At a time when debates over the CHP’s party congress, criminal cases, rulings of absolute nullity, and questions of legitimacy have intensified, Özgür Özel’s article in Newsweek, written for the international public, is noteworthy. This is because the article does not merely assess political developments in Turkey; it frames these developments within the context of NATO, Europe, and regional security, presenting them as an international issue.

The article by Özgür Özel, the CHP’s chairman who was temporarily suspended from his post, titled “Turkey’s Democratic Crisis Is Becoming a Security Crisis,” published in Newsweek on June 1, 2026, appears at first glance to be an appeal to the international community regarding the issues of democracy, the rule of law, and political competition in Turkey.

However, upon careful reading of the text, it becomes clear that this is not merely a critique of democracy; rather, it is a political discourse aimed at framing Turkey’s domestic political and legal debates as an issue of international security.

Özel’s main argument is as follows:

The democratic backslide in Turkey is no longer merely an internal matter for Turkey; it is also a matter of concern for NATO, Europe, the Black Sea region, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East, migration management, and energy security.

This claim is not merely a simple assessment of foreign policy.

This amounts to bringing Turkey’s domestic politics into the international security agenda.

In the literature on international relations, such discourse is referred to as “securitization.” Securitization refers to the framing of ordinary political and legal debates as security threats, thereby shifting them outside the realm of ordinary politics.

That is exactly what Özgür Özel has done.

Political competition in Turkey, judicial proceedings, court rulings, investigations targeting mayors, disputes over CHP conventions, and debates over internal party legitimacy are being portrayed as threats to NATO’s security, Europe’s stability, and the regional order.

Therefore, the following question is inevitable:

Is Turkey really facing a security crisis, or is Özgür Özel’s CHP trying to repackage its own legitimacy crisis using the language of international security?

Is There a Security Crisis?

In the aftermath of the Cold War, the characterization of domestic political issues in the Balkans, certain countries during the Arab Spring, and various “color revolutions” as international security concerns has evolved into discourses that legitimize intervention by external actors. For this reason, securitization is not merely an academic concept but a process capable of producing concrete political consequences.

To speak of a security crisis in a country, there must be a collapse of state authority, the constitutional order must have effectively ceased to function, a climate of widespread internal conflict must have emerged, the country’s territorial integrity must be under threat, or its foreign policy capacity must have been seriously compromised.

There are heated political debates in Turkey.

Judicial decisions are coming under heavy criticism.

Relations between the ruling party and the opposition are tense.

There is polarization in society.

However, the mere existence of these factors does not mean that Turkey is facing a security crisis.

Özgür Özel’s article also contains no concrete evidence to suggest that Turkey has failed to fulfill its NATO obligations, lost its role in the Black Sea, completely lost control of migration management, become ineffective in energy security, or seen its foreign policy capacity collapse.

On the contrary, Turkey remains a key player in the field of foreign policy.

The country that enforces the Montreux Convention in the Black Sea is Turkey.

Turkey is one of the few actors capable of engaging with both Kyiv and Moscow in the Russia-Ukraine War.

Turkey has taken on a central role in the Grain Corridor initiative.

As NATO’s second-largest military force, it maintains its strategic importance within the alliance.

Turkey remains an indispensable actor in areas such as Europe’s energy security, migration management, the balance of power in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Caucasus, the Balkans, and the Middle East.

Consequently, there is a significant disconnect between the picture of “Turkey on the path from democratic collapse to a security crisis” painted by Özgür Özel and Turkey’s actual foreign policy capacity.

To Explain Turkey’s Strategic Importance, or to Complain About Turkey?

The most critical paragraph in Özgür Özel’s article is the assertion that Turkey serves as the gateway to the Black Sea, NATO’s second-largest military power, and a crossroads between Europe, Eurasia, the Middle East, and the Eastern Mediterranean; and that, due to the role it plays in migration, energy, and regional security, the democratic collapse in Turkey will not remain confined within its borders.

