The revolutionary tradition, which claims social transformation, historically represents not only a particular political orientation but also one of the most radical veins of criticism in modern political thought. This tradition includes not only the goal of transforming existing power relations but also the claim to reconstruct forms of political representation, mechanisms of legitimacy production and the horizon of social imagination. For this reason, revolutionary politics should be considered not only as a struggle for power but also as a search for an epistemological, ethical and ontological break. However, one of the most prominent tendencies observed in today's political conjuncture is the gradual redefinition of this radical critical legacy within the institutional boundaries of the politics of order. This redefinition often proceeds through the selective recall of historical baggage and the silencing of disturbing memories.
This process of redefinition is not accidental. When the historical adventure of revolutionary movements is examined, it is seen that these movements were not only eliminated through repression; they were also absorbed and neutralized by the hegemonic political order. Antonio Gramsci's conceptualization of hegemony provides an important analytical framework for making sense of this process. Hegemony operates not only through the apparatus of force but also through the mechanisms of consent production and ideological internalization. In this context, the dissolution of the revolutionary tradition within the parties of order is not merely an organizational change of orientation; it is the result of the hegemonic political order channeling oppositional energy into forms of representation within the system. This channelization is not only specific to contemporary politics; the reorganization of historical memory is also part of this process.
In Turkey today, this channelization operates in different ways. The Republican People's Party, the main actor of center politics, presents its pragmatic relations with right-wing parties as a “strategy of compulsory democracy” while conducting broad alliance politics; however, it often keeps its relations with socialist parties distant and controlled. This is not just a tactic, but a hegemonic framework that has internalized the limits of the politics of representation. However, there is a deeper issue here: This party, while historically being the founding force of the Republic, has also been the political carrier of the authoritarian practices of the single party era. This dual legacy cannot be ignored in terms of the politics of memory.
Sabahattin Ali's murder in 1948 was not directly recorded as a party decision; however, when evaluated in the context of the political atmosphere of the period, the functioning of the security apparatus and the repression against the leftist opposition, it cannot be considered outside the sphere of responsibility of the single party regime. Nâzım Hikmet's long years of imprisonment and deprivation of citizenship is not a matter that can be explained solely by judicial techniques; the political climate, state ideology and anti-leftist reflexes were decisive in the background of these decisions. These historical experiences show that the revolutionary tradition was limited not only by external pressure but also within the state practice shaped by the founding party of the Republic.
Therefore, when discussing the pragmatic politics of representation today, it is not possible to move forward by erasing these breaking moments of the past from memory. Memory is not only a field of achievements to be proud of, but also of political choices that need to be confronted. If the revolutionary tradition is to maintain its claim of historical continuity, it must also critically evaluate the distance taken by the founding party of the Republic towards leftist thought.
Although the concept of realpolitik emphasizes the need to act within the existing balance of power, it can lead to a blurring of the boundary between the strategic flexibility of revolutionary politics and integration into the system. This blurring has also been observed historically. In 1972, when the death sentences of Deniz Gezmiş, Yusuf Aslan and Hüseyin İnan were voted in the Parliament, different attitudes emerged within the CHP; although the party did not vote “yes” as a bloc, some deputies supported the executions, some abstained and some opposed them. The discourse of “tacit support” was used as a means of legitimization in the political atmosphere of this period. However, the result did not change: The executions took place. This event shows the historical impact of the limits of the politics of representation and real political calculations on revolutionary youth.
These examples reveal that hegemonic absorption operates not only in contemporary alliance politics but also in historical decision moments. Concepts such as the survival of the state, the stability of the order and political balance were prioritized over revolutionary demands; the claim for radical transformation was coded as “extremism”. This coding continues today in different forms.
The question is open:
While the alliance with right-wing parties is defended as “realism”, how to explain the historical distance from the left opposition?
This question is addressed not only to contemporary actors but to all political structures that claim historical continuity.
Representation, the Position of the Left and the Contradictions of Alliance Politics
These historical examples show that the revolutionary tradition was neutralized not only through repression and bans, but also by narrowing the boundaries of political legitimacy. The dark atmosphere surrounding the murder of Sabahattin Ali, the conviction and de-citizenship of Nâzım Hikmet, the differences of stance within the Parliament during the execution process of Deniz Gezmiş and his friends; each of these provide historical cross-sections on how the tension between the state and revolutionary thought is managed in the field of representation. What is decisive here is not only overt repression, but also the continuity of political reflexes that prioritize the preservation of order.
This process of absorption often accelerates after periods of defeat, political decline and organizational dissolution. Historically, the moments of rupture experienced by revolutionary movements are determined not only by shifts in the material balance of power, but also by how the political subject makes sense of its own historical experience. Defeat is not necessarily the end of revolutionary politics. However, when defeat leads to pragmatic strategies of adaptation instead of producing a critical historical consciousness, it weakens the constitutive claim of the revolutionary tradition. At this point, the discourse of “realpolitik” functions as an ideological repositioning, often presented as a historical necessity. There is a structural similarity between the language of “forced choice” seen in the past in death penalty votes or political judicial processes and the language of “democratic necessity” used in alliance politics today.
