To understand the history of trade unionism in Turkey, it is first necessary to dispel an illusion: Trade unions in this country did not emerge as an organic product of a long class struggle from below, as in Western Europe. Trade unionism in Turkey developed within the controlled framework of state-centered modernization.
The waves of strikes in the last period of the Ottoman Empire (port, tobacco and railway strikes after 1908), while important, failed to produce continuity. In the early Republican period, industrialization was largely carried out by the state. The working class often emerged in state enterprises, not against private capital. This was a factor that shaped the development of class consciousness from the beginning.
The 1947 Trade Union Law granted workers the right to form trade unions, but not the right to strike. This is a critical detail. The state accepted organization but not conflict. The worker could be represented but could not stop production. This was the first structural limit placed on the nature of trade unionism.
1961 Anayasası ile grev ve toplu sözleşme hakkı tanındı. 1963’te yürürlüğe giren yasalarla birlikte işçi sınıfı tarihsel olarak en güçlü hukuki zemine kavuştu. 1960’ların sonunda yaklaşık 2 milyon sigortalı işçi vardı ve sendikalı oranı %40’lara yaklaşmıştı. Bugünkü %14–15 oranıyla kıyaslandığında bu dramatik bir farktır.
But there is an important point here: Legal expansion has not produced a fully autonomous class politics. Trade unions established strong ties with political parties. The distance from the state was never fully built. This created a union culture in the 1970s that was both strong and fragile at the same time.
The June 15-16 resistance of 1970 was the clearest expression of the collective power of the working class. The 1977 May Day massacre in Taksim showed the point of conflict of this power with the state. By the end of the 1970s, the number of official members was approaching 5 million; although academic studies show that the actual effective membership was in the 1.5-2 million range, the unionization rate was high.
This period was the peak of the trade union movement. But it was also the period of the failure to institutionalize the independent class line.
When the September 12, 1980 military coup came, not only were trade unions closed down; the collective memory of the class was also interrupted. The 1982 Constitution and 1983 laws introduced authorization thresholds, strike restrictions and bureaucratic obstacles.
From this point on, trade unionism took a defensive posture.
The first big observation here is this:
Trade unionism in Turkey has never taken root as a fully autonomous class movement. Its permeable relationship with the state and the political system has increased its strength but also its fragility.
Here lies the first root of today's structural weakness.
NEOLIBERAL RESTORATION: PRIVATIZATION, SUBCONTRACTING AND THE SYSTEMATIC EROSION OF UNION POWER
The September 12, 1980 coup politically suppressed the trade union movement. However, what really weakened trade unionism was not the military bans, but the neoliberal economic order that followed. Because repression may be temporary, but the transformation of the regime of production is permanent.
The neoliberal policies implemented in Turkey since the mid-1980s have eroded union power along three main axes:
- Privatization
- Subcontracting
- Flexible and precarious employment model
This triad removed the historical basis of the trade union movement.
Privatization: Dismantling Trade Union Strongholds
Accelerated after 1986 and peaking in the 2000s, the privatization process was not only an economic choice; it was also a class restructuring.
Between 2002 and 2020, privatization revenues in Turkey exceeded $60 billion. TEKEL, TÜPRAŞ, PETKİM, TELEKOM, ports, sugar factories, SEKA, energy distribution companies and many other public enterprises changed hands.
What did these businesses have in common?
High unionization rate.
Kamu işletmelerinde sendikalaşma oranı %70–80 bandındaydı. Toplu sözleşme kapsamı güçlüydü. İş güvencesi yüksekti.
What happened after privatization?
- The number of permanent workers has decreased.
- Chains of subcontractors were set up.
- Fragmented employment structure has emerged.
- The scope of union contracts has narrowed.
This process dramatically reduced the proportion of unionized workers.
1980’lerde sendikalaşma oranı %40’lara yaklaşırken, bugün %14–15 seviyesinde.
This decline is not natural, but the result of a structural choice.
