Ortado\u011fu\u2019da silahlar\u0131n susmas\u0131, \u00e7o\u011fu zaman bar\u0131\u015f\u0131n ba\u015flad\u0131\u011f\u0131 anlam\u0131na gelmez.
\nBazen yaln\u0131zca bir sonraki b\u00fcy\u00fck hesapla\u015fman\u0131n nefes aral\u0131\u011f\u0131d\u0131r.
\nBug\u00fcn kar\u015f\u0131m\u0131zda duran tablo tam da budur.
\n\u0130lk bak\u0131\u015fta sava\u015f durmu\u015f gibi g\u00f6r\u00fcn\u00fcyor. Ate\u015fkes konu\u015fuluyor. Diplomatik kanallar yeniden devreye sokulmaya \u00e7al\u0131\u015f\u0131l\u0131yor. Washington kendi kamuoyuna \u201czafer\u201d anlat\u0131s\u0131 pazarl\u0131yor. Tel Aviv, \u0130ran\u2019a a\u011f\u0131r hasar verdi\u011fi tezini diri tutmaya u\u011fra\u015f\u0131yor. Tahran ise ayakta kalm\u0131\u015f olmay\u0131 psikolojik ve siyasal bir \u00fcst\u00fcnl\u00fck gibi sunuyor.
\nOysa hakikat \u00e7ok daha sert.
\nBu sava\u015fta hi\u00e7 kimse ger\u00e7ek anlamda kazanmad\u0131.
\nHatta daha net s\u00f6yleyelim:
\nAll sides are trying to cover up their strategic weaknesses by hiding behind the fog produced by their own propaganda apparatus.<\/p>\n
ABD a\u00e7\u0131s\u0131ndan mesele nettir.
\nWashington, askeri kapasitesinin b\u00fcy\u00fckl\u00fc\u011f\u00fcne g\u00fcvenerek girdi\u011fi bu s\u00fcre\u00e7te, bir kez daha stratejinin yerine g\u00fc\u00e7 g\u00f6sterisini koyman\u0131n bedelini \u00f6dedi. E\u011fer ilk 72 saatte \u0130ran rejiminin komuta-kontrol omurgas\u0131n\u0131 \u00e7\u00f6kertemiyorsan\u0131z, sava\u015f\u0131 ba\u015flatm\u0131\u015f olman\u0131z size \u00fcst\u00fcnl\u00fck sa\u011flamaz; bilakis inisiyatifi kaybetti\u011finizin ilan\u0131 olur. \u00c7\u00fcnk\u00fc o andan sonra \u00e7at\u0131\u015fman\u0131n ritmini, alan\u0131n\u0131 ve \u015fiddet d\u00fczeyini siz de\u011fil, kar\u015f\u0131 taraf\u0131n diren\u00e7 kapasitesi belirlemeye ba\u015flar.
\nTam da bu oldu.
\nABD, sahaya kuvvet koydu ama siyasi sonucu tahkim edemedi.
\nTaktik hamleler yapt\u0131 ama bunlar\u0131 stratejik kazan\u0131ma \u00e7eviremedi.
\nZafer g\u00fcr\u00fclt\u00fcs\u00fc \u00e7\u0131kard\u0131 ama o g\u00fcr\u00fclt\u00fcn\u00fcn arkas\u0131nda kal\u0131c\u0131 bir denge in\u015fa edemedi.
\nBu nedenle bug\u00fcn konu\u015fulan tablo, bir Amerikan zaferi de\u011fil; kontroll\u00fc bir geri \u00e7ekilmenin, ileti\u015fim m\u00fchendisli\u011fiyle s\u00fcslenmi\u015f halidir.<\/p>\n
\u0130srail cephesinde de durum farkl\u0131 de\u011fil.
\nNetanyahu y\u00f6netimi, k\u0131sa vadeli askeri reflekslerle uzun vadeli g\u00fcvenlik denklemine h\u00fckmedebilece\u011fini d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcnd\u00fc. Oysa devlet akl\u0131 ile se\u00e7im akl\u0131 ayn\u0131 \u015fey de\u011fildir. \u0130\u00e7 politikada s\u0131k\u0131\u015fan liderlerin sava\u015f \u00fczerinden zaman kazanma refleksi, bazen \u00fclkelerine birka\u00e7 g\u00fcnl\u00fck manevra alan\u0131 a\u00e7ar; fakat \u00e7o\u011fu zaman y\u0131llarca ta\u015f\u0131nacak stratejik maliyetler \u00fcretir.
\nBug\u00fcn \u0130srail\u2019in kar\u015f\u0131 kar\u015f\u0131ya oldu\u011fu risk tam olarak budur.
