The Republic of Turkey began to be built as a nation-state on the axis of Turkish culture and Turkish identity. This preference is not the result of an ethnic claim of superiority, but of the necessity to unite a fragmented society, a remnant of the empire, around a common political identity. The Republic is not a continuation of the Ottoman order that turned ethnic and religious communities into political subjects; it is the will to establish a new political unity on the basis of common language, common culture and common citizenship.
The legal equivalent of this will is clear: Everyone who is bound to the Republic of Turkey by the bonds of citizenship is a Turk. The definition of “Turk” here is not ethnic; it is a political and legal definition. It is based on the bond of citizenship, not blood.
Citizenship, Equality and State Responsibility
Therefore, in the Republic of Turkey, a person's Kurdish, Zaza, Laz, Georgian, Georgian, Arab, Armenian or any other origin does not lead to their exclusion or marginalization. Similarly, these identities do not entitle a person to a position in the state. Those who serve in the state are appointed to these positions not because of their ethnic or religious identity, but because they belong to the Republic of Turkey and are Turkish citizens.
The State of the Republic of Turkey is obliged to find solutions to the economic, social, security, health, education and life problems of its citizens, regardless of their ethnic, religious or sectarian identities. The nation-state approach is not based on denying ethnic, religious or sectarian problems; on the contrary, it is based on solving them on the basis of common citizenship.
However, this approach does not recognize as a legitimate demand for citizenship those who do not want to be included within the framework of the nation-state and who aim to create a separate sphere of political representation through their own ethnic and/or religious-sectarian identities. Solving problems and sharing sovereignty over identities are not the same thing.
The Fallacy of Ethnic Discourse
Recent references to state officials by their ethnic identities, although seemingly well-intentioned, involve an ethnicization that contradicts the nation-state logic of the Republic. Expressions such as “the Minister is Kurdish” or “the Vice President is Zaza” unwittingly present the state as the sum total of ethnic identities. However, in Turkey, a person can hold office at any level of the state not because he or she is Kurdish, but because he or she is Turkish.
If a citizen is employed by the state “because he is Kurdish”, “because he is Arab” or because of his religious/sectarian/communal identity, this is not a nation-state, ethnic/religious quota regime this would be the case. If he is appointed “despite being Kurdish/Arab/Communist”, this is an indirect acceptance of discrimination. The claim of the Republic of Turkey is clear: Ethnic identity/religious identity is neither an obstacle nor a reference for entry into the state.
The European Delusion and Historical Experience
At this point, comparisons with European examples should be handled with care. The fact that a politician of Kurdish origin became a minister in the Netherlands is not the result of an identity politics based on ethnic representation. Dilan Yeşilgöz assumed this position not because she is a Kurd, but because she is a good Dutch citizen, defends the interests of the Dutch state and is loyally integrated into the Dutch political system. Her ethnicity is not the source of her political legitimacy, but part of her personal history. To read “Kurds in Europe become ministers as Kurds” is to be ignorant of the mechanisms of citizenship and the state in Europe.
As a matter of fact, the French Constitutional Council has also made this distinction clear at the constitutional level. The Council ruled that the expression “Corsican people” was unconstitutional, emphasizing that the French State recognizes a single “French People”. The judgment clearly distinguishes between the recognition of cultural differences and the sharing of political sovereignty on an ethnic basis. The State recognizes the diversity of its citizens, but does not share sovereignty between ethnic communities.
Historical experience is clear in this regard. States where political space is shared through ethnic and religious identities, it has been shown time and time again that it does not last. The dissolution of the Ottoman Empire was also the result of the structural weakness created by the division of political space on the basis of communities and identities. The Republic's preference for the nation-state is a conscious rejection of this experience.
The state is a state of citizens, not identities.
Identities are protected, problems are solved, but sovereignty is not divided.