Subcontracting: Fragmented Labor, Weakened Bargaining
The subcontractor system became widespread in Turkey in the 1990s and became the norm in the 2000s.
The union impact of subcontracting is clear:
- The worker is not on the main employer's staff.
- The contract is short.
- Dismissal is easy.
- The workplace organizing threshold is divided.
If there are 1,000 workers in an enterprise and 600 of them are subcontractors, the organizing power is effectively fragmented.
The first person at risk is the subcontracted worker when he or she becomes a union member.
This fear is not individual but systemic.
Service Sector: New Labor Field, Old Trade Union Model
Since the 1990s, the Turkish economy has evolved from an industry-oriented structure to a service-oriented structure.
Today:
- Retail
- Logistics
- Warehouse
- Call centers
- Shopping Mall employees
- Platform economics
has a significant share in total employment.
However, the unionization rate in these sectors is extremely low.
Why?
Because these sectors:
- It involves high labor circulation.
- Works on flexible contracts.
- Under pressure to perform.
- Their anti-union reflexes are strong.
The classical model of industrial unionism could not adapt to this new labor regime.
Strike Postponement and De facto Prohibition Mechanism
One of the most critical tools of the neoliberal era is the systematic use of the strike postponement mechanism.
Many strikes in strategic sectors such as metals, glass, petrochemicals and banks were postponed on the grounds of “national security” or “economic stability”.
The postponement is technically 60 days. However, at the end of 60 days the process goes to the High Arbitration Council and the strike effectively ends.
This mechanism gives the following message:
“The state steps in when the production chain is at risk.”
This makes bargaining power asymmetric.
Decline in Real Wages
In Turkey, the share of wages in national income has declined in the last 10-15 years.
Especially in the post-2016 period:
- Inflation has risen,
- Real wage growth remained limited,
- Dividends have increased in relative terms.
In economies with low unionization rates, the wage share falls.
This is not an ideological thesis; it is a basic observation of political economy.
Neoliberal transformation did not abolish trade unionism.
But he neutralized him.
There is a union.
There is a collective agreement.
There is the right to strike.
But actual power is limited.
This is a systematic restructuring.
RESISTANCE IN NEW LABOR SPACES: MİGROS WAREHOUSE WORKERS, DGD-SEN AND THE CRACKS OF LOGISTICS CAPITALISM
The neoliberal transformation has not only dismantled old industrial strongholds; it has also created a new labor map. Today, the heart of production in Turkey often beats not in the factory but in the warehouse. Supply chains, e-commerce platforms, logistics centers and distribution networks have become the nervous system of modern capitalism. And hundreds of thousands of workers in these areas are excluded from the classical union model.
But here it is necessary to correct a misconception: Disorganization does not mean that there is no opposition.
Migros Warehouse Workers: The Invisible Face of Retail
In 2022, the resistance of workers at the Migros warehouse in Esenyurt, Istanbul, made the labor tensions of the new era visible. The workers’ main demand was an objection to insufficient wage increases in the face of high inflation.
O dönem resmi enflasyon %36 civarındaydı; gıda enflasyonu daha yüksekti. Depo işçilerine önerilen zam oranı ise bu artışı telafi etmiyordu. İşçiler eyleme geçti. Sonuç?
- Layoffs
- Detentions
- Police intervention
- Safety barriers
It was not just about wage negotiations. It was about the “strategic” position of the logistics sector. Because the warehouse is the production line of modern capitalism. If the warehouse stops, the shelves empty. If the shelves are empty, the brand suffers.
Therefore, the reflex against union movements in these sectors is harsher.
DGD-SEN and Alternative Organization Attempt
Structures such as DGD-SEN, which seeks to organize distribution, warehouse and logistics workers, represent a departure from the classic confederation model. These unions usually
- Couriers
- Warehouse workers
- Logistics workers
- Flexible contract laborers
between the two countries.
These areas have this in common:
- High labor turnover
- Short-term contracts
- Subcontractor chains
- Employer reflex against unions
Organizing in these conditions is much more difficult than in the metal factory of the 1970s.
