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<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
The modern state is sustained not only by laws but also by the functionality of institutions. An institution is legitimate as long as it responds to a social need. Institutions that have lost their function but continue to exist show the weakness of the state, not its strength. This is because such structures feed on habit, not need.<\/p>\n
Public administration in Turkey has undergone a major transformation in the last fifteen years. Digitalization has radically redefined the state's relationship with citizens. Population registrations, address declarations, residence certificates, social assistance applications, health and education procedures are no longer tied to physical locations; they are now carried out through centralized databases and digital verification systems.<\/p>\n
This transformation is not only technological. It is also a political and managerial transformation.<\/p>\n
Because the digital state:<\/p>\n
This is precisely why digitalization is not just a bureaucratic convenience; it is a process that transforms power relations.<\/p>\n
However, there is a notable exception to this general picture of transformation: The mukhtar institution is a product of a period in Turkey when the modern state had not yet penetrated everywhere. It emerged as an intermediary mechanism based on local knowledge, functioning through face-to-face relations, and ensuring the state's contact with the neighborhood. In this context, it is historically meaningful and functional.<\/p>\n But one of the basic tenets of modern public administration theory is this: In the city centers today:<\/p>\n Under these conditions, the mukhtar's claim to be the \u201clocal eye of the state\u201d has lost its objective value.<\/p>\n The main functions performed by mukhtars' offices in urban centers in the past were as follows:<\/p>\n All of these functions today:<\/p>\n The documents issued by the mukhtar are no longer legally binding. Mukhtar<\/p>\n This situation transforms the mukhtar's office from an administrative actor. into a symbolic figure.<\/strong><\/p>\n In urban centers, the only regular activity that the mukhtar's office actually performs today is notification.<\/p>\n This activity:<\/p>\n Moreover, this service is no longer compulsory. Because the notification system is largely<\/p>\n At this point, the following observation is inevitable: What needs to be discussed in Turkey today is not the historical background of the mukhtar institution. Approximately in Turkey 31,900 urban (neighborhood) mukhtars<\/strong> are available. Mukhtars' offices do not only have salary expenses. Even at the minimum level, there are office expenses, electricity, water, internet, stationery and mandatory operating costs. When these items are added, the average annual additional cost reaches approximately 30,000 TL.<\/p>\n In this framework, the total annual public cost of a city mukhtar is approximately 444,000 TL for personnel costs and 30,000 TL for office and operational costs. 474.000 TL<\/strong> level.<\/p>\n This figure 31.900<\/strong> multiplied by the number of urban mukhtars, the total annual public cost of urban mukhtars is approximately 15.1 billion TL<\/strong> as a result of the new development.<\/p>\n In the same period, the total monthly cost of a teacher to the state was approximately 90.000 TL\u2019<\/strong>is. This amount is approximately 1 million 80 thousand TL<\/strong>\u2019corresponds to the amount of the annual allocation for urban mukhtars' offices. Annual allocation for city mukhtars' offices 15.1 billion TL<\/strong>\u2019with a resource of approx. 14 thousand teachers<\/strong> employment is possible.<\/p>\n This is not a debate on local democracy or tradition. It is a concrete budget choice that shows where public resources are locked in the face of an education system where teacher shortages are deepening, classrooms are overcrowded, and guidance and support services are inadequate.<\/p>\n The problem is not with individuals or labor. The problem is the commitment of billions of liras of public resources every year for the sake of maintaining a structure whose function has become largely symbolic. This reveals a heavy and persistent public price paid for institutional inertia.<\/p>\n This is not just financial data. It is an indicator that compels us to ask why a defunct institution continues to be politically protected.