded in 1925 and later institutionalized under the umbrella of the Machinery and Chemical Industry Corporation, the structure is considered to carry Turkey's uninterrupted production memory.
Ammunition production, weapon systems, heavy industry... These are the basis of a country's defense reflex. And it can be stated that this reflex was produced in Kırıkkale for decades.
Why is this fact not being talked about today?
It can be said that the answer to this question may change according to different perspectives. Because if this fact is accepted, the “miracle from scratch” narrative may need to be re-evaluated.
If a country has production capacity since the 1920s, it can be said that it did not start its defense industry from scratch. However, this fact may not always coincide with today's political narrative.
Therefore, it can be argued that memory has become selective.
One could argue that the past is minimized and the present is magnified.
And this is what happens:
The more a country forgets its past, the more it begins to think that every step today is a miracle.
That is why it is necessary to put the first fact clearly:
Turkey did not start its defense industry from scratch.
But he could not ensure continuity.
And it is precisely for this reason that today's progress can be said to appear larger and more “extraordinary” than it actually is.
However, it can be argued that the claim that there is a miracle is open to debate.
There is an unfinished history and an acceleration built on it.
Any analysis without accepting this fact can be evaluated as producing a narrative, not the truth.
THE MOMENT WHEN NECESSITY PRODUCES STATE WISDOM: CYPRUS, THE EMBARGO AND THE TRUE BIRTH OF THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY
It can be said that the real story of the Turkish defense industry began not with a vision document, but with a shock. The name of this shock is 1974. The Cyprus Peace Operation was not only militarily important, but also a strategic breaking point. Because the embargo that immediately followed this operation can be considered as imposing a reality on Turkey that was known in theory but not in practice:
It can be argued that dependency can be interpreted as not only an economic but also a political chain.
It is known that until then, Turkey had been a country that largely outsourced its defense needs. This model seemed sustainable in times of peace. However, in times of crisis, this system collapsed. The country that supplied the weapon could suddenly restrict the use of that weapon.
At this point, it can be said that the defense industry is no longer a choice.
It can be stated that it has become a necessity.
It can be argued that this necessity led to the establishment of a systematic defense ecosystem for the first time in Turkey.
And it can be argued that this ecosystem can be considered the product of a period that is often ignored today.
The institutions established since the mid-1970s are the invisible backbone of today's defense industry:
- ASELSAN (1975)
- TAI
- HAVELSAN
- ROKETSAN
- Presidency of Defense Industry
These institutions can be interpreted as the product of a state reflex, not the charisma of a political leader. Because crises produce structures, not slogans.
However, to understand this period correctly, an important distinction must be made:
This period is not a “success story”.
This period can be considered as an “infrastructure building process”.
Turkey has started to produce, but is still dependent. A model based on licensed production, technology transfer and assembly is dominant. In other words, what was done in this period can be seen as a preparation for independence, rather than direct independence.
This fact is often underestimated. However, it can be argued that this is the most critical phase of the defense industry. This is because no country starts to produce fully independent technology from scratch. First it learns, then it adapts, then it develops.
It can be said that Turkey has done exactly this.
The period between 1980 and 2000 is therefore crucial. During these years:
- Improved engineering capacity
- Institutional structure matured
- Production culture is established
- System integration learned
F-16 production, electronic systems, communication infrastructures... It can be stated that it is difficult to consider any of these as “domestic miracles”, but that they form the basis for today's projects.
A critical question arises here:
If not for this period, would the projects we are talking about today have been possible?
It can be said that the answer could be largely negative.
But this answer may not always fit the narrative of today.
This is why it can be argued that this period was either underestimated or passed by in silence.
However, an evaluation can be made as follows:
Turkey established its defense industry not with a political vision, but under the compulsion of a crisis.
And that crisis belongs to a history far beyond today's narrative.
Therefore, today's capacity can be interpreted not as an overnight leap, but as the accumulation of decades.
But accepting this accumulation requires sharing ownership.
Politics, according to some critics, does not prefer this kind of sharing in most cases.