But it is also the area where class tensions are most intense.
Logistics Capitalism: The New Factory
The retail and logistics sector in Turkey has grown exponentially in the last 15 years. The volume of e-commerce has reached billions of dollars. Warehouse and distribution workers constitute the new proletariat.
But trade union protection is extremely limited.
There are two critical issues here:
- Identity
The warehouse worker may not see himself as a “worker”. He/she identifies himself/herself as “operations staff” or “specialist”. - Transience
Average job tenure is low. The psychology of “I am already temporary” makes it difficult to organize.
This psychology is not accidental; it is generated by the system.
Security Reflex in the State-Capital Axis
The logistics and distribution chain is the sweet spot of the modern economy. Therefore, any collective action in this area can quickly become a matter of “public order”.
This shows that the legal framework of the trade union movement and the security mechanism are intertwined.
New Generation, New Language
Young workers are distant from the classical trade union bureaucracy. They are:
- Demands transparency
- Digital communication requires
- Demands fast results
- No hierarchy
If the classical model does not transform, new forms of organization will emerge.
Trade unionism is not dead in Turkey today.
But it has not yet been institutionalized in new areas of labor.
Examples like the Migros warehouse resistance and DGD-SEN show this:
Class tensions are alive.
But the organizational channel is weak.
This space holds the potential to break the future.
SYSTEMATIC NARROWING OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT: STRIKE RIGHT OR STRIKE POSTPONEMENT REGIME?
In Turkey, the right to strike is a constitutional right. Article 54 of the 1982 Constitution explicitly recognizes the right to strike. If you look at the legal text, there is no problem. But the issue is not the text, but the practice. There is a right to strike in Turkey, but it is de facto limited in strategic sectors. This is the point that weakens the heart of trade unionism.
What is the real power of a trade union?
The threat of a strike at the collective bargaining table.
If the threat of a strike is not credible, the bargaining is not symmetrical.
Strike Postponement Mechanism: Technical Tool, Political Outcome
In Turkey, the government can postpone strikes for 60 days on grounds of “national security” or “public health”. On paper this is a “postponement”. In practice, it is often a de facto ban.
Because:
- The strike is postponed.
- After 60 days the dispute goes to the High Arbitration Council.
- The Arbitral Tribunal shall render a binding decision.
- The strike is de facto abolished.
This mechanism has been used many times in the last 20 years.
The postponement of strikes in sectors such as metal, glass, banking and petrochemicals has weakened union bargaining power.
“National Security” Justification
The fundamental question to be asked here is this:
How does a worker's demand for wages threaten national security?
Most of the decisions to postpone strikes were taken on the grounds of economic stability and production chain. This shows that:
Production continuity in strategic sectors has been put ahead of the right to collective bargaining.
This makes union power technically available but strategically limited.
The Psychology of Strike Postponement
This mechanism is not only a legal limitation; it is also a psychological deterrent.
There is a perception on the worker's side:
“The strike will be postponed anyway.”
There is a perception on the employer's side:
“The state steps in when necessary.”
This asymmetry is felt at the bargaining table.
International Comparison
OECD ülkelerinde sendikalaşma oranı ortalama %15–20 civarındadır. Türkiye de benzer oranlara sahiptir. Ancak fark şudur:
Many European countries have a sectoral contracting system.
The right to strike is de facto enforceable.
The arbitral mechanism is used exceptionally.
In Turkey:
- The mandate threshold is high.
- Strike postponement is common.
- Subcontractor chains make it difficult to organize.
So while the ratio is similar, the power is not.
Real Wage and Strike Relationship
Real wage growth in Turkey has been limited in the last 10-15 years. Inflation has seriously eroded wages, especially in the post-2021 period.
In an economy where the threat of strikes is weak, the wage share falls.
This is not just a theoretical proposition; it is an observable trend with data.
The right to strike exists in Turkey, but it is de facto limited in strategic areas.
This is the union:
- An institution that manages a negotiation procedure,
- A structure that makes press releases,
- An organization that produces symbols
to become a part of the world.
