In Turkey, the Directorate of Religious Affairs derives its legal basis from the Law No. 633 on the Establishment and Duties of the Directorate of Religious Affairs. Article 1 of the law defines the Diyanet's mission as follows:
“To carry out affairs related to the beliefs, worship and ethical principles of the religion of Islam, to enlighten the public on religion and to manage places of worship.”
Does it say in the Diyanet law that it is a Sunni institution?
No, it doesn't.
And this is where the issue starts.
Because modern states do not function solely through the text of laws. The structure we call the state exists through its institutional practices, budgetary choices, staff structures and ideological continuities. The distance between the legal text and political reality often reveals the true character of the state. The Diyanet debate points to precisely such an area: It is not a matter of narrow legal interpretation, but a question of how the state's regime of belief is constituted in Turkey.
At the textual level, neither “Sunni” nor “Hanafi” is mentioned. There is no sectarian definition. On paper, the Diyanet appears to be a supra-sectarian institution. For this very reason, to reduce the debate to the question “is it written in the law?” is to consciously or unconsciously deflect the issue.
Because here is the problem:
The law is not sectarian, the practice is sectarian.
From sermons to fatwas, from religious education curricula to the definition of places of worship, from personnel appointments to budget distribution, the actual functioning of the Diyanet has made the Sunni-Hanafi interpretation the state norm. This norm not only represents the belief of the majority; it imposes it as the only valid interpretation in the public sphere. Alevism is not recognized as an equal faith within this structure; it is either presented as a folkloric element or reduced to an administrative “social reality”. The fact that cemevis are not recognized as places of worship is not a secondary consequence of this approach, but a direct product of its institutional logic.
The issue here is not “deficient practice” or “misinterpretation”. There is a systematic, continuous and politically protected hierarchy of beliefs. This hierarchy erodes not only Alevis but also secularism itself.
Philosophy of Establishment: Why Atatürk Established the Diyanet?
At this point, it is necessary to correct a common but often distorted historical narrative. The Diyanet was established by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk not to strengthen religion, but to take it out of the hands of politics and autonomous religious power centers.
With the abolition of the caliphate in 1924, the centralized religious authority left by the Ottoman Empire was dissolved. Atatürk had two options in front of him:
Either the religious sphere would be abandoned to sects, sheikhs and political Islam,
or be placed under strict state control.
Diyanet is the product of this second choice. Atatürk's understanding of secularism was not one that multiplied religion in the public sphere, but one that limited its public influence. Religion is free in the individual sphere; clergymen are civil servants; religion is not an autonomous political force. For this reason, imams are salaried and sermons are determined centrally.
This founding logic is embodied in the first president of the Diyanet. The first President of Religious Affairs, Rıfat Börekçi, was one of the representatives of the Kemalist revolution in the field of religion. Börekçi's Diyanet did not exist to bring religion into the political sphere, but to keep religion out of the political sphere.
This difference is even more striking when compared to today. Under Mehmet Görmez, the Diyanet was invited back into the political sphere with the discourse of “moral guidance”, while under Ali Erbaş, this boundary has completely disappeared. A Diyanet profile has emerged that takes explicit political positions from foreign policy to domestic politics, from gender debates to lifestyles. This transformation goes far beyond personal preferences and represents a systematic break with the founding logic of secularism.
Today, the Diyanet is not the guarantee of secularism; it is the center of instrumentalization of secularism.
Constitution, Secularism and the Law-Practice Contradiction
The principle of secularism in the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey requires the state to be neutral towards any faith or sect. However, the de facto structure of the Diyanet is in constant and structural tension with this principle. Secularism ceases to be a principle of freedom; it becomes the state's technique of regulating and directing religion.
The picture is clear:
Law is abstract and inclusive; practice is exclusive.
Law is non-denominational; practice is mono-denominational.
This is not only a domestic law problem. Decisions of the European Court of Human Rights have clearly demonstrated that Alevis are subjected to discriminatory treatment in the context of freedom of religion. Cemevis are not “cultural differences”; they are places of worship that must be protected within the scope of freedom of belief.
