<\/p>\n
The article by \u00d6zg\u00fcr \u00d6zel, the CHP\u2019s chairman who was temporarily suspended from his post, titled \u201cTurkey\u2019s Democratic Crisis Is Becoming a Security Crisis,\u201d published in Newsweek on June 1, 2026, appears at first glance to be an appeal to the international community regarding the issues of democracy, the rule of law, and political competition in Turkey.<\/span><\/p>\n However, upon careful reading of the text, it becomes clear that this is not merely a critique of democracy; rather, it is a political discourse aimed at framing Turkey\u2019s domestic political and legal debates as an issue of international security.<\/span><\/p>\n \u00d6zel\u2019s main argument is as follows:<\/span><\/p>\n The democratic backslide in Turkey is no longer merely an internal matter for Turkey; it is also a matter of concern for NATO, Europe, the Black Sea region, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East, migration management, and energy security.<\/span><\/p>\n This claim is not merely a simple assessment of foreign policy.<\/span><\/p>\n This amounts to bringing Turkey\u2019s domestic politics into the international security agenda.<\/span><\/p>\n In the literature on international relations, such discourse is referred to as \u201csecuritization.\u201d Securitization refers to the framing of ordinary political and legal debates as security threats, thereby shifting them outside the realm of ordinary politics.<\/span><\/p>\n That is exactly what \u00d6zg\u00fcr \u00d6zel has done.<\/span><\/p>\n Political competition in Turkey, judicial proceedings, court rulings, investigations targeting mayors, disputes over CHP conventions, and debates over internal party legitimacy are being portrayed as threats to NATO\u2019s security, Europe\u2019s stability, and the regional order.<\/span><\/p>\n Therefore, the following question is inevitable:<\/span><\/p>\n Is Turkey really facing a security crisis, or is \u00d6zg\u00fcr \u00d6zel\u2019s CHP trying to repackage its own legitimacy crisis using the language of international security?<\/span><\/p>\n In the aftermath of the Cold War, the characterization of domestic political issues in the Balkans, certain countries during the Arab Spring, and various \u201ccolor revolutions\u201d as international security concerns has evolved into discourses that legitimize intervention by external actors. For this reason, securitization is not merely an academic concept but a process capable of producing concrete political consequences.<\/span><\/p>\n To speak of a security crisis in a country, there must be a collapse of state authority, the constitutional order must have effectively ceased to function, a climate of widespread internal conflict must have emerged, the country\u2019s territorial integrity must be under threat, or its foreign policy capacity must have been seriously compromised.<\/span><\/p>\n There are heated political debates in Turkey.<\/span><\/p>\n Judicial decisions are coming under heavy criticism.<\/span><\/p>\n Relations between the ruling party and the opposition are tense.<\/span><\/p>\n There is polarization in society.<\/span><\/p>\n However, the mere existence of these factors does not mean that Turkey is facing a security crisis.<\/span><\/p>\n \u00d6zg\u00fcr \u00d6zel\u2019s article also contains no concrete evidence to suggest that Turkey has failed to fulfill its NATO obligations, lost its role in the Black Sea, completely lost control of migration management, become ineffective in energy security, or seen its foreign policy capacity collapse.<\/span><\/p>\n On the contrary, Turkey remains a key player in the field of foreign policy.<\/span><\/p>\n The country that enforces the Montreux Convention in the Black Sea is Turkey.<\/span><\/p>\n Turkey is one of the few actors capable of engaging with both Kyiv and Moscow in the Russia-Ukraine War.<\/span><\/p>\n Turkey has taken on a central role in the Grain Corridor initiative.<\/span><\/p>\n As NATO\u2019s second-largest military force, it maintains its strategic importance within the alliance.<\/span><\/p>\n Turkey remains an indispensable actor in areas such as Europe\u2019s energy security, migration management, the balance of power in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Caucasus, the Balkans, and the Middle East.<\/span><\/p>\n Consequently, there is a significant disconnect between the picture of \u201cTurkey on the path from democratic collapse to a security crisis\u201d painted by \u00d6zg\u00fcr \u00d6zel and Turkey\u2019s actual foreign policy capacity.