The situation that has emerged in the CHP is no longer just an internal party debate; it has become an issue that concerns the institutional balances of Turkish politics.
The field of political power that has formed around Ekrem İmamoğlu has been discussed within the party for a long time. It cannot be denied that İmamoğlu has had a significant impact on the CHP's recent fractures. Traces of this influence were seen in many topics ranging from local election processes to internal party cadre struggles.
But it is not only about Ekrem İmamoğlu.
The critical point is the contradiction created by Özgür Özel's political position.
Because the most risky situation in the history of politics is leadership styles that play two different power centers at the same time. Trying to manage the balances within the party on the one hand, and following a line that oscillates between conflict and compromise with the government on the other, creates serious fractures in institutional structures.
There are examples of this in Turkish political history.
In the 1990s, weakened party leaderships disrupted the internal balance of political institutions and intra-party struggles turned into crises that directly affected national governance. There is a risk of a similar situation today.
This is precisely why Özgür Özel's policy deserves to be described as a “bomb with the pin pulled”.
Because it is a political position that plays on two different targets at the same time;
and a crisis of confidence within the party,
and it generates serious uncertainties in the political system.
A leader either stands behind a political line, or he or she is engaged in an open struggle to change that line.
But trying to control both areas at the same time weakens institutional structures from within.
In a geopolitically critical country like Turkey, the weakening of the main opposition is not just a party problem. It directly affects the democratic balance and the institutional security of the state.
Because a strong opposition is necessary not only to win elections but also for the proper functioning of the state order.
In the political history of the Republican People's Party, leadership has always been established by taking direct responsibility.
Under İsmet İnönü, the party was governed with a state-building reflex.
Under Bülent Ecevit, the leadership was established through a social movement.
Under Deniz Baykal, although internal party struggles were fierce, the leadership was carried out by assuming direct political responsibility.
Under Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, after many years, the CHP moved to a line of contact with broad social segments with the claim of being the alternative to the government. Despite all the controversies, Kılıçdaroğlu did not take refuge in the shadow of another political figure, but took direct political responsibility.
Today, a different picture emerges.
On the one hand, the political force field created by Ekrem İmamoğlu,
On the other side, a president who tries to produce politics by hiding behind this field.
This is not just a leadership debate.
It is also a question of institutional weight.
Because in politics, you cannot build leadership with entrusted power.
Politics conducted by shielding someone else's power may create space in the short term, but in the long term it weakens the institution.
This is precisely the question that needs to be asked:
Who will put a stop to this ambiguous political line emerging in Turkey's main opposition party?
Internal party mechanisms?
Political tradition?
Or rational cadres who prioritize the seriousness of the state?
Because history has shown us time and time again:
Where the state mind is weakened, the noise of politics rises.
But that noise is often a harbinger of crisis.
And the simplest rule of political history is this:
As the shadow grows, the leader shrinks.