But the union should be a force that can stop production.
The Great Contradiction
As the distance between the constitutional right and actual practice widens, union confidence weakens.
This is a problem not only for the worker but also for democracy.
Because the right to strike is one of the fundamental instruments of economic democracy.
CIVIL SERVANT UNIONISM: HIGH MEMBERSHIP RATE, LIMITED STRIKE RIGHTS AND THE POLITICALIZATION KNOT
When we talk about trade unionism in Turkey, most of the time we talk about private sector workers. However, in terms of quantity, public sector workers are the most organized segment of the union sector. However, there is a great paradox here: Membership is high, but bargaining power is limited.
Today, there are approximately Around 5 million public employees are available. Unionization rate of civil servants according to official data %60’ın üzerindedir. This rate is close to four times that of the private sector.
On paper the picture is strong:
- Major confederations
- High membership rate
- Institutionalized collective bargaining process
But the critical question here is this:
Does this organization produce real bargaining power?
Trade Union without the Right to Strike
The most fundamental structural problem of civil servants' unions is this:
They have no right to strike.
There is a collective bargaining process. However, in case of dispute, the final say goes to the arbitration mechanism. This distinguishes public unionism from labor unionism.
Without the right to strike, there is limited real leverage at the bargaining table.
Therefore, while civil servants' unionism is quantitatively strong, it is strategically limited.
Inflation and Public Salaries
In recent years, public employees' salaries have been seriously eroded by high inflation.
Post-2021 period:
- Salary increases have lagged behind inflation.
- Diluted increases have been on the agenda.
- Real purchasing power has fallen.
This shows that bargaining power is limited despite the high membership rate.
Politicization and Belonging
The second main issue in civil servant unionism is politicization.
A significant portion of public employees make union choices based on ideological and political affiliation.
This has the following consequences:
- Class consciousness becomes secondary.
- The choice of union is based on identity, not economics.
- The bargaining process is shaped by the political atmosphere, not the technical one.
This structure weakens the independent class line.
Corporate Comfort and Culture of Action
Since there is no right to strike, the culture of mass action is weak in civil servants' unions. Actions are mostly in the form of press releases or rallies.
This makes the union an institution of negotiation, not of struggle.
Long-term leadership and centralized decision-making processes also limit grassroots participation.
Contradiction
In the private sector:
- Unionization is low
- The right to strike exists but is de facto limited
Public sector:
- Unionization is high
- No right to strike
Neither model produces full power.
This contributes to the overall weakening of the trade union space.
Civil servant unionism in Turkey is quantitatively strong but structurally limited.
A trade union is incomplete without the right to strike.
When political affiliation predominates, class identity weakens.
Therefore, public trade unionism is also experiencing a crisis of representation.
UNION BUREAUCRACY, YELLOW UNIONISM AND THE CRISIS OF REPRESENTATION: DISSOLUTION FROM WITHIN
We are now entering a more disturbing area.
It is easy to attribute the weakening of trade unionism in Turkey solely to the state, solely to neoliberal policies or solely to employer pressure. But it is incomplete. Because there is also an internal unraveling: bureaucratization and a crisis of representation.
If the union loses touch with the rank and file, even without external pressure, it will be weakened.
Bureaucratization: From Struggle to Institution
In many unions the leadership remains unchanged for many years. The positions of general chair, general secretary and central management have become de facto jobs.
This has three consequences:
- Trade unionism becomes a permanent career field, not temporary representation.
- The distance between the base and the center opens.
- Decision-making is done by narrow cadres.
This structure dulls the dynamism of struggle.
The union ceases to be a class organization and turns into a corporate apparatus.
Yellow Trade Unionism: Beyond the Slogan
“The term ”yellow union" is used a lot in Turkey. But it needs to be filled in.
Yellow unionism is this:
- Avoid conflict with the employer,
- Not using the threat of a strike,
- Presenting the minimum increase as a “big win”,
- A structure that does not involve the grassroots in the decision-making process.
