The debate on secularism in Turkey has never been merely a debate on ideology; it has often been a security debate on the character of the state and the future of the Republic.
Politics in Turkey is often read through election results, party rivalries and daily polemics. However, in the political history of the Republic, some debates go beyond elections; they concern the character of the state, the direction of the regime and the future of the country.
The secularism debate is just such a debate.
Since the founding of the Republic, secularism has not only been a constitutional principle, but also a fundamental security principle that determines the direction of Turkey's modernization and the institutional structure of the state. Therefore, the issue of secularism in Turkey is often not an ideological choice, the protection of state order as the most important.
To see this approach most clearly, it is enough to look at the political debates of the 1990s. Bülent Ecevit and Deniz Baykal, the two most important political actors of that period, came from the same historical political tradition, even though they belonged to different parties.
Both were leaders carrying the political legacy of the Republican People's Party (CHP), the founding party of the Republic.
CHP Tradition and the Founding Logic of the Republic
Founded by the founding leader of the Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the CHP is not just a political party.
The CHP is also a political tradition that represents the ideological framework and state philosophy of the Republic.
The Six Arrows - Republicanism, Nationalism, Populism, Statism, Secularism and Revolutionism - are the pillars of the political architecture of the Republic of Turkey.
It is no coincidence that in 1937 these principles were incorporated into the Constitution. This step was a sign that the Republic was not only a form of government, but also a philosophy of state that it is.
The political continuity of this tradition was carried by different leaders at different stages of the Republican period.
The ’left of center“ approach put forward by İsmet İnönü in the 1960s gained a programmatic content under Bülent Ecevit, and the Party became one of the most powerful actors in Turkish politics in the 1970s with Ecevit's ”New CHP“ and the democratic left discourse he later developed. After the 1980 military intervention and the closure of political parties, it continued this political line under the umbrella of the Democratic Left Party (DSP).
Deniz Baykal took the helm of the CHP after its reopening in 1992 and became its fourth president, restoring the continuity of the founding party of the Republic in political life.
Ecevit and Baykal are therefore not just two politicians.
They are also the representatives of the secular state and the founding political tradition of the Republic.
Welfare Party, Regime Debate and February 28
In 1990s Turkey, there was a rising movement at the center of political debates: The political Islamist movement led by Necmettin Erbakan.
In Turkey, the rise of the Welfare Party was not only seen as a political competition. A significant part of the state elite saw this process a matter of the character of the regime as the most important thing in the world.
The idea that there is a tension between Turkey's secular republican model and a political Islamist political project has taken center stage in political debates.
This tension reached its peak with the February 28 process in 1997.
The February 28 process is not only a debate on military intervention. It was also interpreted as a strong political reflex to protect the secular character of the state in Turkey.
What Ecevit and Baykal have in Common
In Bülent Ecevit's government program speeches in the 1990s, Turkey's remain uncompromisingly committed to the secular and social state of law is particularly emphasized.
Ecevit also stated that Turkey is a pioneering model for secularism, democracy and equality between men and women in the Islamic world.
This approach clearly defines Turkey's political identity: Turkey is not only a Muslim society; Turkey is also is a model of a secular modern Republic.
Deniz Baykal used a more open and direct political language in this debate.
According to Baykal, secularism is not just a constitutional article. Secularism is also is a fundamental condition for the survival of the state.
Indeed, Baykal expressed this approach in the following words:
“Secularism is not just a matter of lifestyle; it is a matter of the existence of the Republic.”
For this reason, secularism is often seen in Turkey not only as a principle of freedom, but also as The security doctrine of the Republic as the most important.
AKP Era and the “New Turkey” Discourse
In the early 2000s, Turkey entered a new political era.
Founded in 2001, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power with great success in the November 3, 2002 elections.
AKP leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has often described this process in terms of “New Turkey” and “silent revolution”.
This discourse brought with it the claim that the founding political paradigm of the Republic had changed.
With the 2017 constitutional amendment, Turkey switched from a parliamentary regime to a Presidential Government Regime and the institutional structure of the state changed significantly.
What should CHP do?
This is the question that needs to be discussed today.
Is the CHP only an opposition party?
Or is he a representative of the founding political tradition of the Republic?
If the CHP takes on the latter role, it is important to recognize that the Six Arrows are not only a historical symbol, must be reinterpreted as an up-to-date political program.
Three main strategic issues emerge for the CHP today.
Re-explaining secularism: Secularism is not only the separation of religion and state; it is also the guarantee of freedoms, the rule of law and democratic order.
The relationship between republicanism and democracy: Republicanism is not only a form of government but also a political order in which sovereignty belongs to the nation and citizens are equal.
Updating the principle of revolutionism: Revolutionism does not mean defending the past, but adapting the achievements of the Republic to the conditions of the age.
However, the integrity of the Six Arrows is not limited to these three principles.
Nationalism, is not an assertion of ethnic superiority, but an expression of political unity based on common citizenship.
Populism, means that the state is not the state of certain classes, but of all citizens.
Statism is not only an economic model, but also an understanding of the state that prioritizes the protection of the public interest and social development.
When these principles are considered together, Six Arrows is not just a party program; It is the political and institutional philosophy of the Republic.
Shouldn't the CHP transform the political and institutional philosophy of the Republic into an up-to-date political program and put a barrier in front of the political line that is being substituted with the discourse of “new Turkey” and “silent revolution”?
Conclusion
Political debates in Turkey today are often conducted within the confines of daily political polemics.
However, the debate on the founding principles of the Republic points to a much deeper question: What is the character of the state and how will it be protected?
The political line represented by Ecevit and Baykal gave a clear answer to this question.
Secularism, democracy and the Republic are not merely ideological preferences; They are the condition of existence of the Republic of Turkey.
Therefore, a CHP rooted in the will to exist is not just a political party; when necessary “He is the representative of a historical political reason that also shapes the ”state".
The reincarnation of this mind It is possible with a strong CHP built on the will of existence.