Turkey is currently facing an alliance of order that is trying to carry out more than one crisis process together. In the Kurdish issue, which has a historical counterpart, it is understood that they call it a solution process, but on the contrary to the excitement it did not create in the Kurdish people, it is understood that with the involvement of some nationalist movements, an excitement is created especially among young people for provocation purposes. Again, the increase in nationalist discourse in the tribunes over \u00d6calan seems to have pushed the reaction focused on migrants to the background for now.<\/p>\n
With the political crises accompanying the long-standing economic crisis, the minimum wages of the working class remain below the hunger limit, while the purchasing power is decreasing day by day. In this period when the capitalist system, which causes this situation, exposes all laborers to exploitation without caring about national differences, the release of the people's energy is only in the championship of Amedspor, while on the other hand, it is in the form of relief in the nationalist slogans of bursaspor fans.<\/p>\n
It is no coincidence that nationalism is on the rise in the crisis of capitalism. Today, when workers are unable to meet their basic needs, local worker resistances are shaped by the lack of wages or compensation rights. They are not fighting for new rights, but for their natural rights. On the other hand, the annual profitability rates announced by the capitalist class are increasing. When nationalism, which is the representative of a class that is not affected by the crisis, is considered in the historical context, I can say that there is nothing but serving NATO and being an apparatus of the bosses.<\/p>\n
This situation, combined with the youth's anxiety about the future and their demand for freedom against increasing authoritarianism, pushes them to the extremes, while at the same time showing that they see politics as a solution. The youth are defending a Republic between the racist political line and the Communists.<\/p>\n
Today, there is a tendency in almost every segment of society to search for a way out. The inadequacy of the politics of the order at this point, the main opposition party's election-oriented politics before and after and its failures here strengthen the idea that there may be another alternative. Today, it is critical that Kemalists and Republicans energize themselves in a position that does not embrace the old, but gives a shoulder to the establishment of the new, that is, in a position that realizes that the old cannot be rebuilt unless the class determinant of the Republic this time is the working class itself.<\/p>\n
One of the biggest ideological blurs in Turkish politics is that those who define themselves as \u201cKemalist\u201d, \u201cKemalist\u201d, \u201cKemalist\u201d, \u201cKemalist\u201d, \"secular republican\" are increasingly intertwined with Turkish nationalism. However, historically speaking, there is both a continuity and a serious tension between Kemalism and nationalism. Today, this tension has largely disappeared and has been replaced by a common \"state reflex\". This is precisely the question that needs to be asked: What do Kemalists have to do with nationalists?<\/p>\n
From a Marxist point of view, the answer is not only ideological, but class-based.<\/p>\n
Kemalism was historically a project of building a new nation-state on the ruins of a collapsed empire inherited from the Ottoman Empire. On the one hand, this project had an anti-imperialist character, and on the other, it aimed to create a Turkish bourgeoisie in Anatolia. During the founding years of the Republic, capital accumulation was created with the discourse of \u201cnational economy\u201d and a new ruling class was built by the state. For this reason, Kemalism was never a classless, neutral \u201cenlightenment movement\u201d; it was shaped as the ideological cement of a certain class order.<\/p>\n
Nationalism was the most functional mortar of this cement.<\/p>\n
Because for capitalist nation-states, nationalism is not just an emotion, but a tool to keep the working classes in line. It renders the contradiction between workers and bosses invisible; it suppresses class conflict by saying \u201cwe are all sons of the same nation\u201d. Since the founding of the Republic in Turkey, this has been the basic reflex of the state on many issues ranging from the Kurdish issue to labor movements. The Kemalist modernization project was founded on the idea of \u201cone nation\u201d as much as secularism and westernization.<\/p>\n
It is not a coincidence that Kemalists today stand side by side with nationalists; it is a continuation of historical codes.<\/p>\n
Especially with the neoliberal transformation after 1980, Kemalism's claim of publicism was largely liquidated. What is left is more of a security, statist and nationalist backbone. As the capitalist class grew with privatizations, workers became precarious, work murders increased, and poverty deepened, the discourses of \u201chomeland\u201d, \u201csurvival\u201d and \u201cnational unity\u201d became more prominent. Because the ruling classes do not want social anger to flow into a class line in times of economic crisis. Instead, a new social consolidation is created through identities, flags and security concerns.<\/p>\n
This is why it is not surprising that many Kemalist circles that define themselves through secularism today use the same language as ultra-nationalists when it comes to hostility towards immigrants, the Kurdish issue or security policies. Because the common denominator is not populism but the state. The continuity of the state has become the main reference point, not the interests of the workers, the poor and the precarious youth. A radical change of reference is essential here.<\/p>\n
For Marxism, however, the issue is clear: The worker's homeland is not the same as that of the boss.<\/p>\n
Any politics that equates a textile worker with a conglomerate boss in the common \u201cnational interest\u201d is the politics of capital. The problem of the low-paid laborer in the factory is not the peoples across the borders, but the system of exploitation in his own country. But nationalism exists precisely to veil this reality. The cause of poverty is not the bosses but immigrants; the cause of unemployment is not the capitalist order but foreign powers; the source of oppression is not the state but \u201cinternal enemies\u201d.<\/p>\n
This is the basis of the Kemalist-nationalist rapprochement today: The reflex to preserve order.<\/p>\n
Because the capitalist order is in crisis. The youth are without a future, the workers are unorganized, the people are poor. In such periods, the dominant ideologies converge. The differences between the secular-nationalist line and right-wing nationalism blur. What remains is a common political language that demands sacrifices from the people in the name of the security of the state.<\/p>\n
Therefore, the question is not only \u201cWhy are the Kemalists allying with the nationalists?\u201d. The real question is this: Why are the working classes still caught between different ideological camps of the capitalist order?<\/p>\n
The communists' bond with their country in the building of the Republic is organic. Love for the homeland and the search for an equal and free order are always intertwined. Today, the only system in which the principles of the Republic can be realized is socialism itself.<\/p>\n
It must be well understood that the nationalist ideology that the Kemalists embrace for the survival of the state is rooted outside, that independence, which is not in the interest of the people, does not stand apart from the working class struggle.<\/p>\n
It is precisely this smokescreen that Marxist politics has to disperse.<\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
This is the basis of the Kemalist-nationalist rapprochement today: The reflex to preserve order.<\/p>","protected":false},"author":12,"featured_media":286075,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[286],"tags":[289],"class_list":{"0":"post-286073","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-yazarlar","8":"tag-manset"},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/halkweb.com.tr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/286073","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/halkweb.com.tr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/halkweb.com.tr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/halkweb.com.tr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/12"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/halkweb.com.tr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=286073"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/halkweb.com.tr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/286073\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":286076,"href":"https:\/\/halkweb.com.tr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/286073\/revisions\/286076"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/halkweb.com.tr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/286075"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/halkweb.com.tr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=286073"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/halkweb.com.tr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=286073"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/halkweb.com.tr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=286073"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}