At first glance, this paragraph might seem to acknowledge Turkey’s geopolitical importance.

However, when read in context, the meaning is different.

Özel is using these factors not to highlight Turkey’s strategic importance, but to portray domestic political developments in Turkey as a threat to international security.

So the message is:

“If the current political developments in Turkey continue, the consequences will affect not only Turkey but also NATO, Europe, the Black Sea, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East, energy security, and migration management.”

This language is no longer the language of the traditional opposition.

This statement is a call directed at Washington, Brussels, NATO circles, and the international media.

The logical conclusion is also clear:

If domestic political developments in Turkey threaten international security, it may be considered legitimate for international actors to exert pressure on Turkey’s domestic politics.

This is where the article’s biggest problem lies.

The opposition’s role may be to criticize allegations of lawlessness in the country, demand democracy, and defend the rule of law.

However, portraying a country’s internal political and legal debates as an international security threat is another matter entirely.

This is perceived as an attempt to lodge complaints against Turkey on the international stage and to construct a narrative conducive to generating external pressure.

The source of political legitimacy is not Washington, Brussels, Newsweek, or NATO circles.

The source of political legitimacy is the will of the nation.

The Truth About the CHP That Wasn’t Told to Newsweek

The main shortcoming of Özgür Özel’s article is that it completely ignores the crisis of legitimacy the CHP is facing internally.

The article discusses Ekrem İmamoğlu, the investigations targeting CHP mayors, the legal proceedings against the CHP leadership, and the ruling of absolute nullity.

However, the CHP’s 38th Ordinary Congress, the Istanbul Provincial Congress, the 21st Extraordinary Congress, 22nd Extraordinary Congress, YSK decisions, district election committee decisions, applications for full annulment, Article 48 of the CHP Charter, delegate accounts, notary signatures, and criminal proceedings are being kept hidden from Newsweek readers.

However, the debate is not as simple as “the ruling party is eliminating the opposition.”.

The Ankara Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office has conducted an investigation into the CHP’s 38th Ordinary Congress and has filed an indictment.

The indictment includes evidence such as witness statements, MASAK reports, correspondence from the Supreme Election Board (YSK) and district election boards, institutional correspondence, CD/DVD examination reports, and a police report.

This does not in itself mean a conviction.

However, this indicates that there is not merely political speculation at play, but a serious allegation and a case file that has been the subject of criminal proceedings.

The indictment also states that the total number of delegates at the 38th Ordinary Congress was 1,366; in the first round, Özgür Özel received 682 votes, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu received 664 votes, 18 votes were deemed invalid, a second round was held because a simple majority could not be achieved, and in the second round, Özgür Özel received 812 votes and Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu received 536 votes.

This table shows just how delicately the outcome of the convention was determined, particularly in the first round.

It is precisely this delicate balance that lies at the heart of the allegations:

Whether the will of the delegates has been compromised,

allegations of seeking personal gain,

political promises,

allegations of job placement,

claims for money or other material benefits,

whether the delegates were directed or not,

Whether an impression was created that Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu had withdrawn ahead of the second round.

All of these are subject to legal review.

Therefore, the fact that Özgür Özel made no mention of these cases when he told Newsweek that “the opposition is being eliminated through the courts” is a serious omission.

The Istanbul Provincial Congress and the Problem of Chain Legitimacy

The CHP Istanbul Provincial Congress is also at the center of this debate.

It appears that the Istanbul Provincial Congress held on October 8, 2023, has become the subject of controversy in the case before the 45th Istanbul Civil Court of First Instance, with allegations regarding jurisdiction, venue, procedure, the will of the delegates, and vote-rigging in exchange for benefits.

According to allegations, the convention was held within the boundaries of Beyoğlu despite having been reported to the Sarıyer District Election Board; it has been claimed that the delegates’ decisions were influenced by money, phones, tablets, job offers, and various material benefits; the number of votes cast at the convention and the delegate quota have also been the subject of debate.