<\/p>\n At this point, the technical discussion is over. The real question is this: The answer to this question necessarily takes us into the realm of politics. In urban centers, the mukhtar office has largely lost its administrative and managerial function. Despite this, the institution is not only protected, it is also pushed out of the political debate and presented as a \u201cnatural\u201d and \u201cuntouchable\u201d element. This takes the issue out of the technical realm and moves it directly into the realm of power relations. The institution of mukhtars is legally non-partisan. Mukhtars are not candidates for political parties and are not elected from party lists. This makes the mukhtarship \u201cinnocent\u201d<\/strong> a local structure. But political theory teaches us this:<\/p>\n The claim of neutrality is often the strongest form of politicization.<\/p>\n Because they appear to be neutral:<\/p>\n In urban centers, the mukhtar serves exactly this function. In law, it is neutral; in practice, it is the silent carrier of the relationship that the government establishes with the neighborhood.<\/p>\n The modern state operates by rules. Rights are granted to citizens, not individuals. However, the urban practice that operates through mukhtar offices reproduces an understanding of the state that is mediated rather than modern.<\/p>\n In this understanding:<\/p>\n The mukhtar does not make a legal decision at this point, but becomes a door of access. The existence of this door indicates the weakening of the institutional state and the strengthening of personal contact. Legally, mukhtars do not distribute social assistance. This is true. But in practice the mukhtar:<\/p>\n In this process, aid becomes dependent on local relations rather than objective criteria. Social policy ceases to be a right; it becomes a conditional relationship. Mukhtarship is in this relationship:<\/p>\n This is precisely why it is useful for the government. Because:<\/p>\n This is characteristic of the patrimonial political tradition, not of the modern welfare state.<\/p>\n The second dimension of the relationship between mukhtars and power emerges during electoral processes. Mukhtars do not officially engage in propaganda. However, political power is not only propaganda; having information is also power.<\/p>\n City headman<\/p>\n This information is more micro than parties and municipalities. Moreover:<\/p>\n The mukhtars' offices therefore function as a low-cost but widespread network of local contact and observation for the government. 31,900 neighborhood mukhtars means a silent political infrastructure scattered across the country.<\/p>\n Another reason why the mukhtarate is politically functional is that it is unaccountable. Mukhtar<\/p>\n This makes the mukhtarate a gray area within the political system. It is neither fully supervised like a public official nor accountable like an elected local administrator. For this reason, the institution of the mukhtar is persistently preserved, even though it has lost its function in the age of digitalization.<\/p>\n After this stage, it's a matter of the mukhtar: And it becomes a question: It clearly shows that mukhtar offices in urban centers are no longer a technical necessity. In a digitalized, centralized and data-driven state, the mukhtar office is neither an administrative nor a service necessity. Nevertheless, protecting, excluding from discussion and even strengthening the institution inevitably leads us to the following conclusion:<\/p>\n At this point, it is no longer \u201cwhat happens if it is abolished?\u201d<\/strong> The question is secondary. The real question is this: Almost all of the arguments against the abolition of mukhtar offices in urban centers \u201cservice disrupted\u201d<\/strong> claim that the mukhtar's services are already carried out by other institutions. However, as shown in detail in Chapter I, all of the services that mukhtars actually carry out in the city are either carried out through digital systems or are already carried out by other institutions. In none of these areas does the mukhtar play a mandatory and non-substitutable role. The mukhtar office enables the urban government to maintain its relationship with the neighborhood indirectly rather than directly. This indirectness produces three critical advantages for the government:<\/p>\n 1. Avoiding responsibility<\/strong> 2. Loyalty generation<\/strong> 3. Lack of supervision<\/strong> When these three elements are considered together, the mukhtar office becomes a low-cost but highly efficient instrument of local control for the government.<\/p>\n Abolition of mukhtar offices in urban centers:<\/p>\n But it spoils this:<\/p>\n Therefore, abolishing the mukhtar office is a technically easy but politically difficult step. The difficulty is political, not administrative.<\/p>\n The needs that will arise with the abolition of the mukhtar office in the city can easily be met with the tools that the modern state already has:<\/p>\n These alternatives have this in common: Precisely for this reason, these models are less favorable for the government. \u201cflexible\u201d<\/strong>, but it is fairer and more predictable for the citizen.