The 61-year Baathist rule was overthrown in Syria. Bashar al-Assad, who ruled the country for 24 years, left the country with his family and went to Russia. Time will tell how the jihadists who have taken over the country will govern. But there are serious uncertainties. The most important one is what will happen to communities such as Alawites, Christians, Druze and Ismaili. Especially the jihadist circles“ hostile attitude towards the Arab Alawites, also known as ”Nusayri’, is obvious. Alawites, who make up 13 percent of the Syrian population, supported Assad throughout the civil war. This support was partly out of necessity. Because in the days of war, when religious discourses came to the forefront, they had to give such support in order to preserve their existence. Otherwise, no one would have fought a war that lasted for 13 years and caused great loss of life just to protect someone's seat.
Alawites in Syria are worried
Following the fall of the Assad regime, there is concern in provinces such as Latakia and Tartous, which have large Alawite populations. There are also Alawites in rural Homs and Hama, albeit in smaller numbers. So far there have been no large-scale attacks on Alawites, but there have been reports on social media of incidents, kidnappings and killings in some places. The general concern is that even if HTS leader Colani and the new Syrian leadership have changed their attitude towards the Alawites, it is not known how much control they will have over the many radical groups within their ranks. This is among the reasons that increase the anxiety there.
Change in Syria reflected in language
Of course, this concern is also reflected in the Alevi community in Turkey. The change in Syria was immediately reflected in the language of some Islamist and nationalist circles in the country. Even Colani's language seems reasonable in the face of what they share. Obviously, these groups were expecting extensive arrests and even executions in Syria under the name of “revenge”. Under the influence of these posts, some Alawite associations started to publish posts drawing attention to what is happening in Syria and aiming to raise awareness.
Reactions to the statement of Alevi associations
Recently, some people on social media reacted to the statement of some Alevi NGOs in Hatay Samandağ drawing attention to the events in Syria. For example, one of them, SETA researcher Can Acun, quoted the Alevi associations“ statement and tweeted the following: ”For 13 years they supported Assad, one of the most despicable regimes in human history. They deliberately covered up massacres, atrocities and rapes. Now they shamelessly spew hatred against Syria and Turkey. What kind of poisonous sectarianism is political Alevism?"
Alawites and Assad's Alawism
With this in mind, let's take a look at the relationship, or rather the non-relationship, of Turkey's Alevis with Assad. Until 2010, perhaps 95 percent of the Alevis in Turkey, especially those of Turkish, Kurdish and Zaza origin, did not even know that Assad was an Alawite. There had never been a single contact between an Alawite organization and the Syrian government. Most of Turkey's Alawites knew little more about Assad than that he was the leader of a neighboring country who had very good relations with Erdoğan.
Interestingly, the situation was not very different among the Arab Alawites living in Latakia and Tartus in Syria and the Arab Alawites living in Hatay, Adana and Mersin in Turkey, who share the same roots.
Perhaps they, unlike other Alawite communities, only knew that Assad was an Alawite.
The Arab Alawites in Adana and Mersin have little contact with Syria, with the only exception being the Arab Alawites in Hatay.
Alawites in this province, like in all other border regions, occasionally exchanged visits and cultural contacts with their relatives on the other side, but not intensively. Therefore, unlike in other regions, sympathy for the Assad family was partially present here.
Assad also downplayed his Alawite identity
Interestingly, Assad, whose country is nearly 70 percent Sunni, did not emphasize his Alawite identity.
His wife and many of his ministers were Sunnis.
The country's law also included provisions of Sunni Sharia law.
Under these circumstances, it took until 2010 for at least most of Turkey's Alawites to learn that Assad was an Alawite.
When things got complicated in Syria, that's when the Alawites of Turkey learned that Assad was an Alawite.
How did he learn? Thanks to some AKP politicians and Islamists...
They started to talk about Assad's sect, with which they were very friendly until yesterday.
The Arab Spring shifted the language of Erdoğan and the AKP, which had used a more liberal language in the first years of its rule, back to an Islamic line.
In the aftermath of the unrest in Syria, they were obviously planning to gain support for their policies from radical circles within the country and other Sunni Arab countries by emphasizing the “Alawite dictatorship” of Assad.
According to them, the Alawites, a small minority, were oppressing the majority Sunnis in Syria.
Sectarian discourse escalated by the constitutional referendum
In the early days of the events in Syria, Turkey's Alawites were just watching the situation. Because they did not have much of an opinion about Syria.
Then they learned that the word “Nusayri” means Arab Alevi, and that these people are related to the Alevis of Hatay, Adana and Mersin, who have now become part of Turkish Alevism.
But the real issues started after some images appeared on social media.
Images of civilians and soldiers captured by radical militants being killed or even beheaded simply because they were Alevi began to circulate.
In the 2010 constitutional referendum, Alevis, whose old concerns had been revived by Erdoğan's statement “We will purge the judiciary of grandfathers” and statements targeting Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, the CHP leader from Tuncelli, because of his identity, were now bewildered by the government's policy of emphasizing sectarianism in a foreign policy issue.
Turkey's Alevis, who still have bitter memories of Maraş, Çorum and Sivas in their memories, suddenly began to worry that the opposition circles supported by the government in their own country, with the support of jihadists from other countries, could exterminate the Alevis in Syria and that this could lead to an outcome that could eventually be directed against them in Turkey.
As a result, for 13 years, the Alawite public opinion in Turkey has been dominated by a weak attitude towards what is happening in Syria, which has remained mostly at the level of discourse and consisted of statements expressing concern.
But obviously even this disturbed Islamist circles and some circles close to the government.
A reflex of protection, not partisanship
However, the attitude they are uncomfortable with, which they try to define as “political Alevism”, is in fact a reflex that develops only as a means of self-protection against the hostile sectarianism directed against Alevis.
However, it is not possible for those who cannot even call what happened in Maraş and Sivas a massacre and characterize what happened as “incidents” or “the play of foreign powers” to understand this sensitivity of Alevis.
Final word: If anyone is uncomfortable with the position of Alevis in Syria, it is because of the circles we have briefly mentioned above...