\nGazze\u2019de y\u00fcr\u00fct\u00fclen sava\u015f\u0131n ahlaki ve diplomatik faturas\u0131 zaten a\u011f\u0131rd\u0131. \u0130ran ba\u015fl\u0131\u011f\u0131nda a\u00e7\u0131lan yeni cephe ise bu faturay\u0131 daha da b\u00fcy\u00fctt\u00fc. Askeri kapasite korunmu\u015f olabilir. Baz\u0131 hedefler vurulmu\u015f olabilir. B\u00f6lgesel rakiplere anl\u0131k cayd\u0131r\u0131c\u0131l\u0131k mesajlar\u0131 verilmi\u015f olabilir. Ancak b\u00fct\u00fcn bunlar, \u0130srail\u2019in orta ve uzun vadeli g\u00fcvenli\u011fini daha sa\u011flam hale getirmeye yetmiyor.
\nAksine\u2026
\nB\u00f6lgesel yaln\u0131zla\u015fma derinle\u015fiyor.
\nUluslararas\u0131 me\u015fruiyet a\u015f\u0131n\u0131yor.
\nVe her \u201ctaktik ba\u015far\u0131\u201d, yeni bir \u201cstratejik ku\u015fatma\u201d riski do\u011furuyor.
\nDevletler i\u00e7in mesele sadece vurmak de\u011fildir.
\nAs\u0131l mesele, vurduktan sonra daha g\u00fcvenli bir jeopolitik denge kurabilmektir.
\nBug\u00fcn \u0130srail\u2019in bunu ba\u015fard\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 s\u00f6ylemek m\u00fcmk\u00fcn de\u011fildir.<\/p>\n
Peki ya \u0130ran?
\nBurada en s\u0131k yap\u0131lan hata, rejimin ayakta kalmas\u0131n\u0131 \u201czafer\u201d zannetmektir.
\nNo, no, no.
\nAyakta kalmak, kazanmak de\u011fildir.
\n\u0130ran rejimi bug\u00fcn, rakiplerinin stratejik k\u00f6rl\u00fc\u011f\u00fcnden ve a\u015f\u0131r\u0131 g\u00fcveninden faydalanarak, y\u0131k\u0131lmam\u0131\u015f olmay\u0131 bir ba\u015far\u0131 hik\u00e2yesi gibi sunuyor. Oysa bu ba\u015far\u0131 de\u011fil; sadece zaman kazanm\u0131\u015f bir rejimin nefeslenme aral\u0131\u011f\u0131d\u0131r. Ve daha \u00f6nemlisi, bu nefes aral\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131n ger\u00e7ek sahibi rejim de\u011fil, b\u00fcy\u00fck bir ferasetle b\u00fct\u00fcn bu y\u0131k\u0131m\u0131n alt\u0131nda ezilmeye devam eden \u0130ran halk\u0131d\u0131r.
\nBask\u0131 alt\u0131nda ya\u015fayan, ekonomik maliyeti s\u0131rtlanan, sava\u015f\u0131n psikolojik y\u00fck\u00fcn\u00fc ta\u015f\u0131yan ve buna ra\u011fmen rejimin toplumsal r\u0131zas\u0131n\u0131n ne kadar a\u015f\u0131nd\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 herkese g\u00f6steren \u0130ran halk\u0131\u2026
\nAs\u0131l bedeli yine onlar \u00f6dedi.
\nRejim ise e\u011fer bug\u00fcnk\u00fc tabloyu yanl\u0131\u015f okursa, yani bu sonucu; n\u00fckleer program\u0131n\u0131 h\u0131zland\u0131rmak, balistik kapasitesini tahkim etmek, vekil g\u00fc\u00e7 a\u011flar\u0131n\u0131 yeniden finanse etmek ve b\u00f6lgenin k\u0131r\u0131lgan dengelerine daha pervas\u0131z bi\u00e7imde abanmak i\u00e7in bir f\u0131rsat olarak g\u00f6r\u00fcrse, bug\u00fcnk\u00fc \u201ckaybetmeme hali\u201d yar\u0131n\u0131n \u00e7ok daha a\u011f\u0131r k\u0131r\u0131lmalar\u0131n\u0131n habercisi olur.<\/p>\n
\u00c7\u00fcnk\u00fc bazen devletler sava\u015fta yenilmez;
\nAma sava\u015f\u0131n yanl\u0131\u015f derslerini \u00e7\u0131kararak gelece\u011fi kaybeder.
\n\u0130ran i\u00e7in as\u0131l soru da budur:
\nD\u00fcnya ile bar\u0131\u015farak elindeki mevcut pozisyonu korumaya m\u0131 \u00e7al\u0131\u015facak?
\nYoksa ideolojik inatla, elde etti\u011fi g\u00f6reli avantaj\u0131 daha b\u00fcy\u00fck bir stratejik riske mi d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015ft\u00fcrecek?
\n\u0130kinci se\u00e7ene\u011fi tercih etmesi durumunda, bu da \u0130ran i\u00e7in kal\u0131c\u0131 bar\u0131\u015f ihtimalini zay\u0131flat\u0131r.
