“The repercussions of the CHP's decision not to give a member to the parliamentary delegation that will go to İmralı to meet Abdullah Öcalan as part of the ”Turkey without Terror" project continue. Meanwhile, the Yeni Yol Group, which supports the process and is a member of the parliamentary commission, also did not give a member to the delegation, but this decision was not discussed in the public opinion as much as the CHP's decision.
Judging by the reactions, there are those who find the CHP's decision right and those who find it wrong.
Especially the DEM Party and its grassroots were disappointed by the CHP's decision. As a matter of fact, Pervin Buldan's post, which she first wrote and then deleted, ‘The main opposition party is the DEM Party. Period.” was the peak of this reaction.
So what was the rationale behind the CHP's decision? Which factors influenced the decision?
There is a multi-layered answer to this question. CHP took this decision for both strategic and tactical reasons.
Let's start at the beginning of the process.
Devlet Bahçeli's statement on October 22, 2024 “If his isolation is lifted, let him come and speak at the DEM Party meeting in Parliament. Let him shout that terrorism is over and the organization is disbanded” One day after his call, CHP Chairman Özgür Özel, “Mr. Devlet, I'm going one step further, I'm raising my hand, I'm offering a state to the Kurds” In this way, he both supported the process and signaled that the CHP was ready for further demands in the process initiated by Bahçeli.
However, over time, there have been fluctuations in the CHP's approach to the Turkey Without Terror process.
The first break came after President Erdoğan's prolonged silence in the face of Bahçeli's call. At the time, the CHP leadership often “Why is Erdoğan silent, let him come out and explain whether he supports the process or not” calls came in.
This was undoubtedly due to the CHP's confusion about the ‘Terror Free Turkey’ process.
At the beginning of the process, the dominant view in the CHP was that this process was a tactical political step taken by Tayyip Erdoğan to become president for one more term. With this step, Erdoğan would both remove the obstacle to his candidacy by obtaining the constitutional amendment he wanted or a decision to renew the parliamentary elections with the support of the DEM Party, and regain the support of Kurdish voters who had gradually distanced themselves from him and his party since 2015.
The second, non-dominant view in the CHP was that the ‘Turkey without Terror’ project was a state policy and should be supported.
But in this case, another ‘problem’ arose.
If the process was successful, who would get the biggest share of the ‘political benefits’?
The strong belief that President Erdoğan would reap the biggest share of the benefits has led to an ambivalent attitude towards the process on the part of the CHP and its media.
In fact, it was precisely for this reason that MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli was chosen as the architect of the ‘Turkey without Terror’ project.
Bahçeli was not chosen just to convince the nationalist base. He was chosen because he was the only political leader who would not take into account the ‘political benefits’ if the process succeeded or the ‘political costs' if it failed.
Don't be misunderstood, this is not because ‘other leaders think about their political future, Bahçeli thinks about the country’.
In the new system established with the constitutional amendment in 2017, the task assigned to the TSK by the old regime was given to the MHP.
What was that mission? ‘Protecting and balancing the regime’
The asymmetrical power of Devlet Bahçeli, regardless of his vote, is directly related to this reconstruction of the regime.
Nitekim MHP, DSP’nin % 22.19 oyla birinci olduğu 1999 seçimlerinde %17.98 oy alarak koalisyon ortağı olduğu 56. Hükümette sahip olduğu gücün kat be kat üstünde bir güce, sadece %10’luk oy oranı ve ‘Cumhurbaşkanlığı Hükümet Sistemi’ gibi şeklen Cumhurbaşkanının tek güç olarak tanımlandığı sistemde ulaştı.
Let's close the long parenthesis and return to the CHP's decision not to include a member in the İmralı delegation.
During the 18th meeting of the parliamentary commission on sending a delegation to İmralı, CHP members left the meeting.
Deputy Group Deputy Chairman Murat Emir, one of the CHP's commission members, explained his party's decision not to include a member in the İmralı delegation.
In his statement, Emir said:
“At a time like this, when we need to find solutions to these problems in order to ensure our internal peace, our nation does not consent to the whole issue being squeezed into the issue of whether or not to go to İmralı. Defining this decision as a sine qua non, as a historic crossroads and as the only option is incompatible with the purpose of the Commission's establishment. ..
