It is intellectually lazy to start the media crisis in Turkey today. Because the confrontation we are experiencing today is rooted in the journalistic culture of yesterday. Bab-ı Âli was not just a neighborhood; it was a professional ethic. Journalism was not an investment item, but a public claim. The Bab-ı Âli tradition was not flawless. There was censorship. There was pressure. But the journalist was a personality. He was the owner of the pen. He was not just an economic apparatus of the boss. The newspaper carried political views, but it also carried intellectual weight. The writing was polemical, but it did not generate personal loyalty. In the Republican era, journalism gained public intellectualism. The columnist was not only a commentator, but an idea producer. It was possible to criticize the state. There was risk, but there was also professional honor.
He is one of the symbols of this line: Ugur Mumcu. Mumcu's journalism was based on documents, research and shadowy relations. He wrote about internal state structures, arms smuggling, political-financial connections. He was assassinated in 1993. Another name: Cetin Emeç. He was killed by gunfire in 1990. These murders were not just individual tragedies. They were a clear message to journalism: If you dig deep, you will pay a price. The first break occurred here. The physical threat narrowed the professional field. But the real transformation came later.
Holding Journalism's Entry into Economic Dependency
Since the late 1990s, media ownership has changed structurally. Journalism was transformed from ideological capital into a part of economic capital. Today, the structures in the mainstream bloc are: Turkuvaz Media Group, Demirören Holding, Ciner Media Holding. These structures do not only operate media. They are involved in energy, infrastructure, mining and public projects. Now let's ask the basic question: To what extent can the media arm of a conglomerate that has billions of liras of economic relations with the state control that state? This is not conspiracy. This is the math of interests.
No one has to give instructions to the editor. The corporate risk calculation already draws the line. If a conglomerate is involved in public tenders, if it uses state bank loans, if it is dependent on regulatory authority, its capacity for editorial risk-taking naturally shrinks. This is not open censorship. It is economic self-discipline. And economic self-discipline is more effective than outright prohibition.
Public Broadcasting and the Power Multiplier
There is a special position in this picture: TRT. Public broadcasting is theoretically based on the principle of impartiality. However, when the perception of impartiality becomes controversial through screen time and frame preferences, the media balance is disrupted. If public broadcasting does not represent equality, private media imbalance becomes even more visible.
First phase: Bab-ı Âli → personal journalism.
Second phase Assassination period → physical threat.
Third phase: Conglomeration → economic dependency.
The journalist is no longer just a penholder; he or she is an actor in the corporate risk equation. Journalism has turned from a profession of honor into a part of the architecture of power. And this transformation prepared the next phase: party televangelization and open political confrontation.
Saraçhane, the ‘Fund’ Effect and the Troll Economy
Holding companies narrowed the media space economically. The next phase was the political crystallization of this narrowing: party television. It is not necessary to carry a party logo to become a party television. Systematic asymmetry of screen time, one-way agenda selection and loss of critical distance are sufficient. Today, Turkuvaz Media Group, Demirören Holding and Ciner Broadcasting Holding, which are in the mainstream bloc, produce a frame that systematically centers the perspective of power. This is done not only through the language of news, but also through the choice of guests, the order of headlines and the way crises are presented. The narrative of stability is repeated. The language of risk is constructed through opposition. This is a clear political alignment. However, to complete the picture, it is necessary to look at the opposite front.
Now it's the opposite block: Halk TV, Tele 1, Sözcü TV. These channels position themselves as elements of balance. However, the line between balance and counter-balance is often thin. The language of constant crisis produces mobilization, but a state of constant alarm does not produce social trust. When every development becomes a regime break, every judicial process a democracy threshold, every economic data a narrative of collapse, voters develop immunity after a while. Mobilization is short-term gain; trust is long-term capital.
The Saraçhane process is the symbolic moment of this transformation. Saraçhane turned into a broadcasting center, not just a municipal center. Live broadcasting tools, constant connections, social media synchronization... The distance between the television and the square disappeared. This was mobilization media. The media consolidation around Ekrem İmamoğlu is an example of the construction of a personal political brand through the media. Systematic criticism in the ruling media, systematic protection in the opposition media... This two-way structure weakens the journalistic reflex. If a politician is constantly protected, the control mechanism does not work. This is not a personal but a structural observation.
Let's come to the issue of “funding”. During the Saraçhane process, a distinct discourse was produced in the ruling media: foreign connection, funded media, international support. The concept of “funding” was transformed from a discussion of technical financing into a discussion of political legitimacy. The message was clear: This media and this politics are not local. This framework mobilizes the nationalist reflex. However, the critical distinction here is this: Is the funding debate for transparency or for political delegitimization? If the goal is transparency, then all media funding should be equally disclosed. If it is directed only at certain actors, then this discourse is a political tool. At this point, the issue is not financing but the production of legitimacy.