<\/span><\/p>\n The most critical paragraph in \u00d6zg\u00fcr \u00d6zel\u2019s article is the assertion that Turkey serves as the gateway to the Black Sea, NATO\u2019s second-largest military power, and a crossroads between Europe, Eurasia, the Middle East, and the Eastern Mediterranean; and that, due to the role it plays in migration, energy, and regional security, the democratic collapse in Turkey will not remain confined within its borders.<\/span><\/p>\n At first glance, this paragraph might seem to acknowledge Turkey\u2019s geopolitical importance.<\/span><\/p>\n However, when read in context, the meaning is different.<\/span><\/p>\n \u00d6zel is using these factors not to highlight Turkey\u2019s strategic importance, but to portray domestic political developments in Turkey as a threat to international security.<\/span><\/p>\n So the message is:<\/span><\/p>\n \u201cIf the current political developments in Turkey continue, the consequences will affect not only Turkey but also NATO, Europe, the Black Sea, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East, energy security, and migration management.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n This language is no longer the language of the traditional opposition.<\/span><\/p>\n This statement is a call directed at Washington, Brussels, NATO circles, and the international media.<\/span><\/p>\n The logical conclusion is also clear:<\/span><\/p>\n If domestic political developments in Turkey threaten international security, it may be considered legitimate for international actors to exert pressure on Turkey\u2019s domestic politics.<\/span><\/p>\n This is where the article\u2019s biggest problem lies.<\/span><\/p>\n The opposition\u2019s role may be to criticize allegations of lawlessness in the country, demand democracy, and defend the rule of law.<\/span><\/p>\n However, portraying a country\u2019s internal political and legal debates as an international security threat is another matter entirely.<\/span><\/p>\n This is perceived as an attempt to lodge complaints against Turkey on the international stage and to construct a narrative conducive to generating external pressure.<\/span><\/p>\n The source of political legitimacy is not Washington, Brussels, Newsweek, or NATO circles.<\/span><\/p>\n The source of political legitimacy is the will of the nation.<\/span><\/p>\n The main shortcoming of \u00d6zg\u00fcr \u00d6zel\u2019s article is that it completely ignores the crisis of legitimacy the CHP is facing internally.<\/span><\/p>\n The article discusses Ekrem \u0130mamo\u011flu, the investigations targeting CHP mayors, the legal proceedings against the CHP leadership, and the ruling of absolute nullity.<\/span><\/p>\n However, the CHP\u2019s 38th Ordinary Congress, the Istanbul Provincial Congress, the 21st Extraordinary Congress, 22nd Extraordinary Congress, YSK decisions, district election committee decisions, applications for full annulment, Article 48 of the CHP Charter, delegate accounts, notary signatures, and criminal proceedings are being kept hidden from Newsweek readers.<\/span><\/p>\n However, the debate is not as simple as \u201cthe ruling party is eliminating the opposition.\u201d.<\/span><\/p>\n The Ankara Chief Public Prosecutor\u2019s Office has conducted an investigation into the CHP\u2019s 38th Ordinary Congress and has filed an indictment.<\/span><\/p>\n The indictment includes evidence such as witness statements, MASAK reports, correspondence from the Supreme Election Board (YSK) and district election boards, institutional correspondence, CD\/DVD examination reports, and a police report.<\/span><\/p>\n This does not in itself mean a conviction.<\/span><\/p>\n However, this indicates that there is not merely political speculation at play, but a serious allegation and a case file that has been the subject of criminal proceedings.<\/span><\/p>\n The indictment also states that the total number of delegates at the 38th Ordinary Congress was 1,366; in the first round, \u00d6zg\u00fcr \u00d6zel received 682 votes, Kemal K\u0131l\u0131\u00e7daro\u011flu received 664 votes, 18 votes were deemed invalid, a second round was held because a simple majority could not be achieved, and in the second round, \u00d6zg\u00fcr \u00d6zel received 812 votes and Kemal K\u0131l\u0131\u00e7daro\u011flu received 536 votes.<\/span><\/p>\n This table shows just how delicately the outcome of the convention was determined, particularly in the first round.