The current picture of the left-socialist field in Turkey is shaped precisely by this tension. The Communist Party of Turkey, while trying to maintain its ideological clarity and anti-system position, faces the problem of social scale. The Workers' Party of Turkey has reached a wide audience through parliamentary visibility, but faces the question of how to preserve its radical discourse within the limits of representation. Although the Labor Party focuses on class-based struggle, it faces visibility problems due to the shrinking trade union space and the pressure of electoral-centered politics. The DEM Party, on the other hand, has to act within the limits of intense pressure and legitimacy while maintaining its identity, democracy and local government-oriented line in the parliamentary arena. This picture reveals not only the differences in organizational power but also the structural narrowing effect of the field of representation.
A critical contradiction emerges here:
When CHP aligns with right-wing parties, this is defended as a “democratic necessity”, while rapprochement with socialist parties is often limited on the grounds of “risk of vote loss” or “marginalization”. This approach shows that the hegemonic center is expanding to the right rather than to the left. This expansion is not just a current tactic; it is the continuation of a political reflex with historical continuity. The tendency to produce a center that is compatible with the state mind rather than a tense distance from the state has been part of the long-term political character of the founding party of the Republic.
In a situation where the left is not called to the center and the center is expanded towards the right, the dissolution of the revolutionary tradition within the order becomes inevitable. This dissolution is more dangerous than open bans, because the radical claim is neutralized by the illusion that it is represented within the system. An objection voiced on the floor of parliament, if it is not linked to a perspective of structural transformation, is reduced to a demand for reform within the order. Historically, the similarity between the decisions defended with the emphasis on the “rule of law” during the conviction of Nâzım Hikmet and the justification of “protecting the constitutional order” during the executions of Deniz Gezmiş shows how state legitimacy is prioritized over revolutionary demands.
This transformation manifests itself not only at the organizational level, but also in the narrowing of the political imagination. Revolutionary politics is historically based on the imagination of a new sociality beyond the existing social order. Politics carried out within the parties of order, on the other hand, often reduces this vision to reformist projects of improvement. Thus, the revolutionary political imagination is squeezed into the framework of manageable crises and gradual reforms, moving away from the perspective of structural transformation. It is not only strategy that gets stuck; it is the horizon.
At this point, the fundamental question for the left-socialist field is this:
How will the line between existing in the field of representation and internalizing the mental boundaries of the field of representation be maintained?
Memory, Criticism and the Possibility of Re-establishment
The process of the dissolution of the revolutionary tradition in the politics of order is directly linked to the reconstruction of collective memory. The memory politics of political movements determine not only how the past is remembered, but also the political orientations of the present. Breaking moments such as the death of Sabahattin Ali, the exile of Nâzım Hikmet and the execution of Deniz Gezmiş are not only historical tragedies but also indicators of the limits of the politics of representation. When these events are reduced to symbolic commemorations and not subjected to structural critique, memory becomes depoliticized.
This is precisely the problem in a significant part of the left today: the past is either romanticized or instrumentalized by adapting it to contemporary pragmatism. When critical memory cannot be produced, history is either sanctified or used, but not analyzed. However, political loyalty is only possible through the capacity to critically analyze past experiences and adapt them to new historical conditions. Without this capacity, the claim of continuity is mere rhetoric.
This is the main risk facing left-socialist-communist parties in Turkey today. If electoral strategy begins to determine the political horizon, if alliance calculations take precedence over the program, if the concern to “look reasonable” overshadows the perspective of structural transformation, then hegemonic absorption is complete. In this case, politics ceases to be transformation and is reduced to a technique of governance. It is precisely at this point that the distance between the technique of governance and the revolutionary imagination opens up.
Today's global political order does not only suppress radical dissent; it integrates it into the realm of institutional politics and transforms it into manageable demands for reform. This shows that the crisis of the revolutionary tradition stems not only from a local but also a global hegemonic structure. The neoliberal political structure limits the demands for transformation by drawing the opposition into the mechanisms of representation within the system, thus narrowing the political imaginary.
In conclusion, the hegemonic absorption of the revolutionary tradition within the parties of order is not only an organizational change of orientation. This process means the reconstruction of memory, the narrowing of forms of representation and the limitation of political imagination. The CHP's historical legacy of authoritarian practices, its distance from the leftist opposition and the preferences that prioritize the state reflex at critical moments, when evaluated together with the pragmatic tendencies observed in current alliance politics, point to a logic of representation that carries continuity.
The question is this:
Is left politics preparing to take over power or to transform the social order?
If the second question cannot be re-centered, the political imagination of the revolutionary tradition will continue to shrink.
And politics will be reduced to a technique of governance rather than transformation.