Trump's words “we are close to victory” do not change the reality on the ground.
At first glance, Donald Trump's statement “we are close to victory” in his April 1 speech appears to be a declaration of success, but his emphasis on the fact that “the war may last for another 2-3 weeks” reveals that this rhetoric is actually a political framework to cover the reality on the ground. Because if victory was really imminent, the main message to the public would have been that the war was coming to an end, not that it would drag on. Therefore, Trump's statement should not be read as a victory speech, but as a political and strategic declaration that the controlled escalation will continue.
This speech is a message to multiple addresses at the same time. First of all, to Trump's domestic political base MAGA, then to the evangelical circles and finally to the Israeli leadership, the message was given that “there is no step back from the goals”. The bottom line is this: Israel's military and political goals are not yet complete; the pressure to weaken Iran's military capacity will continue. Therefore, there has been no fundamental change in the process. On the contrary, it has become more apparent that the war will continue for a few more weeks, even if the global economic costs are getting heavier.
What is important to note is the impact of the war not only on the frontline, but also on the main arteries of the global system. Today, the Strait of Hormuz is one of the most critical transit points for world energy security. A permanent disruption in this strait, through which around 20 million barrels of oil pass daily, would not only raise energy prices, but also shake the global trade, logistics, production and consumption chains. Rising oil and natural gas prices would have a knock-on effect on fuel costs, fertilizers, air freight, sea freight, basic consumer goods and food prices. The natural consequence is a new and more severe wave of inflation around the world. As the war drags on, not only the Middle East but the whole world, from Europe to Asia, from the Americas to Africa, will be burdened by this cost.
As far as Trump is concerned, the picture is not as rosy as one might think. In the short term, he may be trying to consolidate his base with the language of war, but the political cost of this strategy will become heavier if the cost of energy and living costs are reflected more harshly on the daily lives of the American people. For Trump, who is already on fragile social and political ground, a protracted war could further erode his support ratings, exacerbate economic dissatisfaction and lead him into the November midterm elections in a weaker political climate. History has shown us time and again: Short-lived and seemingly controlled external crises, when prolonged, can weaken rather than strengthen the hand of domestic leaders.
Looking at the military equation on the ground, there are no clear signs of retreat on the Iranian front. On the contrary, it is understood that Iran is maintaining its asymmetric capacity, keeping the line of resistance alive and preparing to wage war not only through direct confrontation but also through multi-layered regional pressure mechanisms. Therefore, it would not be surprising if Hezbollah increases its offensive capacity on the Lebanese front.
Russia and China are not directly intervening militarily in Iran, but they are providing significant diplomatic, intelligence, technological and economic support. This support is “controlled” and indirect; both countries prioritize their own strategic interests (to wear down the US, to benefit from energy prices, to strengthen their alliances). This is not an “alliance” but a partnership based on interests.
A protracted war would not only mean the introduction of regional proxies, but would also make Russia and China's political and strategic support for Iran more visible. In this respect, the current crisis is not only a regional hot conflict, but also a re-hardening of great power rivalry in the Middle East theater.
From Israel's point of view, it should not be forgotten that there is not as solid a social ground as it appears from the outside. In a society that has been living with a bunker psychology for a long time, security concerns eventually lead to a questioning of the government. A protracted war increases not only military risks, but also social attrition and political pressure. Therefore, there is a strong possibility that anti-government voices within Israel will increase, new domestic political fronts will open and security-centered social pressure will become a heavier burden on the administration.
One of the most critical issues of the coming period is the Bab al-Mendep line beyond Hormuz. If there is a comprehensive attack on Iran's energy and electricity infrastructure with severe consequences in terms of international law, it will not only have regional repercussions in the Iranian theater. In such a scenario, the Houthis targeting the Bab al-Mandeb Strait becomes a very serious possibility. This would mean not only a further disruption of Red Sea traffic, but also a severe impact on oil shipments through Saudi Arabia's Yanbu Port. Such a development would add a second shock on top of the energy pressure from Hormuz and send global markets into a much more severe shake-up.
This whole picture shows that the war cannot be read solely along Iran-Israel lines. The hardening of Trump's anti-NATO rhetoric could make more visible the strategic incompatibility between Washington and the main European actors - France, the UK, Germany, Italy and the UK. This would mean not only a diplomatic rift, but a deeper fault line that would challenge the internal cohesion of the Western alliance. In short, this war is not limited to the Middle East; it also has the potential to reshape US-European relations, the balance within NATO and the global security architecture.
The most sensitive issue for Turkey is the risk of being drawn into the conflict rather than direct military confrontation. Turkey, Azerbaijan, Pakistan and the Gulf countries, as well as Azerbaijan, Pakistan and the Gulf states, must be extremely cautious against manipulations, provocations and perception operations that may be carried out to spread this war on a wider front. Especially in times of crisis, false flag operations, controlled tension scenarios and psychological warfare elements aimed at manipulating public opinion may be deployed more frequently. In this process, it is vital for Turkey to act with a patient and strategic security mind, based on multidimensional intelligence assessment and away from emotional reflexes. The best approach for Turkey is not to become a party to the tension, but to maintain the wisdom, balance and state reflex to prevent the tension from dragging the region into greater destruction.
In conclusion, Trump's April 1st speech is not a declaration of victory. It shows that the controlled escalation will continue, the war will continue for a few more weeks, the risks centered on Hormuz are growing and global markets are seriously pricing this. There is a strong likelihood that energy, logistics, inflation and security headlines will fluctuate more sharply in the coming period. It is no longer just a question of how long the war will last. The real issue is the extent to which this war will shake the global economic order, the regional security architecture and the domestic political balances of countries.
That is why the message today is clear:
This is not a victory speech, but a declaration of an ongoing escalation. And the most vital fact for Turkey is this: What is sometimes as dangerous as war in this geography is the possibility of being drawn into it. Turkey has to be careful, patient and cool-headed against provocations.