Every Minister of Justice in Turkey makes a similar emphasis: “The judiciary is independent and impartial.” This statement has a constitutional basis. However, enshrining a constitutional principle in a text is not the same as institutionally generating trust. The real issue is whether the institutional architecture that produces independence is strong enough.
Judicial independence only in the courtroom “no instructions can be given” It is not established by a provision. The mechanisms that determine a judge's appointment, promotion, disciplinary process, place of duty and personal security are as strong as the quality of those mechanisms. Independence is not a matter of declaration; it is a matter of institutional design.
In this framework, the issue should be evaluated at three main levels: the constitutional normative structure, the institutional architecture and historical-current practices.
I. Constitutional Framework: Normative Guarantee
The Constitution stipulates that judicial power shall be exercised by independent and impartial courts. It is clearly stipulated that courts cannot be given orders and instructions and that the legislature and the executive are obliged to obey court decisions. The guarantee of judgeship is backed up by impeachment and personal guarantees.
However, within the same constitutional system, the relationship between judges and prosecutors and the Ministry of Justice in terms of their administrative duties is regulated. Although this point of contact is theoretically limited to the administrative sphere, it constitutes the discussion area of institutional independence.
The most critical provision is Article 159 of the Constitution. This article defines the Council of Judges and Prosecutors as a constitutional body and grants it a wide range of authority from the admission of judges and prosecutors to the profession to their discipline. Thus, the institutional fate of the judicial power is left in the hands of a board with constitutional status.
Independence is therefore measured not only by the non-interference in the judgment of the court, but also by the structure of the body that determines the careers of members of the judiciary.
II. Institutional Architecture: Framework of Law No. 6087 and 2802
Law No. 6087 and the Powers of the CJP
Law No. 6087 on the Council of Judges and Prosecutors, on the HSK;
-
Admission to the profession,
-
Appointment and transfer,
-
Promotion and first classification,
-
Disciplinary action,
-
Suspension from duty,
-
Deciding to stay in the profession
such as the right to vote in favor of the government.
The Law states that the Board is independent in the performance of its duties. However, the fact that the chairperson of the Board is the Minister of Justice and that the executive plays an influential role in its composition brings the independence debate to a structural level.
Independence is not merely the absence of actual interference; it requires an institutional design that is closed to the possibility of interference.
Law No. 2802 and Disciplinary Regime
Law No. 2802 on Judges and Prosecutors regulates the disciplinary system in detail. Sanctions such as warning, reprimand, salary deduction, suspension of progression, relocation and dismissal from the profession directly affect the professional life of judges and prosecutors.
The existence of a disciplinary system is essential for the rule of law. However, the openness of disciplinary decisions to judicial review and the standard of justification determine the balance between independence and accountability.
As a constitutional body, the HSK's obligation to act in accordance with the rule of law is embodied here.
III. The HSK and the Binding Force of Judicial Decisions: A Concrete Test
The most concrete measure of the rule of law is the obligation to comply with judicial decisions.
The three separate annulment decisions on the HSK's refusal to provide information and documents are noteworthy in this respect:
-
The Ankara 4th Administrative Court's decision dated 21.02.2022 and numbered 2021/1131 E., 2022/364 K. annulled the HSK's refusal to provide information and documents.
This decision was finalized by the decision of the Ankara Regional Administrative Court 12th IRB dated 09.06.2022 and numbered 2022/729 E., 2022/938 K. -
Upon the HSK's re-establishment of a similar procedure, the Ankara 25th Administrative Court's decision dated 28.02.2024 and numbered 2023/1559 E., 2024/305 K. annulled the procedure once again.
With its decision dated 06.11.2024 and numbered 2024/1042 E., 2024/2185 K., Ankara Regional Administrative Court 12th İDD unanimously rejected the HSK's appeal.
-
Upon the establishment of a similar procedure for the third time, the Ankara 16th Administrative Court's decision dated 23.10.2025 and numbered 2025/624 E., 2025/1441 K. annulled the procedure again. The Court clearly stated that information and documents regarding completed examinations -except for those related to the internal functioning of the administration- should be provided to the relevant person. The file is under appeal review.
The re-establishment of transactions that have been found to be unlawful in three separate files and with decisions that have been finalized after passing through the appeal review twice, puts the appearance of the rule of law principle in practice into question.
The binding nature of the Constitution gains meaning not only in the text of norms but also in the implementation of judicial decisions.
IV. Judicial Associations and Institutional Concentration
There is a widespread perception that the largest and most influential professional organization within the judiciary is the Association for Unity in the Judiciary. There is a strong perception that members of the association hold important positions from the courts of first instance to the higher levels, from the membership of the CJP to the bureaucracy of the Ministry of Justice.
Membership to an association by itself does not constitute a violation of impartiality. However, the concentration of representation in different layers of the judicial power in a certain professional organization may be questionable in terms of institutional pluralism and balance.
Judicial independence is not only independence from the executive; it also requires institutional checks and balances against concentrations of power within the judiciary.
Impartiality is not only a matter of individual intention; it is a matter of institutional structure.
V. From Trigger Trials to Current Investigations
The Sledgehammer and Ergenekon processes were later described as “conspiracy trials”, and the existence of an organizational structure within the judiciary was revealed after the July 15, 2016 attempt. The dismissal and prosecution of thousands of judges and prosecutors showed that the institutional architecture had suffered a serious break in the past.
Recent investigations and trials - for example, the investigation and criminal cases against Istanbul Metropolitan Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, which also point to a criminal organization, the proceedings against the signatories of the secularism declaration, the investigations and criminal cases opened due to social media posts, arrest warrants issued even though there will be no time in prison even if a sentence is imposed, detentions carried out in the early hours of the morning and by the police, accompanied by media coverage, etc. - have led to public debates on political influence.
The issue here is not the merits of the cases; it is the question:
Are judicial decisions debated on their legal grounds or on their political consequences?
If the latter perception is strengthening in the public opinion, a crisis of confidence arises.
Conclusion Independence and Trust
Tjudicial independence in Turkey is strong at the constitutional text level. The normative framework is clear; there is a ban on instructions; the guarantee of judgeship is regulated; the CJP has constitutional status.
However, when the institutional architecture, historical breaks and examples in practice are evaluated together, it is possible to conclude the following:
Judicial independence in Turkey exists normatively, but is institutionally fragile.
Independence is not only the absence of direct instructions from the executive.
Independence;
-
The structure of the CJP to produce balance,
-
Transparent operation of the discipline and promotion system,
-
Full implementation of judicial decisions,
-
Protecting pluralism,
-
Failure to place critical files at the center of political debate
and it makes sense.
Considering the re-establishment of similar procedures despite three separate annulment decisions, the ruptures ranging from the conspiracy cases to the July 15 purges, and the debates around current cases, it is seen that the capacity of independence to generate institutional trust is weak.
Therefore, the most honest answer to the question is this:
The independence of the judiciary in Turkey is a constitutional principle; however, it is not institutionalized in terms of institutional design and implementation at a level to generate confidence.
Independence is measured by the system, not the declaration. Trust can only be built by practice without exception.
Therefore, it is necessary to look at the practices, not the words of the Ministers of Justice.