... Instead of only 5 MPs going to the Island without even the Chairperson of our Commission, it is possible to manage an easier, more participatory and more non-controversial process by utilizing technological means...”
He went on to explain the other reasons for this stance as follows:
“We would like to remind you: Today, the Republican People's Party, which everyone is waiting to see what it will say, is facing a closure case. 16 elected mayors and the Presidential Candidate are in prison. Women, children and families are being persecuted. But despite everything, our Party remains in this commission, hoping for democracy, peace and a solution. If the hopes for peace of this nation are once again wasted by personal ambitions and ambitions as it was 10 years ago, the Republican People's Party will continue to stand firmly where it stands.”
The CHP's decision was criticized by the Kurdish political movement, liberal circles that have recently joined the CHP, and some circles within the CHP that advocated for their party to act more courageously and be a playmaker in the solution of the Kurdish issue.
On the other hand, all eyes turned to the statement from Silivri after the verdict.
What would Ekrem İmamoğlu, the CHP's presidential candidate on paper, say about this decision?
As a matter of fact, the silence that lasted for 2 days after the CHP's decision created expectations that ‘there would be a criticism of the decision from Silivri’.
On November 23, the Presidential Candidate Office (@CAOIletisim) account opened for Ekrem İmamoğlu made a statement regarding the CHP's decision.
In his 3-page statement supporting the CHP's decision, İmamoğlu explained his reasoning as follows:
“The reasons for our party's non-participation in the commission's proposal to “meet Abdullah Öcalan in Imrali Prison” should be well understood. As CHP, we have been in favor of the solution of the Kurdish issue since day one and we will continue to do so. However, we do not find it right to contribute to the continuation of the process in ways and methods that do not receive the approval of the majority of the nation. Unless democratization steps are taken to show that the government takes the process seriously and the nation is made a part of the process, the CHP will continue to contribute to the process in a cautious manner.
The imprisonment of many mayors and politicians, the trustees appointed to municipalities and the politics of hostility towards the opposition, the non-recognition of ECtHR and Constitutional Court judgments and The approach of Mr. President, who has refrained from strongly defending the process, are the biggest obstacles to this critical process. The way, method and medicine for the process is democratization and a democratic solution based on equal citizenship.”
Despite the CHP administration's statement, Ekrem İmamoğlu's statement, and even the AK Party, which is the main contractor of the project “this is a supra-political issue” But it clearly shows the reality that politicians cannot look at any issue above politics.
I have explained above why I exclude Bahçeli from this picture.
Just when it was being said that “CHP's İmralı decision was taken with the full harmony of CHP administration and İmamoğlu”, a completely different development took place.
According to a report by Ceren Bayar in T24, which has not been denied so far; “Ekrem İmamoğlu, the arrested presidential candidate of the CHP, initially expressed the opinion that a visit to İmralı was necessary, but after talks he said he would respect the party's decision.”
Well, when we look at the CHP's practices since November 2023, I leave it to the readers' discretion how possible it is for the current party administration to take a decision that Ekrem İmamoğlu does not agree with and for İmamoğlu to agree with this decision.
Then why did Özgür Özel, who said “I raise my hand and promise the Kurds a state”, take an opposing stance on the İmralı meeting, which all interlocutors agreed on for the continuation of the process?
Let me first state my opinion and then I will explain my reasons.
In my opinion, this decision is not ’a decision taken by the CHP administration that İmamoğlu had to comply with‘ as claimed in the news article in T24, on the contrary, it is a decision taken by İmamoğlu in Silivri that the CHP administration had to comply with.
The rationale is purely political tactics.
Let's go back a little bit.
Özgür Özel was asked the question “Will you be a presidential candidate?” after the CHP congress in which he was elected CHP chairman, “There are two strikers in the team right now. One is Mansur Yavaş and the other is Ekrem İmamoğlu. But many new figures are also shining. It is important to build the best team from these names. When a penalty is awarded in the last minute of the match, the coach does not say, ‘Let me take it’. He'll give it to his most in-form player. “ he replied.
This sentence not only gave a perspective on the CHP's method of nominating a presidential candidate, but also condemned Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu's candidacy for the presidency in 2023 (even though that candidacy was agreed upon by Özgür Özel and the entire party leadership of that day).
Of course, in politics, the maxim ‘yesterday is yesterday, today is today’, although it is attributed to Süleyman Demirel, is in fact an immutable rule.
