As the world's energy geopolitics are being reshaped, Turkey often describes itself as an “energy hub”. But let's be clear: any discussion is incomplete if this concept is not filled in. Because being an energy hub is not just about being a country through which pipelines pass.
A true energy hub is a structure that can receive gas and oil from different sources, store them, shape the price formation and, most importantly, resell the energy it receives. In other words, it is not just about “crossing the line”; it is about who controls that line and how this translates into economic power. Therefore, there is a clear reality:
Being a pipeline country is not being an energy hub.
In this equation, Turkey stands exactly between a “corridor” and a “candidate energy center”. Its infrastructure cannot be underestimated.TANAP, TurkStream and the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline have made Turkey an important energy transit country.
But here we need to read the picture correctly. Turkey does not own the energy passing through these lines. Turkey does not set the price either. And its storage capacity is still too limited to claim to be a major energy hub. Therefore, Turkey today is not a “hub” in the full sense of the word; more accurately, it is a regional energy transit country and an emerging actor at the same time.
This is where the Strait of Hormuz comes into play. As long as this strait, one of the most critical arteries of the world energy trade, remains open, Gulf oil and gas reaches the world markets by sea transportation, the cheapest and fastest way.
This creates a twofold picture for Turkey:
- On the one hand, energy costs are falling and it provides economic relief.
- On the other hand, Turkey's value as an alternative route is diminishing and its strategic weight is being limited.
Because there is a fundamental rule in energy geopolitics that has not changed:The value of alternatives emerges in times of crisis.
If the Strait of Hormuz is closed or becomes risky, the balance will change in an instant. The Gulf exit would become more difficult, Europe's energy supply would come under pressure and alternative routes would come back on the agenda. In such a scenario, the lines passing through Turkey would become critical and Turkey would suddenly become a “mandatory actor”. This would significantly increase the possibility of becoming an energy hub.
The paradox is actually quite clear:Turkey's prospects as an energy hub are strongest in times of global crisis.
So why hasn't Turkey achieved this goal yet?
The answer is not political, it is structural.
First of all, Turkey does not have a strong energy trading center or gas exchange that produces international reference prices. There are developed examples of this in Europe, but Turkey is not at that level yet. Storage capacity is insufficient, whereas big energy players drive the market with their stock power. Legal security and transparency are also still question marks for international investors. In addition, resource diversity is limited; the dominance of Russia and Azerbaijan limits Turkey's bargaining power.
In this context, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's oft-voiced goal of becoming an “energy hub” is not just empty rhetoric. On the contrary, it is based on a serious infrastructure and a strong geographical advantage. However, at the point we are at today, the level of realization of this goal lags behind the rhetoric.
The most accurate definition is actually this:
It is a strategic vision, a partially realized reality and an unfinished project.
Turkey today, after all:
- Energy transition country
- A regional power
- But not yet a full-fledged energy hub
The right strategy is clear: In the short term, Turkey should take advantage of cheap energy while Hormuz is open; in the medium term, it should strengthen its storage and trade infrastructure; and in the long term, it should aim to become a price-setting actor.
Because the ultimate truth is clear: Turkey's institutional capacity and economic strength, not geography, will determine whether it will become an energy hub.