<\/p>\n The maintenance of mukhtars in urban centers is not due to the state's lack of technical capacity, but to its political preference. Power at the local level:<\/p>\n The mukhtarate is ideal for this choice. Because<\/p>\n The issue of mukhtars in urban centers is a matter of power in Turkey:<\/p>\n is a litmus paper.<\/p>\n Today is the mukhtar's office:<\/p>\n Therefore, the muhtar issue is not a matter of savings, reform or bureaucracy; Abolishing mukhtar offices in urban centers does not weaken the state. And that is precisely why this step is technically possible; The Digital State, Institutional Leftovers and the Persistence of the Mukhtar in the City<\/p>","protected":false},"author":14,"featured_media":281813,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[286],"tags":[289],"class_list":{"0":"post-281805","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-yazarlar","8":"tag-manset"},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/halkweb.com.tr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/281805","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/halkweb.com.tr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/halkweb.com.tr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/halkweb.com.tr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/14"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/halkweb.com.tr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=281805"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/halkweb.com.tr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/281805\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":281816,"href":"https:\/\/halkweb.com.tr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/281805\/revisions\/281816"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/halkweb.com.tr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/281813"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/halkweb.com.tr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=281805"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/halkweb.com.tr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=281805"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/halkweb.com.tr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=281805"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}
\nNeighborhood mukhtars in urban centers.<\/strong><\/p>\nCorporate Continuity or Corporate Freeze?<\/h3>\n
\nThe historical legitimacy of an institution does not guarantee its function today.<\/p>\n\n
\nAddress information is in central databases
\nPopulation movements can be monitored instantly
\nSocial policy is conducted through digital records<\/li>\n<\/ul>\nFunctional Dissolution of the Mukhtar Office<\/h3>\n
\n
\nProviding a birth registration sample
\nUpdating voter lists
\nMaking local identification for social assistance<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n
\nOr it is outside the jurisdiction of the mukhtar's office<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n
\nCannot use budget
\nCannot plan public services
\nNo administrative responsibility<\/li>\n<\/ul>\nNarrowing of the Actual Function: The Institution Reduced to Notification<\/h3>\n
\n
\nReceives court and enforcement notices
\nRecord drops when citizen cannot be found
\nHolds and delivers documents<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n
\nNot a public decision-making process
\nDemocratic representation is not at all
\nThis is technically a manual clerical service.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n
\nUYAP
\nPTT distribution network
\nis carried out through.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
\nIn urban centers, the mukhtar's office is an institutional remnant outside, not inside, the digital state.<\/p>\nThe Cost of Corporate Persistence in Figures<\/h3>\n
\nWhat needs to be discussed is the clear imbalance between the current public function of the city mukhtarate and its cost to the public.<\/p>\n
\nAll of these mukhtars have a net 28.075 TL<\/strong> Assuming a minimum wage, the monthly public cost, including gross wage, SSI and employer contributions, is approximately 37.000 TL<\/strong>\u2019reaches up to '000. This amount is annualized as 444.000 TL<\/strong>\u2019s personnel expenses.<\/p>\n
\nIn a digitalized, centralized and data-driven state; <\/em>Why is an institution that has no authority, does not take decisions and does not produce services persistently protected?<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n
\nThe Relationship between Muhtarl\u0131k and Power: Mediated State, Loyalty Production and Uncontrolled Space<\/em><\/p>\n
\nThere is a basic principle in political science:
\nDysfunctional institutions do not survive on their own; they are politically protected.
\nSo the question is now \u201cwhat is the mukhtar's office for?\u201d<\/strong> It is not.