\nBug\u00fcn \u00f6n\u00fcm\u00fczde duran denklem maalesef, \u201cbar\u0131\u015f\u201d denklemi de\u011fildir.
\nBu bir \u201certelenmi\u015f hesapla\u015fma\u201d denklemidir.
\nABD\u2019nin talepleri ile \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n \u00f6ne s\u00fcrd\u00fc\u011f\u00fc \u015fartlar aras\u0131nda derin bir g\u00fcvensizlik var. \u0130srail h\u00fck\u00fcmetinin g\u00fcvenlik \u00f6ncelikleri ile b\u00f6lgesel ger\u00e7eklik aras\u0131nda ciddi bir uyumsuzluk var. \u0130ran rejiminin i\u00e7 yap\u0131s\u0131 ile d\u0131\u015far\u0131ya verebilece\u011fi rasyonel taahh\u00fctler aras\u0131nda ise kronik bir k\u0131r\u0131lma bulunuyor.
\nB\u00f6yle bir tabloda kal\u0131c\u0131 bar\u0131\u015f \u00fcretmek kolay de\u011fildir.
\nEn iyi ihtimalle s\u00fcrd\u00fcr\u00fclebilir bir ate\u015fkes m\u00fcmk\u00fcnd\u00fcr.
\nAma onun bile garantisi yoktur.
\n\u00c7\u00fcnk\u00fc masadaki akt\u00f6rlerin neredeyse tamam\u0131, i\u00e7 siyasette y\u0131pranm\u0131\u015f, d\u0131\u015f siyasette g\u00fcven \u00fcretme kapasitesi a\u015f\u0131nm\u0131\u015f, krizden beslenmeye al\u0131\u015fm\u0131\u015f ve gerekti\u011finde \u201cm\u0131z\u0131k\u00e7\u0131l\u0131k\u201d yapmaktan \u00e7ekinmeyecek yap\u0131lard\u0131r.
\nBu y\u00fczden denge kimin lehine kurulursa kurulsun, o dengeyi bozma te\u015febb\u00fcs\u00fc di\u011fer taraftan mutlaka gelecektir.<\/p>\n
Sonu\u00e7 olarak\u2026
\nOrtado\u011fu\u2019da bug\u00fcn g\u00f6rd\u00fc\u011f\u00fcm\u00fcz \u015fey, sava\u015f\u0131n bitmesi de\u011fil; sava\u015f\u0131n bi\u00e7im de\u011fi\u015ftirmesidir.
\nMermi susabilir.
\nF\u00fczeler bir s\u00fcreli\u011fine durabilir.
\nLiderler zafer konu\u015fmalar\u0131 yapabilir.
\nDiplomatlar masa kurabilir.
\nAma stratejik tehdit yerinde duruyorsa, hatta baz\u0131 ba\u015fl\u0131klarda b\u00fcy\u00fcyorsa, o zaman ortada ger\u00e7ek bir \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm yoktur.
\nSadece \u015fimdilik zaman sat\u0131n al\u0131nm\u0131\u015f olma ihtimali y\u00fcksektir.
\nVe zaman sat\u0131n almak, devletler i\u00e7in bazen bir ba\u015far\u0131 gibi g\u00f6r\u00fcn\u00fcr.
\nAma yanl\u0131\u015f ellerde, o zaman en pahal\u0131 hezimete d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015f\u00fcr.
\nBug\u00fcn Ortado\u011fu\u2019da olan budur.
\nMevcut durum bir bar\u0131\u015f de\u011fil, sadece bir interregnum (fetret d\u00f6nemi).
\n\u200bABD i\u00e7in: Bir prestij krizi.
\n\u200b\u0130srail i\u00e7in: Me\u015fruiyet erozyonu.
\n\u200b\u0130ran i\u00e7in: Sosyal patlama riski ta\u015f\u0131yan bir zaman kazanma hamlesi.
\n\u015eimdilik sava\u015f\u0131n \u00fcretti\u011fi y\u0131k\u0131m durdu.
\nAma tehdit hen\u00fcz hi\u00e7 uzakla\u015fmad\u0131.<\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
All sides are trying to cover up their strategic weaknesses by hiding behind the fog produced by their own propaganda apparatus.<\/p>","protected":false},"author":55,"featured_media":284848,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[286],"tags":[289],"class_list":{"0":"post-284847","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-yazarlar","8":"tag-manset"},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/halkweb.com.tr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/284847","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/halkweb.com.tr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/halkweb.com.tr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/halkweb.com.tr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/55"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/halkweb.com.tr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=284847"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/halkweb.com.tr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/284847\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":284849,"href":"https:\/\/halkweb.com.tr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/284847\/revisions\/284849"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/halkweb.com.tr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/284848"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/halkweb.com.tr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=284847"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/halkweb.com.tr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=284847"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/halkweb.com.tr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=284847"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}