Cemevis are places of worship
Cemevis are places of worship. This is not a matter of administrative interpretation, cultural definition or political discretion. The place of worship of a faith community cannot be determined by state regulations or bureaucratic classifications. This authority does not belong to the state, but to the citizens of that faith.
Just as mosques, churches and synagogues are unquestionably recognized as places of worship, cemevis are the primary places of worship of the Alevi faith. The state's failure to recognize this fact is not a deficiency, but a conscious political choice. Excluding cemevis from the status of places of worship is not a technical legislative problem; it is a state practice that establishes a hierarchy between beliefs.
For this reason, the status of cemevis cannot be negotiated, postponed with administrative regulations and temporary solutions. This status is an equal citizenship right that must be constitutionally guaranteed.
CHP, Secularism and Structural Hesitation
At this point, the position of the Republican People's Party is decisive. Despite being the founding party of secularism, the CHP has long held a statist and timid line on the Diyanet issue. Instead of radically questioning the structure, it is content with the rhetoric of “inclusiveness”. However, the problem is not inclusiveness, but inequality itself.
Özgür Özel's approach of “linking Alevis to the President” is the current expression of this mental limit. This proposal does not mean equality, but a change in the form of tutelage. Alevis demand equal citizenship, not patronage.
Alevis, Religious Affairs and the Illusion of “Equal Citizenship”
At first glance, the idea of Alevis being “represented within the Diyanet on the basis of equal citizenship” may seem reconciliatory. However, the issue is not the extent to which Alevis will be included in the Diyanet, but which belief regime the Diyanet assumes.
Equal citizenship is possible not through the recognition of a faith community within the central religious apparatus of the state, but through the state's equal distance to all faiths. The Diyanet model makes this equal distance structurally impossible. Including Alevism within this structure does not produce equality; it institutionalizes assimilation.
Alevism is not a sub-interpretation of Sunni Islam. It is a unique faith path with its own rituals, places of worship, ethics and historical memory. Therefore, bringing Alevism under the umbrella of the Diyanet is not recognizing it; it is forcing it to translate into the norms of another faith regime.
Tax, Budget and Suspension of Law
Another vital dimension of this debate is the issue of budget and taxation. The Directorate of Religious Affairs is a public institution financed by taxes paid by all citizens. Alevis contribute equally to this budget, but no institutionalized and regular resources are allocated from this budget for Alevi faith leaders, grandfathers, mothers and Alevi places of worship.
This is not only a political choice, but a clear violation of equality. On the one hand, the state collects taxes from Alevis, while on the other hand it finances only the Sunni-Hanafi practice of faith. Moreover, the rulings of the European Court of Human Rights on compulsory religion classes, the status of cemevis and public recognition have not been implemented for years.
Solution: Transform, Not Manage
At this point, the issue is clear: the problem is not technical, but regime-based.
The first way is to transfer the resources of the Diyanet, if it continues to exist, to all faith groups, including Alevis, in an equal, transparent and institutionalized manner. The minimum condition for this path is that Alevi faith leaders are granted public status, cemevis are recognized as places of worship and receive a share of the Diyanet budget.
The second path is the complete withdrawal of the state from the sphere of faith. The Diyanet should be abolished, faith communities should be organized in a civil and autonomous manner, and the role of the state should be limited to guaranteeing rights and freedoms.
All other proposals for “special status”, “binding” and “coordination” do not solve inequality; they institutionalize it.
Conclusion
The Diyanet law may not say “Sunni institution”.
But it doesn't say equal citizenship either.
This gap has produced a structural inequality that works against Alevis. It is time to eliminate this inequality, not manage it.
Enacted on January 22, the regulation, instead of confronting the demands that the Alevi community has been voicing for years, has given the politics of denial an administrative form.
The place of worship of a belief cannot be determined by regulations. Cemevis are places of worship and this fact must be constitutionally guaranteed. Compulsory religion classes should be abolished and religious education should be entirely optional.
Ignoring faith will not be tolerated.
Dissolution of identity and assimilation will not be allowed.
There will be no step back from the demand for equal citizenship.
Turkey will either become a state of law that takes secularism seriously
or perpetuate a regime that perpetuates inequality in the area of faith.
There is no third way.