\nThe question is this:
\nWho benefits from being a mukhtar?<\/p>\nThe Discourse of Neutrality and De Facto Politicization<\/h3>\n
\n
\nDeclared out of politics
\nExempted from criticism<\/li>\n<\/ul>\nMediated State Logic: Personal Contact Instead of Institutionalization<\/h3>\n
\n
\nNeeds a \u201clocal intermediary\u201d
\nRights, claims and assistance are based on personal contact<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
\nThis is particularly evident in the area of social assistance.<\/p>\nSocial Assistance From Citizenship to Loyalty<\/h3>\n
\n
\nSuggests list
\nDirects, points<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
\nIn the academic literature, this situation \u201cclientelism\u201d<\/strong> (clientism):
\nState resources are distributed on the basis of loyalty and affinity, not citizenship.<\/p>\n\n
\nActually effective
\nis an actor.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n
\nDoesn't carry responsibility but generates impact
\nUnregulated but decisive<\/li>\n<\/ul>\nElectoral Processes and Local Knowledge Monopoly<\/h3>\n
\n
\nRecognizes the demographic structure of the neighborhood
\nKnows those who move, newcomers, the elderly, those who live alone<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n
\nOut of audit
\n\u201cIt is considered \u201dnatural\"<\/li>\n<\/ul>\nLack of Oversight An Unauthorized but Unaccountable Space<\/h3>\n
\n
\nNot subject to performance evaluation by the central administration
\nAs it has no authority, its legal liability is also limited<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
\nIn terms of political theory, such spaces are extremely favorable for power. This is because:<\/p>\n\n
\nNormalized
\nDiscussion is made difficult<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
\nIt ceases to be a subject of administrative reform
\nNo longer a budget debate<\/p>\n
\nWhy should the government, instead of institutionalized, transparent and auditable relations at the local level;
\nprefers mediated, personal and non-account forms of contact?
\nThis question leads us directly to the regime debate.<\/p>\nAbolition of Mukhtar Office: Preference for a Form of Power, Not Administrative Reform<\/h3>\n
\n
\nIt is a question of a form of power.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
\nWhich form of political relationship collapses when the mukhtarate is abolished?<\/p>\nLooking from a Relationship Perspective, Not a Service Perspective<\/h3>\n
\nNotification, address, residence, population, voter information, social benefits...<\/p>\n
\nThere is therefore no service gap.
\nHowever, with the abolition of the mukhtar office, another vacuum is created:
\nmediated political vacuum.<\/p>\nWhat does it mean when a vehicle disappears?<\/h3>\n
\nThe mukhtar does not decide, but directs. In this way, the government is not held directly responsible for the results.<\/p>\n
\nWhen social assistance, information, access and contact are conducted through personal relationships, the right to citizenship is replaced by a relationship of gratitude.<\/p>\n
\nSince the mukhtar is neither a full-fledged public official nor a local administrator, he\/she is excluded from oversight mechanisms.<\/p>\nWhat Does the Abolition of the Mukhtar Office Violate?<\/h3>\n
\n
\nDoes not stop social assistance
\nDoes not eliminate the need for local representation<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n
\nA form of local contact based on loyalty generation
\nUncontrolled and invisible spheres of influence<\/li>\n<\/ul>\nA Question of Alternatives: Institutionalization or Mediation?<\/h3>\n
\n
\nSocial assistance \u2192 Municipal social service units + digital application
\nLocal participation \u2192 Neighborhood assemblies, digital platforms
\nCommunication \u2192 Open data, direct application channels<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
\nThey are based on the institution, not the individual.<\/p>\nThis is where the real choice comes in<\/h3>\n
\n
\nTransparent
\nAuditable
\nCorporate
\ninstead of a relationship;<\/li>\n
\nPersonal
\nLoyalty-based
\nOut of account
\nprefers a form of relationship.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n
\nEffective but irresponsible
\nCommon but invisible<\/li>\n<\/ul>\nConclusion: Mukhtar Office Debate is a Regime Indicator<\/h3>\n
\n
\nHow it positions the citizen
\nWhether it is based on rights or relationships<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n
\nLocal government is not
\nIt is not a mechanism of democratic representation
\nBut it is functional for the government.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
\nIt is a mirror of the government's relationship with the local.<\/p>\n
\nOn the contrary, it disintermediates the state.<\/p>\n
\nbut it is politically uncomfortable<\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"