The historical course of the Middle East is like a river that seems to be changing on the surface, but deep down it is like a river that moves forward with the same political codes; its bed never changes, only the color of the water darkens, the sound of the flow becomes harsher, and the memory it carries becomes heavier. Today's clashes between HTS and Kurdish forces in Syria, the re-instrumentalization of Arab tribes by the axis of the US, EU and Turkey, and the articulation of Israel's regional architecture are in fact a new bend in this ancient river. Since Muawiya's governorship of Damascus, this geography has been moving forward on the same state mind; a political line in which power is sanctified, opposition is demonized and the will of the peoples is constantly suppressed has been carried to the present without any interruption. History does not repeat itself here; it continues to bleed unceasingly, reproducing itself by opening a new wound in every generation.
Mu'awiya's politics of Siffin against Ali was not only a struggle for power, it was the beginning of a historical rupture in which Islam was turned into a political tool. Muawiya did not only win a war by turning defeat into victimization; he created a state mind, constructed a form of governance, and produced a code of mentality. This mentality was institutionalized by appointing Yazid as the heir apparent and the massacre in Karbala became the manifesto of this mentality written in blood. Karbala is not just a historical event; it is the founding violence of the Middle Eastern Umayyad empire, the Islamic-State mentality. Today, the beheadings of ISIS, the bombs of Al-Qaeda, the executions of Al-Nusra tell us something very clear: These organizations are not a new barbarism; they are modern versions of Umayyad politics. They have grown with the support of regional states; the logistical and political facilities provided by Turkey for years, the US and EU's calculations to design the region, Israel's security strategy, all touch the same historical vein: Political Islam's capacity to generate violence.
The line from the Ottoman Empire to the Republic shows a surprising continuity in preventing the status of the Kurds. The semi-autonomous order established by the Ottoman Empire with the Kurdish beys, although often presented as a recognition of status, was in fact a postponed stage of the centralization process. With the Tanzimat, this geography was directly targeted; Kurdish regions were reorganized militarily and administratively, and local forces were liquidated. In the Republican period, this line was reproduced with the reflexes of the modern nation-state; rebellions were suppressed, languages were banned, identity was denied. The possibility of Kurds becoming a political subject has been a common fear of state minds since the Ottoman Empire. This fear has sometimes “DIVISION” paranoia, sometimes “SAFETY” with his rhetoric, and sometimes “SECTARIAN BALANCE” It was legitimized under the pretext.
The Arab state mind was not outside this line either. In Syria, hundreds of thousands of Kurds were stripped of their citizenship in the 1962 census; “ARAB BELT” project, Kurdish regions were demographically fragmented and replaced by Arab tribes. In Iraq, the policies of Anfal, Halabja and Arabization were the bloodiest examples of the Baath regimes' systematic reflex against Kurdish status. These policies were not just security practices; they were the reproduction of Umayyad politics in the form of the modern state. Today, the population shifts in Idlib, Afrin and Serêkaniyê are the modern geopolitical version of Umayyad politics; the will of the peoples is being shaped at the tables of re-engineering.
Iran is not outside this historical line. The tension between the Safavid legacy and the Alevi-Kizilbash communities continues today with repressive policies in Rojhilat. Iran's reflex against Kurdish status cannot be explained solely by national security concerns; it is the contemporary version of a historical state mindset. The balance it has established in Syria through Shiite militias is a regional extension of its reflex to prevent the Kurds from gaining status. Thus, the four states Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria are the most stable in the Middle East against Kurdish status. “Inter-State Alliance”of the state. This alliance is the product of the common fear of states, not of peoples.
The international system is the third link that completes this picture. The US, EU and Russia's relationship with the Kurds has never been a strategic partnership; it has always been “a manageable file” logic. During the Cold War, Kurdish movements were used as a geopolitical bargaining chip; the post-1991 no-fly zone was both a protection and control mechanism. Today in Syria, the US “politics of balance”, Kurdish status is constantly on hold; Kurds are still seen as a tool for the international system, not a subject. This instrumentalization, combined with regional state minds, turns the Kurdish struggle for status into a right that is constantly postponed. The reason for such a harsh reflex of state minds is the historical transformation of Kurdish movements. The transition from tribalism to modern political subjectivity, the rise of national movements in the 20th century, and the new political model emerging in Rojava. This transformation broke all the memorizations of the power blocs in the region. The emergence of the Kurds not only as an ethnic community but as a political subject has shaken the historical balance of power in the Middle East. The Kurdish status is therefore a challenge for regional state minds. “threat” not a “fear” has become.
Karbala is the breaking point not only of the Shiite memory but also of the collective unconscious of all oppressed peoples. The massacres, exiles, forced Sunnization policies, demographic engineering practices that Alevi-Kizilbash communities have been experiencing for centuries are all part of a line that began with Muawiya and continues to this day. The bloody chain from Karbala to Dersim, from Maraş to Sivas is being rewoven in Syria today. The violence produced by political Islam is not just an ideological preference; it is a historical state mind. This mind reproduces itself by opening wounds in the memory of peoples that cannot be closed.
The fundamental problem of this geography is that the ruptures that emerged when Islam-Terror was transformed into a political identity in the historical process have never been repaired. As long as the peoples do not face their own history, as long as they do not develop a common will against the interventions of foreign powers, as long as the political Islam-Terror squads do not overcome the violence produced by the Cults, Karbala will not remain just a historical event; it will be relived in every generation. What is happening in Syria today is not a repetition of history; it is the new curtain of an unending Karbala. Unless this curtain is closed, the peoples of the Middle East will not be able to determine their own destiny; the dominant State mind will continue to block the will of the peoples.