Therefore, it can be argued that the “miracle” narrative has come into play.
The miracle narrative:
- Does not adequately reflect the process
- He put the past on the back burner
- Makes the result seem bigger than it is
can be evaluated in this direction.
And so a complex history can be reduced to a simpler success story.
However, this simplification may not fully reflect the reality.
The truth is harsher:
It can be said that the defense industry was born in Turkey not as a choice but as a necessity.
And it can be stated that the structure created by this necessity still forms the basis of this system today.
Any analysis that fails to recognize this reality can be incomplete and misleading.
Because the result cannot be read correctly without understanding the process.
And what this process is saying can be summarized as follows:
Turkey did not build its defense industry from scratch.
But he built it through hard work, learning and saving.
VISIBLE LEAP: FROM IHA/SİHA TO KAAN, FROM MİLGEM TO HÜRJET, WHAT IS THE REAL PROGRESS?
It can be argued that the most powerful aspect of the defense industry debate in Turkey is the concrete projects that have emerged in recent years. This is because, for the first time, large masses are seeing “what is being produced”. UAVs, warships, training aircrafts... These are no longer abstract, but visible realities. This naturally generates a strong perception of success.
In the post-2000 period, it can be said that there has been a significant acceleration in the defense industry. This acceleration can be considered as an undeniable fact. Especially in the field of unmanned systems, Turkey has made a remarkable leap forward. UAV and UCAV technologies have become prominent not only in terms of production but also in terms of operational success.
It can be said that this success is no coincidence. This is because Turkey has found a gap in this field where the classical defense industry giants are not concentrated, and has acted quickly. It can be evaluated that it has developed lower-cost, more flexible and operationally effective systems.
But this success needs to be placed in the right context:
It can be stated that this situation can be interpreted as a leap made at the right time, not a beginning.
In the same period, important projects also emerged in the field of aviation:
- HÜRKUŞ
- HÜRJET
- KAAN
It can be stated that these projects show that Turkey has gained not only production but also design capability. In particular, the KAAN project can be considered as a technically complex and long-term initiative.
On the naval side, the most important threshold was MİLGEM. For the first time, Turkey has systematically demonstrated its capacity to design and produce its own warships. This can be interpreted as the result of years of accumulation of shipyard infrastructure and naval culture.
At this point, a critical observation must be made:
These projects did not come out of nowhere.
- Shipyards flourished for decades
- Engineering capacity accumulated over the years
- Institutions have matured for a long time
So it can be said that what we see today is a result.
However, it can be argued that describing this result as a “beginning” may not fully reflect the reality.
Now we come to the more critical part:
Have these projects made Turkey fully independent?
There are evaluations that the answer to this question may be negative.
Because the real determinant in the defense industry is not the visible part of the system, but the invisible core.
The last episode is the most critical:
- the issue of localization
- politics vs state
- final striking closure
Turkey today:
- Can design platform → yes
- The system can integrate → yes
- Can export → yes
But:
- Engine technologies
- Semiconductors
- Critical electronic components
It can be stated that it is difficult to make a definitive assessment that it is fully independent.
It could be argued that this situation should not be considered as a failure, but rather as an incomplete process.
Therefore, it can be stated that the following observation can be made:
Turkey has made a serious leap in the defense industry.
But this leap does not mean full independence.
Any narrative that is constructed without making this distinction can be considered incomplete or exaggerated.
Another important point is this:
These projects have created not only a technical but also a psychological threshold. It is the first time that Turkey has felt the sense of “can-do” so strongly. This is extremely valuable.
However, it can be risky to let this feeling get in the way of reality.
Because saying “we do” is not the same as saying “we are completely independent”.
It can be argued that one of the most important problems in the defense industry today is the confusion between process and outcome.
However, a framework can be drawn as follows:
Turkey has passed an important part of the way.
But the road is not finished.
And it can be argued that the riskiest moment is when you think the road is over.
Because after that point, development may stop, questioning may decrease and the system may have difficulty seeing its own limits.
