President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's remarks at his party's group meeting “CHP has written the history of putschism” This statement cannot be seen as a mere political polemic. It should be seen as a historical characterization directed directly at the founding political will of the Republic of Turkey.
Therefore, this claim should not be evaluated with slogans, but with documents, political practices and historical context.
Looking at the early years of the Republic, the political line represented by the Republican People's Party is quite clear. In government programs, the main objective was to protect the existence, territorial integrity and independence of the state, and foreign policy was based on peace, balance and international legitimacy.
This approach is not based on any coup practice, state-building and the will to institutionalize can be explained. In this respect, the historical role of the CHP is the continuation of a political mind that established the regime and built the basic characteristics of the state.
In democracies, the main determining criterion is the way power changes hands. At this point, the historical practice of the CHP is indisputable. Having lost power in the 1950 elections, the CHP accepted the results and handed over power peacefully. Moreover, during this process, open evaluations were made that a multi-party structure would help the state run its affairs more efficiently.
This picture is incompatible with a putschist political mentality. On the contrary, this is a critical threshold for the establishment of a democratic culture in Turkey.
The post-1960 period is another breaking point where discussions intensified. However, evaluations of this period should be based on concrete texts rather than political discourses. The statements in the coalition protocols clearly reveal the CHP's position. In the protocols “Commitment to the principles of a democratic and secular republic and a common stance against totalitarian tendencies” statements are included in the report.
This approach should not be read as a call for a coup, but as a political reflex to protect the constitutional order.
The political framework put forward under Bülent Ecevit is even more pronounced. The 1974 CHP-MSP coalition protocol explicitly emphasized the rule of law, democratic rights and the secular social rule of law.
In addition, the statements about eliminating the resentments of the past and establishing social peace define the political character of this period. This line is not based on the practice of coups; in search of reconciliation and democratic normalization is related.
In the process of September 12, 1980 in Turkey, it was clearly stated that the legislative and executive powers were taken over by the military authority. This is the classic and undisputed definition of a coup d'état.
What is more important at this point is the political stance in the aftermath of the coup. In the political texts in which the CHP participated in the 1990s, clear goals were set for the liquidation of the legal and institutional legacy of the September 12 period, the strengthening of democratization and the expansion of human rights.
This approach does not embrace the CHP's coup order; that it is positioned on a political line that tries to transcend it shows.
Bülent Ecevit's 1999 government program maintained a similar framework. Adherence to a secular and social state of law, respect for human rights and democratic reconciliation were among the fundamental principles of this period.
These principles are a political reaffirmation of the constitutional character of the Republic.
One of the most striking aspects of the debate concerns the post-2002 period. In this process of reshaping the political system, the CHP's support was decisive in the regulations regarding the lifting of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's political ban, even though it was criticized for paving the way for Erdoğan and the AKP politically.
This is one of the ironies of Turkish politics, given the harsh characterizations voiced today.
In this framework, the generalizing statement that “CHP is a coup plotter” reduces Turkey's multi-layered political history to a one-dimensional reading. However, Turkey's history of coups has been shaped by a combination of many factors such as political crises, social polarization and state-society tensions.
Coups do not occur in a vacuum. They occur in periods when the political system is blocked, social tensions deepen and the institutional structure weakens. Therefore, reducing coups to a single political actor means simplifying historical reality rather than explaining it.
In conclusion, the historical role of the Republican People's Party should be evaluated as a political line that took part in the foundation of this state, enabled the transition to multi-party life and took a position towards democratization in different periods.
So the essence of the debate is this:
This is not a party debate.
It is a question of the historical perspective from which the Republic of Turkey is to be read, and history, after all, is not a matter of slogans; written in documents.