As a matter of fact, in time, Ekrem İmamoğlu's candidacy became impossible, first with the cancellation of his diploma and political ban, then with the IBB investigation and arrest warrant.
Although the CHP leadership referred to İmamoğlu as ‘our presidential candidate’, alternative formulas started to come to the fore over time.
Actually, the alternative candidate was obvious in this situation. When one of the strikers was out of the game, Mansur Yavaş was left as the ‘striker to score the penalty’.
However, the process did not work like that. As the possibility of İmamoğlu's candidacy weakened, the possibility of Özgür Özel's candidacy began to strengthen. Some polling companies close to the CHP started to serve polls showing that Özel received more votes than Mansur Yavaş against Erdoğan.
The concert investigation into Mansur Yavaş has further strengthened the hand of those in and around the CHP who support Özel's candidacy.
For the first time in the 5th month of his detention, Imamoğlu admitted that there could be a candidate other than him:
“I am not naive. If I am officially banned, the democratic opposition must still come together. If another candidate is needed to move forward, that person must continue our shared vision for justice, prosperity and peace”
This statement did not mention a name, nor did it hint at Mansur Yavaş, who was described as the second striker.
“The question ”what does this have to do with the CHP's decision on İmralı?" must have come to your mind, and it is natural to do so.
At the beginning of this article, we pointed out that one of the main concerns of politics is who will get how much share of the ‘political benefits’ that will emerge if the ‘Terror Free Turkey’ process is successful.
Özgür Özel's recent policies, his support for the process and his rhetoric of ‘I promise you a state’ to Kurdish voters have gradually increased his support and popularity in this neighborhood.
On the other hand, Mansur Yavaş's political identity and his hesitant attitude towards the process made Özgür Özel stronger in the search for a ‘winning candidate’ against Mansur Yavaş for the CHP, which is seeking the votes of Kurdish voters for the presidential election.
Undoubtedly, the most important point for Ekrem İmamoğlu is for the CHP to enter the elections with a candidate who will win in the equation in which he is not a candidate. The only option for İmamoğlu, who thinks that his detention in Silivri and political ban will not end as long as the People's Alliance continues to rule, is a CHP government.
The priority of Imamoğlu's politics at this stage is to regain his freedom.
And then to take the presidency, which he aspires to.
So why do I think Imamoğlu is the one who made this decision that will lead to confronting Kurdish voters instead of getting their support?
That's where the tail of the cat is breaking.
Although Özgür Özel's popularity has increased recently, all objective surveys show that Mansur Yavaş has a better chance of winning against Erdoğan.
In fact, Imamoğlu's move is based on the simple equation that the CHP's decision to ‘not go to İmralı’ caused Özgür Özel's favorable ratings among Kurdish voters to be erased with a single move, while the nationalist votes that opposed the process and turned to the İYİ Party and Zafer Party after the CHP's decision to join the commission returned to the CHP.
With this move, İmamoğlu has also paved the way again for Mansur Yavaş to be the strongest candidate for the CHP in the elections that I think will be held in November 2027.
While the first reason for this is undoubtedly ‘to ensure electoral victory’, the tactical move was also made with the next phase in mind.
As you know, Ekrem İmamoğlu's political support is not largely due to the policies he has put forward, “The political leader who will defeat Tayyip Erdoğan” as a political candidate. Otherwise, how else can one explain the fact that everyone from socialist parties to fugitive FETÖ members lined up behind İmamoğlu?.
So in a scenario where Özgür Özel wins against Tayyip Erdoğan in the elections to be held in 2027, would Ekrem İmamoğlu win his freedom? Most likely.
But does he have a chance of becoming president? I think not even % 1.
As a matter of fact, Imamoğlu knows best that Özgür Özel, who has already defeated Erdoğan at the ballot box and is 3 years younger than him, will not step aside and say to İmamoğlu ‘come and run the country’ with this power he will gain.
Mansur Yavaş, on the other hand, is a political actor who, even if he wins against Erdoğan and is elected as the president, is expected to end his political life after a maximum of one term as the “13th president of the Republic of Turkey who returned the country to the democratic parliamentary system”.
Imamoğlu recently told Mansur Yavaş “He should not give up on his candidacy” If we also take into account the claim that he sent a message, we can see more clearly that Ekrem İmamoğlu's signature is under the CHP's İmralı decision.