Therefore, it can be stated that the following conclusion can be drawn:
Yes, Turkey has made a significant leap forward in the defense industry.
But this leap is not a miracle, but an acceleration of accumulation.
And if this acceleration is not read correctly, it could lead to various vulnerabilities in the future.
It is clear that numerical data are important in the defense industry debate. However, it can also be stated that these data can be misleading when taken out of context. The “ localization” rate, which has been frequently mentioned in Turkey in recent years, is presented as a strong indicator of success.
However, it can be said that different evaluations can be made on what this ratio refers to.
The localization rate in the defense industry is not only defined by the amount of production, but also by who produces critical technologies.
It is possible to produce the body of a platform, but the engine that drives it, the software that manages it and the sensors that detect it can be considered as the main determining elements.
As long as foreign dependence continues in areas such as engine technologies, semiconductors, radar systems and advanced materials, it is difficult to talk about full independence.
Therefore, it can be said that the expression “ localization” can be considered as a limited indicator in some respects.
The situation can be summarized as follows:
High localization on paper
Ongoing addiction in reality
This may have political as well as technical implications.
STATE WISDOM OR PARTY NARRATIVE? DEFENSE INDUSTRY'S REAL TEST
It can be said that the defense industry debate is not only technical, but also a matter of governance and signification.
It is clear that this field, by its very nature, requires a long-term and institutional mindset.
In recent years, however, there have been assessments that the defense industry has become a part of the political narrative rather than a technical field.
Presenting each new project as not only an engineering achievement but also a political success can have a powerful short-term impact.
However, in the long run, this may pose some risks.
There is a strong view that what matters in the defense industry is not “government success” but “state continuity”.
The difference between these two approaches can be summarized as follows:
State intelligence:
- Continuous
- Corporate
- Long-term thinker
Party mind:
- Focuses on the short term
- Carries pressure to produce results
- Creates narrative
A disruption in the balance between these two approaches may have negative effects on the system in the long run.
DEFENSE INDUSTRY IS ABOVE POLITICS
The defense industry is not just a propaganda tool to be written on the success list of any political party. It is directly related to a country's sovereignty, deterrence and survival capacity. Therefore, the defense industry can be considered a supra-political state issue by its very nature.
Today, Turkey has come a long way in the defense industry. It can be said that this progress is not the product of a single period, a single government or a single political will, but the result of decades of accumulation. Accepting this fact neither minimizes the present nor exaggerates the past. On the contrary, it forms the basis of a healthy state mind.
The real issue is this:
To claim this space or to play politics over this space?
There are criticisms that some of the discussions on the defense industry are based on superficial and political reflexes rather than technical evaluations. According to some evaluations, this may have a negative impact on the quality of the debate.
In particular, there are criticisms that some discourses deal with such a strategic area with simple metaphors and everyday expressions. Instead of explaining the issue, such approaches simplify it and undermine its seriousness.
There are also comments that such discourses go beyond the right to criticize and produce a superficiality that is incompatible with the gravity of the issue.
Criticism is of course necessary.
But criticism must also have a level, a depth and a responsibility.
Because defense industry:
- Not the subject of everyday politics
- Not a tool for short-term polemics
- It should not be seen as an instrument to win elections
This area:
- Requires long-term planning
- Requires organizational continuity
- They want stability that will not be affected by political changes
It is therefore necessary to set a clear principle:
It can be stated that the defense industry in Turkey should be supported independently of the government.
No matter who is in power:
- Continuation of the right projects
- Preservation of institutional accumulation
- Strategic objectives are not interrupted
should be done to improve the quality of life.
Otherwise, a defense policy that changes direction with every political change could create a vulnerability that a country can ill afford.
This is where true state wisdom comes into play:
Politics can change.
Cadres may change.
Priorities may change.
But it can be stated that the defense reflex should not change.
The bottom line is this:
It is easy to describe the defense industry as a “success story”.
But it is difficult to sustain it as a state policy.
The easy one brings applause.
The difficult thing is to provide security.
What Turkey needs is not applause but continuity.