This does not always mean open cooperation. It often takes the form of accommodationism.
If the collective bargaining outcome is a few percentage points above inflation, but real purchasing power is falling, the contract is not strong.
Loss of Grassroots Trust
The most dangerous stage is this:
The worker begins to see the union as not his or her own.
At this point:
- Membership becomes a formality.
- Participation drops.
- Paying dues becomes a habit, but the consciousness of struggle weakens.
This does not prevent the union from maintaining a visible presence, but it reduces its influence.
May 1st and the Politics of Symbols
Fields can be filled.
Rallies can be held.
Slogans can be shouted.
But if the next day there is no wage increase at the workplace, if working hours do not decrease, if precarity persists, symbolism is limited.
The strength of the union is measured in the contract, not on the rostrum.
Financial Transparency and Accountability
In many unions, financial transparency is limited. Dues are collected, the center manages, reports are kept to a narrow circle.
New generations of employees demand transparency.
Closed structures are not sustainable in the digital age.
Trade unionism in Turkey has been weakened as much by internal stagnation as by external pressure.
If the union
- If the grassroots referendum is not held,
- If it does not impose time limits on administrators,
- Does not provide fiscal transparency,
- If it cannot reach new sectors,
That union is not a fighting organization, it is an administrative structure.
This criticism is not hostility; it is a call for transformation.
NEW LABOR REGIME: PLATFORM WORKERS, WHITE-COLLAR INSECURITY AND THE EROSION OF CLASS IDENTITY
It would be incomplete to explain the crisis of trade unionism in Turkey only in terms of legal restrictions or bureaucratic problems. The real break lies in the transformation of the production and labor regime. There is a structural difference between the 20th century's factory-centered working class and the 21st century's dispersed, digitalized and precarious mass of labor.
And the trade union model is still largely designed according to the old regime.
Platform Economy: Blurring Worker Identity
In the last decade, the platform economy in Turkey has grown rapidly.
- Food and grocery delivery couriers
- E-commerce logistics employees
- Drivers working through the app
- Freelance digital laborers
Their numbers are growing. However, their legal status is often kept in a gray area.
The basic strategy is this:
Define the employee as a “partner” or “independent worker”, not as an “employee”.
The result of this definition:
- No seniority
- No union rights
- No job security
- Limited social security
This model is the new norm of global capitalism. In Turkey, it is applied more harshly due to weak regulatory oversight.
Couriers Workers of the New Factory
Tens of thousands of couriers work in Turkey today. These workers are
- Working long hours
- Under performance pressure with bonus system
- High risk of traffic and work accidents
- Experiencing income volatility
But a significant number of them do not see themselves as “workers” but as “self-employed”.
This contradiction between identity and material reality creates a psychological barrier to union organizing.
But when the hike rate falls, the commission rate rises or the cost of fuel rises, the collective reaction emerges.
This shows that: Class tension has not disappeared; it has changed its form.
The Silent Precarity of White Collar Workers
Turkey's university graduate population has grown rapidly. The service sector expanded. The number of white-collar workers increased.
However:
- Limited real wage growth
- Weak job security
- High pressure to perform
- Contract work is widespread
Many white-collar workers continue to define themselves as “middle class”. But their income and indebtedness levels are approaching those of the classical working class.
This delay in consciousness makes union organizing difficult.
“I am not a worker” raises the collective threshold.
Transience and Circulation Regime
The most prominent feature of the new labor regime is temporariness.
- Short average job tenure
- Flexible contracts
- Easy to dismiss
In these conditions the worker thinks:
“I'm temporary anyway. It's not worth the risk for the union.”
This psychology is not accidental; it is the result of the production model.
Cultural Individualization and the Erasure of Class
In the last 30 years, the narrative of individual success has strengthened in Turkey.
- The myth of entrepreneurship
- Emphasis on personal career
- Competition culture
This cultural atmosphere has weakened collective consciousness.