On the opposition front, the media shield has strengthened. The post-election digital lynching of Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu intensified during the 38th Congress. The leadership change within the Republican People's Party was not only an intra-party competition; it was also a digital mobilization war. Coordinated accounts, anonymous networks, trend manipulations... The troll economy is not unique to the government. Organized digital pressure mechanisms have also emerged within the opposition. A significant part of the criticism against Kılıçdaroğlu was not political analysis but the language of character assassination. In this new media culture, viral impact, not ideas, has become decisive.
What does the algorithm reward? Harsh language. Personal attacks. Conflict. Visibility = engagement. Interaction = advertising value. Trolling thus thrives not only on political but also on economic incentives. The infrastructure of this digital space is not native: Google, Meta Platforms. While political blocs in Turkey struggle against each other, most of the digital advertising revenue goes to global platforms. Political struggle is local, economic gain is global. This double dependency makes the media dependent on both local capital and global algorithms.
The bottom line is this: The ruling media institutionalized stability. Opposition media institutionalized crisis. Two separate realities have emerged. The audience turns on the screen not for information but for confirmation. The media is becoming a camp space, not a public space. Loyalty, not truth, becomes decisive in the campground.
Election Media, Common Reality and the Crossroads
Election periods reveal the true character of the media. Alignments that are hidden in normal times become visible during the campaign. Elections are not only about the ballot box; they are a race for visibility. It is the media architecture that determines visibility. If screen time is asymmetrical, if the language of crisis and the language of stability create two separate universes, that election produces not only political competition but psychological segregation.
The ruling media intensifies the stability frame during election periods. TRT public broadcasting is obliged by the principle of equality. Screen time is the silent measure of democracy. If there is a significant asymmetry between political blocs, this is not a technical but a political issue. The typical narrative in the ruling media is clear: the economic problem is the global wave, security policy is survival, opposition criticism is risk. This narrative does not shout; it repeats. And repetition perpetuates perception.
Opposition media, on the other hand, raise the tone of the crisis. Halk TV, Tele 1, Sözcü TV frame economic data as a failure to manage, the judicial process as a regime crisis, and security policy as authoritarianism. This generates mobilization. However, the constant state of alarm erodes the voters' mental resilience. Politics cannot be sustained on anger alone. Block consolidation is not the same as building a social majority.
At this point, the example of Ekrem İmamoğlu becomes important again. Political figures who grow through media mobilization produce strong personal brands. However, if institutional politics is not built at the same pace, the party becomes dependent on media energy instead of strategy. If the media wind changes direction, political momentum drops. This is not just about an actor; it is a structural risk analysis. Likewise, the digital lynching Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu was subjected to during the 38th Congress is an example of the intra-party debate shifting to the media-troll axis. The struggle for leadership within the Republican People's Party is a democratic process, but when it is shaped by digital manipulation, political culture is eroded. Criticism is one thing, lynching is another.
We are in the age of digital choice. Google and Meta Platforms algorithms reward high engagement, not calm analysis. High engagement is driven by anger, fear and conflict. Micro-targeting means everyone sees a different campaign. The common ground for discussion narrows. Voters do not know which message reaches them through which data. Transparency decreases and the possibility of manipulation increases.
Today in Turkey, the same election is taking place in two different psychological universes. Stability in one universe, crisis in the other. The audience no longer asks “is the news true?”; they ask “which side is this from?”. This is a critical threshold for democracy. Because democracy is not only about the ballot box; it requires a common ground of knowledge. If common truth collapses, the ballot box becomes mechanized.
If the current structure continues, the picture is clear: the ruling media will become more consolidated, the opposition media will become more hardened, the digital space will become more radicalized, the troll economy will become institutionalized. Loyalty will increase and trust will decrease. Loyalty may strengthen politics, but it weakens democracy.
At this point, the reform debate is not romanticism; it is a necessity. Clarifying the distinction between media and public procurement, linking the distribution of public advertisements and official announcements to objective criteria, making TRT pluralistic, removing regulatory bodies from the logic of political quotas, transparency of ownership and financing, algorithmic visibility and political ad openness requirement for digital platforms, screen time equality protocol during election periods, assurance of editorial independence for journalists and independent monitoring mechanism against digital manipulation networks... These are not technical details, but democratic infrastructure.
Without reform, hardening is easy. Hardening produces mobilization. But in the long run it destroys the common ground. The media can continue to generate power, but if it does not produce control, the system gets stuck in its own echo chambers.
The line from Bab-ı Âli to today is clear: from personal journalism to physical threat, from there to economic dependence, party televangelization and digital radicalization. Now we are at a crossroads. Either the media will remain a campground or it will return to the realm of public control.
The easy thing is to harden.
Reform is the hard part.
But it's always the difficult ones that last.