This study analyzes the relations between the Kurdish political-military movement in Rojava and the Russian Federation in the context of the Syrian civil war. It argues that this relationship should not be evaluated in terms of normative concepts such as “betrayal” or “abandonment”, but in terms of state wisdom, strategic priorities and long-term political rationality. The main thesis of the article is that Russia considers the Kurds within the Syrian state integrity, whereas the Kurdish movement rejects state-centered integration and pursues a tactical line based on power accumulation. The result of this choice has produced geopolitical isolation rather than military gains.
The Syrian civil war has revealed not only the military balances but also the nature of relations between states, peoples and great powers. The relationship between the Kurdish political-military movement in Rojava and Russia has often been treated in an emotional and normative language, which has weakened analytical clarity.
However, this relationship becomes more understandable when evaluated within the framework of state continuity, conflict of interest and strategic reading rather than moral judgments.
This article aims to analyze Russia-Rojava relations on an analytical basis and to systematically examine the preferences of the Kurdish movement, Russia's approach and the balance established with the Assad regime along the lines of ANALYSIS-THESIS-CONCLUSION.
Russia's Syria Policy: State Continuity and Regime Stability
For the Russian Federation, Syria is a matter of state continuity and regional balance rather than a temporary sphere of influence. Moscow's main objective is the survival of the Assad regime and the prevention of Syria's disintegration.
In this context, Russia has considered all actors on the ground - including the Kurds - within the integrity of the Syrian state.
Russia's approach towards the Kurds is shaped around the following principles:
1. Kurds are not enemies but a structural element of Syrian society.
2. Autonomy can be discussed, but without severing ties with the central state.
3. The legitimization of permanent, non-state armed structures is unacceptable.
This approach is not ideological, but state-centered and pragmatic. The principle of “state survival”, which is the basic assumption of the realist theory of international relations, is clearly observed in Moscow's Syria policy.
The Nature of the Relationship between the Assad Regime and the Kurds
Contrary to the popular narrative, the Assad regime has never positioned the Kurds as an existential enemy. In the post-2011 period, the regime's withdrawal from Kurdish areas is the result of a realignment of military and political priorities rather than an ethnic or political purge.
This withdrawal has created an important room for maneuver for the Kurdish political-military movement. However, how this space will be utilized will determine the strategic direction of the process.
However, the historical background of the Kurdish movement's distant approach to the central government cannot be ignored. The problems of identity, citizenship and representation in Syria in the past have produced a serious distrust of full integration with the center. This distrust should be considered as a determining psychological and political factor in shaping strategic preferences.
Strategic Orientation of the Kurdish Political-Military Movement
The Kurdish movement has read the emerging authority vacuum through the following assumption: First, to accumulate military and de facto power on the ground, and then to use this power as a tool for political negotiation.
This approach has produced territorial dominance and military gains in the short term, but in the long term it has produced a line of tension with the state mind.
The possibility of integration with Damascus has often been seen by the Kurdish movement as a risk of dependency; instead of sharing power with the center, it has preferred to accumulate power as an element of pressure against the center.
The US Factor and Strategic Break
This orientation gradually brought the Kurdish movement into a closer and institutionalized relationship with the US. Although the alliance with the US led to certain gains at the military level, it did not produce state guarantees.
As in the Iraqi experience, the US has appeared as a protective actor on the ground, but has not assumed permanent political responsibility.
For Russia, this choice has a clear meaning: The Kurdish movement has chosen the Washington line over the Damascus-Moscow line. For the great powers, such choices narrow the gray areas and bring about strategic distancing.
Rejection of the State-Centered Solution and its Consequences
The basic thesis of this article is this:
The tension in Rojava is the result of the Kurdish political-military movement's rejection of a state-centered solution and its preference for tactical politics based on accumulating power, rather than Russia's exclusion of the Kurds.
Under conditions where a state is under threat of disintegration, alliances between non-state actors and external powers struggle to generate long-term legitimacy. While such choices may provide short-term military advantages, in the long run they risk political isolation.
The Rojava experience provides a concrete example of the tension between legitimate demands and strategic choices. The historical grievances and legitimate demands of the Kurdish people do not automatically eliminate the geopolitical consequences of the policies pursued.
The picture can be summarized as follows:
1. Russia has pursued a consistent line in line with its state interests.
2. The Assad regime has aimed to keep the Kurds within the state structure rather than liquidate them.
3. The Kurdish political-military movement, on the other hand, has preferred temporary alliances based on power instead of long-term state politics.
The result of these choices has been more costly than military gains: geopolitical isolation.
The case of Rojava is an important political laboratory that shows the limits of the strategic positioning of non-state actors in a geography where great power competition is intensifying.
The capacity to generate lasting legitimacy in the international system is still largely shaped by state structures. The balance between tactical power accumulation and long-term political institutionalization is therefore crucial.
This study has been written not to produce polemics, but to record a political process on an analytical level. The Rojava experience will continue to be topical for understanding the tension between state wisdom and movement politics.