The court ordered that the relevant election documents, prosecution files, and similar case files be submitted to the court.

This demonstrates that the matter is not merely an internal party dispute, but a serious process that is subject to judicial review.

 

 

Why is the Istanbul Provincial Congress important?

This is because delegates from Istanbul constitute a significant portion of the delegation at CHP conventions.

If there is a serious allegation of legal irregularities regarding the Istanbul Provincial Congress, this could affect not only the Istanbul provincial administration but also the legitimacy of subsequent convention processes.

For this reason, the Istanbul congresses—the 38th Regular Congress, the 21st Extraordinary Congress, and the 22nd Extraordinary Congress—are not unrelated events.

They are links in the same chain of legitimacy.

Proceedings Before the 42nd Civil Court of First Instance in Ankara and the 36th Civil Chamber of the Court of Appeals

The Ankara 42nd Civil Court of First Instance heard the cases related to the CHP’s 38th Ordinary Congress, the Istanbul Provincial Congress, and the 21st and 22nd Extraordinary Congresses together.

The trial court concluded that the cases had become moot, taking into account the extraordinary congresses and conventions held subsequently.

However, this approach is controversial.

This is because the central issue in a claim of absolute nullity is whether subsequent acts can remedy the prior legal defect.

If a convention is fundamentally invalid from the outset, the administration arising from that convention subsequently convening a new convention amounts to it controversially establishing its own legitimacy.

The intervention by the 36th Civil Chamber of the Ankara Regional Court of Appeal is therefore significant.

The 36th Civil Chamber of the Court of Appeals overturned the lower court’s decision; ruled in favor of the plaintiff; and concluded that the CHP’s 38th Ordinary Elective Congress, held on November 4–5, 2023, was null and void.

This decision shows that, contrary to the picture painted by Özgür Özel in his Newsweek article, the issue cannot be dismissed as merely an intervention by the ruling government.

The case involves a criminal investigation, an indictment, civil lawsuits, an appellate review, and a dispute over absolute nullity.

To ignore all of this and frame the issue solely as a “crackdown on the opposition” is to distort the legal reality.

The 21st Extraordinary Congress and the “Don’t Stay Silent” Strategy

The fact that the CHP leadership is proceeding with the 21st Extraordinary Congress while lawsuits regarding the 38th Ordinary Congress are still pending is also legally controversial.

Because this move has been perceived as a “rendering moot” strategy aimed at neutralizing the impact of the ongoing nullity lawsuits.

Indeed, the approach taken by the 42nd Civil Court of First Instance in Ankara—that the cases had become moot—has further fueled this debate.

However, the key question here is:

Can a government whose legal legitimacy is disputed resolve its previous shortcomings by convening a new convention?

If the 38th Ordinary Congress is null and void, the authority of the leadership formed as a result of that congress to convene an extraordinary congress, set the agenda, and manage the subsequent process also becomes subject to dispute.

For this reason, the 21st Extraordinary Congress should be viewed not as a step that brought the debate over absolute nullity to an end, but rather as one that deepened it.

The 22nd Extraordinary Congress, Article 48 of the Bylaws, and Allegations of Complete Illegality

The CHP’s 22nd Extraordinary Congress, however, is a separate topic of discussion.

The key issue regarding this convention is which provision of the bylaws governs its conduct.

The CHP Charter contains different provisions regarding extraordinary congresses and extraordinary conventions.

At the heart of the objections is the claim that Article 48 of the CHP Charter must be applied with regard to the 22nd Extraordinary Congress.

The issues discussed in this section are as follows:

Whether the convention delegates collected the required number of signatures in accordance with the proper procedure,

the authenticity of the notarized signature process,

whether the 15-day signature collection period was adhered to,

whether the collected signatures were submitted within 7 days,

How and through what process the 662 notarized signatures were collected,

The discrepancy between the General Secretary’s public statement regarding “over 1,000 signatures’ and the officially reported 662 signatures,

whether or not the discussion has strayed from the agenda,

whether the confidence vote and election processes were conducted in accordance with the bylaws,

whether the simple majority calculation should be based on those present or on the total number of members,

Whether the legal status of the Istanbul delegates affects the calculation of the convention majority.