<\/span><\/p>\n It is precisely this delicate balance that lies at the heart of the allegations:<\/span><\/p>\n Whether the will of the delegates has been compromised,<\/span><\/p>\n allegations of seeking personal gain,<\/span><\/p>\n political promises,<\/span><\/p>\n allegations of job placement,<\/span><\/p>\n claims for money or other material benefits,<\/span><\/p>\n whether the delegates were directed or not,<\/span><\/p>\n Whether an impression was created that Kemal K\u0131l\u0131\u00e7daro\u011flu had withdrawn ahead of the second round.<\/span><\/p>\n All of these are subject to legal review.<\/span><\/p>\n Therefore, the fact that \u00d6zg\u00fcr \u00d6zel made no mention of these cases when he told Newsweek that \u201cthe opposition is being eliminated through the courts\u201d is a serious omission.<\/span><\/p>\n The CHP Istanbul Provincial Congress is also at the center of this debate.<\/span><\/p>\n It appears that the Istanbul Provincial Congress held on October 8, 2023, has become the subject of controversy in the case before the 45th Istanbul Civil Court of First Instance, with allegations regarding jurisdiction, venue, procedure, the will of the delegates, and vote-rigging in exchange for benefits.<\/span><\/p>\n According to allegations, the convention was held within the boundaries of Beyo\u011flu despite having been reported to the Sar\u0131yer District Election Board; it has been claimed that the delegates\u2019 decisions were influenced by money, phones, tablets, job offers, and various material benefits; the number of votes cast at the convention and the delegate quota have also been the subject of debate.<\/span><\/p>\n The court ordered that the relevant election documents, prosecution files, and similar case files be submitted to the court.<\/span><\/p>\n This demonstrates that the matter is not merely an internal party dispute, but a serious process that is subject to judicial review.<\/span><\/p>\n \u00a0<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n \u00a0<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n Why is the Istanbul Provincial Congress important?<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n This is because delegates from Istanbul constitute a significant portion of the delegation at CHP conventions.<\/span><\/p>\n If there is a serious allegation of legal irregularities regarding the Istanbul Provincial Congress, this could affect not only the Istanbul provincial administration but also the legitimacy of subsequent convention processes.<\/span><\/p>\n For this reason, the Istanbul congresses\u2014the 38th Regular Congress, the 21st Extraordinary Congress, and the 22nd Extraordinary Congress\u2014are not unrelated events.<\/span><\/p>\n They are links in the same chain of legitimacy.<\/span><\/p>\n The Ankara 42nd Civil Court of First Instance heard the cases related to the CHP\u2019s 38th Ordinary Congress, the Istanbul Provincial Congress, and the 21st and 22nd Extraordinary Congresses together.<\/span><\/p>\n The trial court concluded that the cases had become moot, taking into account the extraordinary congresses and conventions held subsequently.<\/span><\/p>\n However, this approach is controversial.<\/span><\/p>\n This is because the central issue in a claim of absolute nullity is whether subsequent acts can remedy the prior legal defect.<\/span><\/p>\n If a convention is fundamentally invalid from the outset, the administration arising from that convention subsequently convening a new convention amounts to it controversially establishing its own legitimacy.<\/span><\/p>\n The intervention by the 36th Civil Chamber of the Ankara Regional Court of Appeal is therefore significant.<\/span><\/p>\n The 36th Civil Chamber of the Court of Appeals overturned the lower court\u2019s decision; ruled in favor of the plaintiff; and concluded that the CHP\u2019s 38th Ordinary Elective Congress, held on November 4\u20135, 2023, was null and void.<\/span><\/p>\n This decision shows that, contrary to the picture painted by \u00d6zg\u00fcr \u00d6zel in his Newsweek article, the issue cannot be dismissed as merely an intervention by the ruling government.<\/span><\/p>\n The case involves a criminal investigation, an indictment, civil lawsuits, an appellate review, and a dispute over absolute nullity.<\/span><\/p>\n To ignore all of this and frame the issue solely as a \u201ccrackdown on the opposition\u201d is to distort the legal reality.