The 61-year Baathist rule was overthrown in Syria. Bashar al-Assad, who ruled the country for 24 years, left the country with his family and went to Russia. Time will tell how the jihadists who have taken over the country will govern. But there are serious uncertainties. The most important one is what will happen to communities such as Alawites, Christians, Druze and Ismaili. Especially the jihadist circles\u201c hostile attitude towards the Arab Alawites, also known as \u201dNusayri\u2019, is obvious. Alawites, who make up 13 percent of the Syrian population, supported Assad throughout the civil war. This support was partly out of necessity. Because in the days of war, when religious discourses came to the forefront, they had to give such support in order to preserve their existence. Otherwise, no one would have fought a war that lasted for 13 years and caused great loss of life just to protect someone's seat.<\/p>\n
Following the fall of the Assad regime, there is concern in provinces such as Latakia and Tartous, which have large Alawite populations. There are also Alawites in rural Homs and Hama, albeit in smaller numbers. So far there have been no large-scale attacks on Alawites, but there have been reports on social media of incidents, kidnappings and killings in some places. The general concern is that even if HTS leader Colani and the new Syrian leadership have changed their attitude towards the Alawites, it is not known how much control they will have over the many radical groups within their ranks. This is among the reasons that increase the anxiety there.<\/p>\n
Of course, this concern is also reflected in the Alevi community in Turkey. The change in Syria was immediately reflected in the language of some Islamist and nationalist circles in the country. Even Colani's language seems reasonable in the face of what they share. Obviously, these groups were expecting extensive arrests and even executions in Syria under the name of \u201crevenge\u201d. Under the influence of these posts, some Alawite associations started to publish posts drawing attention to what is happening in Syria and aiming to raise awareness.<\/p>\n
Recently, some people on social media reacted to the statement of some Alevi NGOs in Hatay Samanda\u011f drawing attention to the events in Syria. For example, one of them, SETA researcher Can Acun, quoted the Alevi associations\u201c statement and tweeted the following: \u201dFor 13 years they supported Assad, one of the most despicable regimes in human history. They deliberately covered up massacres, atrocities and rapes. Now they shamelessly spew hatred against Syria and Turkey. What kind of poisonous sectarianism is political Alevism?\"<\/p>\n
With this in mind, let's take a look at the relationship, or rather the non-relationship, of Turkey's Alevis with Assad. Until 2010, perhaps 95 percent of the Alevis in Turkey, especially those of Turkish, Kurdish and Zaza origin, did not even know that Assad was an Alawite. There had never been a single contact between an Alawite organization and the Syrian government. Most of Turkey's Alawites knew little more about Assad than that he was the leader of a neighboring country who had very good relations with Erdo\u011fan.
\nInterestingly, the situation was not very different among the Arab Alawites living in Latakia and Tartus in Syria and the Arab Alawites living in Hatay, Adana and Mersin in Turkey, who share the same roots.
\nPerhaps they, unlike other Alawite communities, only knew that Assad was an Alawite.
\nThe Arab Alawites in Adana and Mersin have little contact with Syria, with the only exception being the Arab Alawites in Hatay.
\nAlawites in this province, like in all other border regions, occasionally exchanged visits and cultural contacts with their relatives on the other side, but not intensively. Therefore, unlike in other regions, sympathy for the Assad family was partially present here.<\/p>\n
Interestingly, Assad, whose country is nearly 70 percent Sunni, did not emphasize his Alawite identity.
\nHis wife and many of his ministers were Sunnis.
\nThe country's law also included provisions of Sunni Sharia law.
\nUnder these circumstances, it took until 2010 for at least most of Turkey's Alawites to learn that Assad was an Alawite.
\nWhen things got complicated in Syria, that's when the Alawites of Turkey learned that Assad was an Alawite.
\nHow did he learn? Thanks to some AKP politicians and Islamists...
\nThey started to talk about Assad's sect, with which they were very friendly until yesterday.
\nThe Arab Spring shifted the language of Erdo\u011fan and the AKP, which had used a more liberal language in the first years of its rule, back to an Islamic line.