These discussions may seem technical.

However, it actually concerns direct democratic legitimacy.

This is because the procedures by which a party convention—which determines the party’s chairperson, party assembly, and governing bodies—is convened, who casts votes, what majority is required for decisions, and the legal status of delegates form the foundation of internal party democracy.

It is alleged that, with regard to the 22nd Extraordinary Congress, the vetting process was initially conducted based on 1,309 delegates; following objections, the final number of delegates was determined to be 1,127; yet, despite this, the process for the extraordinary congress was initiated based on 662 signatures.

In this case, the following questions need to be answered:

On what number of delegates is the simple majority calculation based?

Have the Istanbul delegates been taken into account?

How were the signatures and votes of delegates who were suspended or whose legal status was in question evaluated?

Do the 662 signatures actually comply with the time, form, and submission requirements set forth in Article 48 of the CHP Charter?

Was the 15-day signature collection and 7-day submission rule followed?

If it was not implemented, why was this situation not considered a complete violation of the law?

Without answering these questions, the discourse on “democracy” remains incomplete.

Because democracy isn’t just about those in power being prepared to lose elections.

Democracy also means that opposition parties conduct their internal elections in accordance with the law.

Decisions of the Supreme Election Board and District Election Boards

The decisions of the Supreme Election Board and the district election boards are also part of the debate in this process.

The decisions of the Çankaya 4th District Election Board regarding the 22nd Extraordinary Congress and the appeals filed with the Supreme Election Board (YSK) alleging complete illegality demonstrate that this is not merely an internal party dispute.

Another notable point here is that the relationship between the election judge presiding over the convention and the body responsible for reviewing objections was also discussed.

On the one hand, the convention is being held under the supervision of the election committee; on the other hand, objections regarding the election process are being addressed within the same framework.

This situation is open to debate, particularly with regard to impartiality, recusal, oversight, and the right to an effective remedy.

The YSK’s approach to allegations of outright illegality also deserves criticism.

Because if there are serious allegations of irregularities at a political party’s convention regarding the provisions of the party charter, delegate status, the calculation of majorities, agenda restrictions, and signature requirements, dismissing these as “internal party matters” or through purely procedural assessments poses a problem in terms of democratic oversight.

Complete lawlessness is not merely a simple avenue for challenging election results.

It is an extraordinary review process designed to address serious and clear violations of the law, regardless of the time that has elapsed.

For this reason, the allegations regarding the 22nd Extraordinary Congress cannot be separated from the picture of victimhood painted by Özgür Özel in Newsweek.

An Attempt to Escape by Politicizing Crimes?

Here, it is important to make a careful distinction.

No one can be declared “guilty” without a final court ruling.

The presumption of innocence applies to everyone.

However, the presumption of innocence does not mean that pending criminal cases, indictments, witness testimonies, evidentiary arguments, and court rulings should be disregarded.

The problem with Özgür Özel’s Newsweek article lies precisely here.

Rather than explaining legal processes, the article politicizes them entirely.

There are no allegations regarding the convention.

There is no indictment.

There are no MASAK reports.

There are no witness accounts.

There is no Istanbul Provincial Congress.

There is no absolute nullity.

There is no Article 48 of the Bylaws.

There are no signatures.

There are 1,127 delegates.

There are no disputes involving the Supreme Election Board or the district election boards.

There are no applications for full annulment.

Instead, there is a single narrative: “The democratic opposition is being purged through the judiciary.”

This narrative is incomplete.

Because portraying legal proceedings entirely as a political conspiracy can amount to an attempt to obscure criminal allegations and debates over legitimacy.