<\/span><\/p>\n The fact that the CHP leadership is proceeding with the 21st Extraordinary Congress while lawsuits regarding the 38th Ordinary Congress are still pending is also legally controversial.<\/span><\/p>\n Because this move has been perceived as a \u201crendering moot\u201d strategy aimed at neutralizing the impact of the ongoing nullity lawsuits.<\/span><\/p>\n Indeed, the approach taken by the 42nd Civil Court of First Instance in Ankara\u2014that the cases had become moot\u2014has further fueled this debate.<\/span><\/p>\n However, the key question here is:<\/span><\/p>\n Can a government whose legal legitimacy is disputed resolve its previous shortcomings by convening a new convention?<\/span><\/p>\n If the 38th Ordinary Congress is null and void, the authority of the leadership formed as a result of that congress to convene an extraordinary congress, set the agenda, and manage the subsequent process also becomes subject to dispute.<\/span><\/p>\n For this reason, the 21st Extraordinary Congress should be viewed not as a step that brought the debate over absolute nullity to an end, but rather as one that deepened it.<\/span><\/p>\n The CHP\u2019s 22nd Extraordinary Congress, however, is a separate topic of discussion.<\/span><\/p>\n The key issue regarding this convention is which provision of the bylaws governs its conduct.<\/span><\/p>\n The CHP Charter contains different provisions regarding extraordinary congresses and extraordinary conventions.<\/span><\/p>\n At the heart of the objections is the claim that Article 48 of the CHP Charter must be applied with regard to the 22nd Extraordinary Congress.<\/span><\/p>\n The issues discussed in this section are as follows:<\/span><\/p>\n Whether the convention delegates collected the required number of signatures in accordance with the proper procedure,<\/span><\/p>\n the authenticity of the notarized signature process,<\/span><\/p>\n whether the 15-day signature collection period was adhered to,<\/span><\/p>\n whether the collected signatures were submitted within 7 days,<\/span><\/p>\n How and through what process the 662 notarized signatures were collected,<\/span><\/p>\n The discrepancy between the General Secretary\u2019s public statement regarding \u201cover 1,000 signatures\u2019 and the officially reported 662 signatures,<\/span><\/p>\n whether or not the discussion has strayed from the agenda,<\/span><\/p>\n whether the confidence vote and election processes were conducted in accordance with the bylaws,<\/span><\/p>\n whether the simple majority calculation should be based on those present or on the total number of members,<\/span><\/p>\n Whether the legal status of the Istanbul delegates affects the calculation of the convention majority.<\/span><\/p>\n These discussions may seem technical.<\/span><\/p>\n However, it actually concerns direct democratic legitimacy.<\/span><\/p>\n This is because the procedures by which a party convention\u2014which determines the party\u2019s chairperson, party assembly, and governing bodies\u2014is convened, who casts votes, what majority is required for decisions, and the legal status of delegates form the foundation of internal party democracy.<\/span><\/p>\n It is alleged that, with regard to the 22nd Extraordinary Congress, the vetting process was initially conducted based on 1,309 delegates; following objections, the final number of delegates was determined to be 1,127; yet, despite this, the process for the extraordinary congress was initiated based on 662 signatures.<\/span><\/p>\n In this case, the following questions need to be answered:<\/span><\/p>\n On what number of delegates is the simple majority calculation based?<\/span><\/p>\n Have the Istanbul delegates been taken into account?<\/span><\/p>\n How were the signatures and votes of delegates who were suspended or whose legal status was in question evaluated?<\/span><\/p>\nIs There a Security Crisis?<\/span><\/b><\/h2>\n
To Explain Turkey\u2019s Strategic Importance, or to Complain About Turkey?<\/span><\/b><\/h2>\n
The Truth About the CHP That Wasn\u2019t Told to Newsweek<\/span><\/b><\/h2>\n
The Istanbul Provincial Congress and the Problem of Chain Legitimacy<\/span><\/b><\/h2>\n
Proceedings Before the 42nd Civil Court of First Instance in Ankara and the 36th Civil Chamber of the Court of Appeals<\/span><\/b><\/h2>\n
The 21st Extraordinary Congress and the \u201cDon\u2019t Stay Silent\u201d Strategy<\/span><\/b><\/h2>\n
The 22nd Extraordinary Congress, Article 48 of the Bylaws, and Allegations of Complete Illegality<\/span><\/b><\/h2>\n