\nIn the aftermath of the unrest in Syria, they were obviously planning to gain support for their policies from radical circles within the country and other Sunni Arab countries by emphasizing the \u201cAlawite dictatorship\u201d of Assad.
\nAccording to them, the Alawites, a small minority, were oppressing the majority Sunnis in Syria.<\/p>\n
In the early days of the events in Syria, Turkey's Alawites were just watching the situation. Because they did not have much of an opinion about Syria.
\nThen they learned that the word \u201cNusayri\u201d means Arab Alevi, and that these people are related to the Alevis of Hatay, Adana and Mersin, who have now become part of Turkish Alevism.
\nBut the real issues started after some images appeared on social media.
\nImages of civilians and soldiers captured by radical militants being killed or even beheaded simply because they were Alevi began to circulate.
\nIn the 2010 constitutional referendum, Alevis, whose old concerns had been revived by Erdo\u011fan's statement \u201cWe will purge the judiciary of grandfathers\u201d and statements targeting Kemal K\u0131l\u0131\u00e7daro\u011flu, the CHP leader from Tuncelli, because of his identity, were now bewildered by the government's policy of emphasizing sectarianism in a foreign policy issue.
\nTurkey's Alevis, who still have bitter memories of Mara\u015f, \u00c7orum and Sivas in their memories, suddenly began to worry that the opposition circles supported by the government in their own country, with the support of jihadists from other countries, could exterminate the Alevis in Syria and that this could lead to an outcome that could eventually be directed against them in Turkey.
\nAs a result, for 13 years, the Alawite public opinion in Turkey has been dominated by a weak attitude towards what is happening in Syria, which has remained mostly at the level of discourse and consisted of statements expressing concern.
\nBut obviously even this disturbed Islamist circles and some circles close to the government.<\/p>\n
However, the attitude they are uncomfortable with, which they try to define as \u201cpolitical Alevism\u201d, is in fact a reflex that develops only as a means of self-protection against the hostile sectarianism directed against Alevis.
\nHowever, it is not possible for those who cannot even call what happened in Mara\u015f and Sivas a massacre and characterize what happened as \u201cincidents\u201d or \u201cthe play of foreign powers\u201d to understand this sensitivity of Alevis.
\nFinal word: If anyone is uncomfortable with the position of Alevis in Syria, it is because of the circles we have briefly mentioned above...<\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Suriye’de 61 y\u0131ll\u0131k Baas y\u00f6netimi devrildi. 24 y\u0131ld\u0131r \u00fclkeyi y\u00f6neten Be\u015far Esad, ailesiyle birlikte \u00fclkeyi terk ederek Rusya’ya gitti. \u00dclke y\u00f6netimini ele ge\u00e7iren cihat\u00e7\u0131lar\u0131n nas\u0131l bir y\u00f6netim sergileyece\u011fini zaman g\u00f6sterecek. Ancak ciddi belirsizlikler var. En \u00f6nemlisi de Alevi, Hristiyan, D\u00fcrzi ve \u0130smaili gibi topluluklara ne olaca\u011f\u0131. \u00d6zellikle cihat\u00e7\u0131 \u00e7evrelerin \u201cNusayri\u201d olarak da bilinen Arap Alevileri’ne […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":6,"featured_media":279163,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[286],"tags":[15,78,288],"class_list":{"0":"post-279161","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-yazarlar","8":"tag-chp","9":"tag-kemal-kilicdaroglu","10":"tag-ozgur-ozel"},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/halkweb.com.tr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/279161","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/halkweb.com.tr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/halkweb.com.tr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/halkweb.com.tr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/6"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/halkweb.com.tr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=279161"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/halkweb.com.tr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/279161\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":279170,"href":"https:\/\/halkweb.com.tr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/279161\/revisions\/279170"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/halkweb.com.tr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/279163"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/halkweb.com.tr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=279161"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/halkweb.com.tr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=279161"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/halkweb.com.tr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=279161"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}