But the economic reality has not changed:
- Rent/income ratio increased
- Indebtedness soared
- High youth unemployment
The contradiction between the material reality and the ideological narrative is deepening.
Trade Unions' Adaptation Problem
The classical trade union structure:
- Factory-centered
- Based on the assumption of long-term employment
- Hierarchical
The new labor regime:
- Digital
- Messy
- Flexible
- Fast
Unless this incompatibility is addressed, the trade union movement cannot take root in new labor areas.
The crisis of trade unionism in Turkey is not only political but also sociological and cultural.
Class identity is dissolved.
The labor structure is fragmented.
Consciousness is dispersed.
But the contradiction has not disappeared.
Labor-capital tensions persist.
This tension either produces new forms of organization or leads to prolonged apathy.
THE THRESHOLD OF UNIONISM IN TURKEY AND THE HARSH REALITY: STRUCTURAL WEAKENING OR THE BIRTH OF A NEW CLASS MOVEMENT?
Now let's put the picture in all its nakedness.
Turkey:
- There are close to 17 million registered workers.
- The number of unionized workers is about 2.4 million.
- Oran %14–15.
- The rate is much lower in the private sector.
- Strikes are being postponed.
- There is no right to strike in public sector unions.
- The logistics and platform sectors are largely unorganized.
- The union bureaucracy is losing confidence.
- Real wages have been under pressure for a long time.
To underestimate this picture would be a conscious denial.
This is not a cyclical fluctuation.
This is structural weakening.
But the real issue here is this:
Is weight loss permanent or is it the pain of a new transformation?
1. Labor Regime Hardened, Income Regime Deteriorated
Over the last decade, the share of wages in national income in Turkey has been volatile but generally under pressure. Real wages have eroded during periods of high inflation. Although minimum wage increases may seem high in nominal terms, they have rapidly eroded in the face of inflation.
Rental prices have increased, household indebtedness has risen, and housing and future prospects for young people have weakened.
This picture is directly related to the weakness of the unions.
Because unorganized labor is labor with weak bargaining power.
2. Silent Impoverishment or Social Fracture?
The most dangerous scenario in Turkey today is not a sudden explosion but a prolonged silent erosion.
Community:
- Works longer
- Can save less
- Living more precariously
But because collective channels are weak, the reaction remains scattered.
This has two consequences:
- Strengthening of political populism
- Social apathy
Neither of these means strengthening the trade union movement.
3. Where can a new class movement come from?
If there is to be transformation, it can emerge from three areas:
- Logistics and couriers: fast and visible mobilization
- White-collar workers: potential for cultural disruption
- Industry: sector with high economic impact
But three conditions are necessary for this potential to become a reality:
- Trust
- Transparency
- Real strike power
Without these, the organization will not last.
4. Reform or Pressure?
In centralized political systems like Turkey, reform from above does not come easily. Legislation cannot change without pressure from below.
But if the pressure is unorganized, it will dissipate.
Transformation is therefore only two-way:
- Organized demand from below
- Legal reform from above
The absence of one neutralizes the other.
The crisis of trade unionism in Turkey is not only a problem of trade unions. It is a crisis of economic democracy.
If labor receives a smaller share of national income,
if the right to strike is de facto limited,
if new areas of labor are unorganized,
it is not only a question of wages.
It is a question of power.
And power does not exist in a vacuum.
If the unions cannot fill this gap,
either the authoritarian order is strengthened
or uncontrolled social fractures occur.
Trade unionism has weakened in Turkey.
Yes, structurally weakened.
But the labor-capital contradiction has not disappeared.
This contradiction either produces an organized transformation
or normalizes prolonged silent impoverishment.
Today we are at the threshold.
Either the unions will transform themselves:
- Going Digital
- Strengthen grassroots democracy
- Fight for the right to strike
- Expanding into new sectors
or it will cede its historical role to other collective forms.
The hard truth is this:
The class struggle does not end.
Only the form of organization changes.
If the organization does not change,
disorganization becomes permanent.
And unorganized labor pays the most expensive price.