The year 1999 was a peak and at the same time a threshold in Turkey's foreign policy and security approach. The Ecevit IV government, which was formed on January 11th at the beginning of this year, and the Ecevit V government that followed it, represented the last complete example of an egalitarian, state-centered and national security-oriented discourse in Turkey's relations with international actors.
Bülent Ecevit was the third chairman of the Republican People's Party, founded by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk to govern the Republic of Turkey, which, even in the post-Cold War era, defined security not in abstract terms but in terms of the existence of the state and the integrity of the nation. “statesman” of a leader with the qualities of a leader. In his political language “security”, It was not a technical field hiding behind diplomatic courtesy; it became a direct subject of state will. Indeed, Ecevit's following words summarize the mentality of the period:
“The State of the Republic of Turkey has the will to continue its fight against terrorism with its own determination and strength, without the need for guidance from any external power.”
This approach became concrete in a short period of time during the Ecevit IV government that served between January 11 and May 28, 1999. Bringing Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the separatist terrorist organization PKK, who was sheltering in Syria, to Turkey in February 1999 was not only an intelligence or security success; it was also an important step for Turkey in the international system. “an equal state” Turkey has also demonstrated that it can act as itself. In this process, Turkey neither acted on the instructions of a global power nor submitted its security to the approval of other actors.
In his evaluations following Öcalan's capture, Ecevit emphasized the following statement:
“This success is the result of Turkey's determination and the strength of the Turkish state.”
It is noteworthy that neither here “international cooperation” nor “common security” is emphasized. Name of the subject “Turkish State”Dir.
Formed on 28 May 1999 and in office until 18 November 2002, the Vth Ecevit Government (DSP-MHP-ANAP Coalition) continued and even institutionalized this line. This coalition, composed of ideologically different parties, was surprisingly monolithic when it came to foreign policy and security. This is not because of a common ideology, but because of a common state reflex.
During this period, the national security discourse was not reduced to the fight against terrorism; the national army was constantly emphasized as the fundamental element of the state's sovereignty capacity. Ecevit's oft-quoted statement is meaningful in this respect:
“The Turkish Armed Forces are the guarantee of the independence and security of the Republic of Turkey.”
In this discourse, the military, beyond being an “institution”, is positioned as the founding pillar of the state. Turkish foreign policy has also been shaped on this basis. Relations with the United States and the European Union were maintained; however, at no time did Turkey use a language that delegated its security to the norms of other actors.
It is precisely for this reason that the Ecevit era of 1999-2002 stands out today as the last consistent example of Turkey's nationalist, sovereignty-centered and egalitarian foreign policy discourse.
After the November 3, 2002 general elections, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power and the discourse changed radically. National security was gradually redefined in terms of international cooperation, partnership, harmonization and multilateralism. Ambitious concepts such as “proactive foreign policy” and the “center state” were introduced; however, these concepts often functioned to make the state more dependent on international balances rather than expanding its decision-making autonomy.
While during the Ecevit era, Turkey assumed a relationship of equals with international actors, during the AKP era, Turkey has often been seen as an actor that adapts, seeks coordination and seeks to strengthen its legitimacy through external references. This difference should be read not only as a difference in policy preference but also as a difference in understanding of the state.
Foreign policy and security have increasingly become part of a leader-centered regime narrative. As the institutional language of the state has receded, personal rhetoric has come to the fore.
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan “The world is bigger than five” Although the slogan may seem like a strong appeal, this rhetoric, unsupported by institutional capacity, has not made Turkey more effective, but more isolated. Toughness has increased and diplomatic weight has decreased. Foreign policy has been transformed from an area that strengthens the continuity of the state into a domestic propaganda tool for the government.
Ahmet Davutoğlu is seen as the theoretical architect of this transformation, “Strategic Depth” with the claim of making Turkey a central country. In practice, however, this approach has led Turkey to multi-front engagements, costly crises and isolation. “Zero problems with neighbors” the rhetoric soon “simultaneous problems with neighbors” has become a reality.
While under Ecevit, state wisdom functioned even with coalition governments, the AKP era's emphasis on a single party and a single leader has not strengthened the state; on the contrary, it has increased institutional fragility. The language of national security, equality and sovereignty has given way to harmony, coordination and personal diplomacy.
In conclusion, the Ecevit Governments IV and V should be read as a period in Turkey's foreign policy and security history when the national state mind was at its peak. The question is, did Turkey become stronger in foreign policy after Ecevit, did its capacity to bring about behavioral change in other actors in the international arena and in its own region increase, or did this capacity diminish?
Turkey, “state of mind”from, “leader's mind”from institutional mechanisms to mechanisms dependent on individuals.
Today, it is inevitable for anyone who wants to critically evaluate the AKP era to rethink the Ecevit era as a point of reference.