In this case, the real issue is this:

Is the CHP leadership responding to legal allegations through legal channels, or is it attempting to neutralize these allegations by bringing them to the attention of the international community and framing them as political victimization?

A Picture That Does Not Align with Turkish Foreign Policy

The emphasis on Turkey’s strategic importance in Özgür Özel’s article is problematically linked to the fundamental realities of Turkish foreign policy.

Turkey is indeed a critical country in terms of the Black Sea, NATO, European security, migration, energy, the Eastern Mediterranean, and the Middle East.

However, this fact does not mean that Turkey’s domestic political debates automatically warrant international intervention.

The main pillars of Turkish foreign policy have historically been sovereignty, territorial integrity, the capacity for independent decision-making, a policy of balance, and regional influence.

Turkey’s geopolitical importance is not a tool that legitimizes foreign actors’ interference in Turkey’s domestic politics; rather, it is a factor that strengthens Turkey’s capacity to conduct an independent foreign policy.

Özel’s article, however, turns this strategic importance on its head.

Turkey’s geopolitical position is being used as an argument to make Turkey vulnerable to international pressure.

This does not align with the traditional sovereignty reflex of Turkish foreign policy.

Turkey’s foreign policy approach requires that, no matter how intense domestic political debates may be, the country not be portrayed as a security risk on the international stage; rather, issues must be resolved through Turkey’s own democratic and legal mechanisms.

For this reason, Özgür Özel’s article is not merely a piece of opposition rhetoric criticizing the government.

It is also a problematic foreign policy narrative that links Turkey’s strategic importance to the expectation of external pressure on the country.

Conclusion: Is It a Discourse on Democracy, or an Attempt to Cover Up a Legitimacy Crisis?

If democracy is truly to be defended, the first place to look is not foreign journals, but the party convention processes, which must be clarified before the law. For the call for democracy to be credible, clarity must first be established regarding internal party legitimacy debates, claims concerning delegate will, criminal cases, and rulings of absolute nullity. Otherwise, the discourse on democracy risks becoming a political communication tool that obscures the legitimacy crisis.

In Turkey, issues related to democracy, the rule of law, judicial independence, and political competition are open to debate.

The government is open to criticism.

Judicial decisions are open to criticism.

The investigations and arrests are legally questionable.

However, while all this is happening, the CHP’s internal crisis of legitimacy cannot be ignored.

The indictment regarding the 38th Ordinary Congress,

Lawsuits related to the Istanbul Provincial Congress,

Proceedings before the 42nd Civil Court of First Instance in Ankara and the 36th Civil Chamber of the Ankara Regional Court of Appeal,

the debate over absolute nullity,

The effect of leaving the 21st Extraordinary Congress without an agenda,

The debates at the 22nd Extraordinary Congress regarding the bylaws, signatures, delegates, and simple majority,

Decisions of the Supreme Election Board and district election boards,

petitions for complete illegality,

Özgür Özel demonstrates that the legitimacy of the CHP is controversial.

Given this picture, simply telling Newsweek readers that “democracy is collapsing in Turkey, and this is a security crisis for NATO and Europe” amounts to an incomplete and biased narrative.

The question is this:

Are we talking about Turkey’s democratic crisis turning into a security crisis?

Or is it an attempt by Özgür Özel’s CHP to mask its legitimacy crisis—which has been exacerbated by controversial party conventions, criminal cases, rulings of absolute nullity, and allegations of outright lawlessness—with rhetoric about international democracy and security?

Democracy is not merely a slogan used against those in power.

Democracy begins with individuals and institutions establishing their own legitimacy within the framework of the law.

Attempts by those whose legal legitimacy is disputed to use NATO, European, and international security discourse as a smokescreen for their own problems are not a defense of democracy; they are an attempt to shift domestic politics into the realm of external pressure.

What Turkey needs is not calls for foreign intervention, but transparency, accountability, and genuine democratic legitimacy within its own legal framework.